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INTRODUCTION
"[G]eography  is fate."'  Dred Scott could testify to the truth of this
observation,2  as  could  the children  of the impoverished  school  districts
that  lost  in  San Antonio Independent School District v.  Rodriguez.'
Throughout  our  history,  arbitrary  geographical  boundary  lines  have
made  tremendous  differences  to  the lives  of innocent  people.  In  other
contexts,  equal  protection  has served as a defense  against  arbitrary  de-
nials of liberty.  How  then does  equal  protection  mitigate  the influence
that political  geography  exerts over  our destinies?
Geographical  classifications  are very  common  in our legal  system.
Municipal ordinances,  zoning laws,  state "special"  legislation and local
option  laws,  federal  statutes  that  apply  differently  in different  states,
residence  requirements,  choice  of  law  rules,  and  circuit  conflicts  are
Grossfeld,  Geography and Law, 82  MICH.  L. Rzv.  1510,  1512  (1984).
S See Scott v. Sandford,  60 U.S. (19  How.)  393 (1857).  Scott lost  in his claim that
after  returning  to  a  slave  state  from  a  free. territory  he could  no  longer  be held  in
bondage.
3 411  U.S.  1 (1973).  The  children  lost in their  claim  that Texas  owed  them  an
education  equal  to that  provided  to children  in  wealthier  districts.
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only  some  of the techniques  by which  our rights  are  made  to vary  de-
pending  on  where  we  are  or  where  we  live.  We  frequently  take  the
differences  created  by  these  techniques  for  granted,  but  when  these
techniques  are  applied  to  legal  regulation  of constitutionally  protected
activities,  we  should  think  more  carefully  before  accepting  the  differ-
ences  that  result.
Some  legal  discriminations  turn  expressly  on place  of  residence;4
such  discriminations  have sparked  much scholarly  comment  when they
disfavor out-of-staters. 5 Other discriminations  are defined by geograph-
ical factors  different  from residence and affect  residence  classes  at most
indirectly. These discriminations,  which I will call "territorial,"  will be
the major  focus of this  article.
Territorial  discriminations  can arise in many  ways.  Take, for  ex-
ample, a simple problem of libel. The Supreme Court has held that the
states may  impose  civil  liability  for  negligent  defamation  of  a  private
figure, though  they are not required  to do so.6 Liability  for unintended
falsehoods  places  serious  burdens  on  first  amendment  rights.  Suppose
that the  State of New  York  enacted  a statute  making  the standard  of
liability  for libel  negligence if the libel were communicated  within New
York  City, but  actual  knowledge  of falsity in the  rest of the state.  Or
that  the courts of New  York imposed the negligence  standard for libels
communicated  within the state, but other rules  for libels  communicated
elsewhere.  Or that the City of New York  adopted  an ordinance creat-
ing  liability  for  negligent  defamation,  even  though the state  law stan-
dard was recklessness.  Or that Congress  enacted a libel statute applying
only  within the District  of Columbia,  or only  within the  states of the
old  Confederacy. In each case, a territorial  discrimination has  been cre-
ated,  setting different  standards of conduct for the exercise  of communi-
cative  activity  in  different  places.  Should  any  of these  be  regarded  as
offensive  to  the principle of equal  protection?
Courts have often regarded territorial  discriminations  as inherently
For important  earlier  analyses of residence  classifications  reaching  conclusions
different  from  those  I  will  describe,  see  Harvith,  The Constitutionality of Residence
Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54  CALIF.  L.  REv.  567
(1966);  Horowitz  & Neitring, Equal Protection  Aspects of Inequalities  in Public Edu-
cation and Public  Assistance Programs  from Place  to Place Within a State, 15 UCLA
L.  REv.  787  (1968).
5  See, e.g.,  Antieau, Paul's  Perverted  Privileges  or the True Meaning of the Priv-
ileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four,  9 WM.  & MARY  L. REV.  1 (1967);  Ely,
Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting  Its Own,  23  WM.  & MARY  L.
REV.  173  (1981);  Simson,  Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV,  128 U.  PA.  L.  REv.  379  (1979);  Varat, State
"Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U.  CH.  L. REV.  487  (1981).
'  See  Dun  & Bradstreet,  Inc.  v.  Greenmoss  Builders,  105  S. Ct. 2939,  2944-46
(1985);  Gertz v.  Robert Welch,  Inc., 418  U.S.  323,  347-48  (1974).
1987]264  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW
innocuous.  For example,  when the public  school  system  of Prince  Ed-
ward  County, Virginia was  shut down  to avoid the prospect of desegre-
gation,  the United  States Supreme  Court  observed:
[T]here  is  no  rule that counties,  as  counties,  must  be treated
alike; the Equal Protection  Clause relates to equal protection
of the  laws  "between  persons  as such  rather  than  between
areas."  ...
A  State,  of course,  has  a wide  discretion in  decid-
ing  whether  laws  shall  operate  statewide  or  shall  operate
only in certain  counties, the legislature  "having  in mind the
needs  and desires  of each."
7
In  fact,  though  the modern  Supreme  Court has  invalidated  territorial
discriminations  on numerous  occasions,8 it has never openly confronted
the question of when  territorial  discriminations  can raise equal protec-
tion problems,  and  its opinions are spotted with citations to older cases
holding  that they  never can.  The  absence  of a self-conscious  approach
to these  problems becomes  a significant  handicap when courts confront
unfamiliar  configurations  of territorial  discrimination.  For  example,  a
broad inquiry into the question of territorial  discrimination  illuminates
some traditional conundrums of conflict  of laws9 and even sheds an un-
usual  light  on  the  Supreme  Court's  exercise  of  its  certiorari jurisdic-
tion.10  Similarly,  it provides  guidance in the  confused  area of claims  of
congressional  discrimination  against the District  of Columbia." 1
7  Griffin v.  County  School Bd.,  377 U.S.  218,  230-31  (1964)  (quoting Salsburg v.
Maryland, 346  U.S.  545, 551-52  (1954)).  It is true that the Court went on to hold that
abolishing public schools  in order  to avoid desegregation  was action  for  an illegal pur-
pose  and  therefore  unconstitutional,  see  id.  at  231-32,  but  it  is  interesting  that the
Court assumed so easily that Virginia could have  abolished public education in a single
county if its  reason  had  not been  unlawful.
s Less  than  a  month  after  its  decision  in Grjffin,  the Court  struck  down  Ala-
bama's allocation of legislative seats among its counties,  insisting that "[t]he  Equal Pro-
tection Clause  demands  no less than substantially  equal state  legislative  representation
for all citizens,  of all  places  as well as all races."  Reynolds  v. Sims,  377 U.S.  533, 568
(1964).  One might  ask  whether this  holding  made equal protection  operate  "between
areas"  rather than  "between  persons  as  such."
0 See infra notes  224-98  and  accompanying  text.
10  See infra notes 340-48  and accompanying  text.
The  D.C.  Circuit  has struggled  over  the  years  with  claims  that  congressional
"discrimination"  against  the  District  of Columbia  violates  equal  protection  and  has
been  unable to  achieve*  consensus  on whether  such discrimination  can  ever exist. Com-
pare United  States  v.  Cohen,  733  F.2d  128  (D.C.  Cir.  1984)  and United  States  v.
Greene,  489  F.2d  1145  (D.C.  Cir.  1973),  cert. denied,  419  U.S.  977  (1974)  with
United States v. Thompson, 452  F.2d 1333  (D.C.  Cir. 1971).  In a later section,  I will
argue  that, although the  problem  is complex,  there are situations where  equal protec-
tion principles  may  condemn  congressional  discrimination  against the  District. See in-
fra notes 385-418  and  accompanying  text.
[Vol.  135:261TERRITORIAL  DISCRIMINATION
In  this  Article,  I  would  like  to  examine  the  law  and  theory  of
equal  protection  as  it  relates to  discriminations  in the  scope of funda-
mental  rights  on  the  basis  of geographical  factors.  I  will  argue  that,
contrary to some  old cases and some recurring dicta,  territorial discrim-
inations  should  not  be  wholly  exempt  from  equal  protection  analysis.
In  particular,  territorial  discriminations  impinging  upon  fundamental
rights  should presumptively  be  subject to the  same heightened  scrutiny
as any other fundamental  rights discriminations.  Certain forms of terri-
torial  discrimination  that  would  not  withstand  heightened  scrutiny,
however,  are  intimately  linked  to  the operation  of self-government  in
our  federal  system.  As  courts  have  long  observed,  toleration  of  these
forms  of territorial  discrimination  accommodates  processes  of  political
self-determination  that  our  society  values  highly.  The  familiar  tension
between  liberty  and  equality  manifests  itself  here  in  the  conflicting
claims  of  local  self-determination  and  territorial  nondiscrimination.  I
will argue  that the tension should  be resolved  in this context by  recog-
nizing that forms  of territorial  discrimination  resulting  from local self-
determination  are  truly exceptional.  For reasons  that  are partly  theo-
retical and partly historical,  normal  equal protection  analysis should be
modified  in  these  exceptional  cases  so  as  to  excuse  the  resulting  dis-
crimination  from  heightened  scrutiny. 2  This  modification  would  pre-
serve  our  traditions  of  local  self-determination  while  maintaining  a
proper  vigilance  toward other  forms  of territorial  discrimination.
Part I of this Article sets out a suggested framework for evaluating
geographical  discriminations  under  the  equal  protection  clause.  Part
I(A)  poses  the  problem  by  describing  the  curious  history  of  the  Su-
preme  Court's  attitudes  toward territorial  discrimination  over the past
century. Part I(B)(1)  then sets out the needed  foundation regarding the
much  criticized  doctrine  of fundamental  rights  equal  protection.  With
this  foundation  in  place,  Part  I(B)(2)  explains  the  difference  between
residence  discrimination  and  location  discrimination.  This  part  con-
cludes  that, in the context  of fundamental  rights,  both  raise legitimate
equal  protection  concerns  where they  commonly  have been  overlooked.
The framework then begins.  Part I(B)(3) states a general proposi-
11  Among the libel examples  discussed above, I would encourage  close scrutiny  of
the discrimination  by the New  York state legislature  against New  York City and of the
discrimination  by  Congress  against  the states of the  old Confederacy.  I would discour-
age  close  scrutiny  of the discrimination  resulting  from  the New  York  City ordinance
and of the  statute applying  only in  the District  of Columbia.  Assuming  that the  dis-
crimination  practiced  by  the  New  York  courts  resulted  from  the application  to  each
case of the law of the jurisdiction where  the libel was communicated,  I would discour-
age close scrutiny;  otherwise I would be in  favor of it. The reasons for these conclusions
will become  clear  later in this  Article.
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tion-geographical  discriminations  affecting  fundamental  rights  are
subject  to heightened  scrutiny-while reserving judgment on geographi-
cal  discriminations  whose  contours  coincide  with  political  boundary
lines. Parts I(B)(4)-I(B)(7)  address four typical  categories of geograph-
ical  discrimination  along political  boundary  lines  and  the  specific  con-
texts  within  each  category  where  fundamental  rights  equal  protection
questions  may  arise. 3  In some  of these  specific  categories,  I  will con-
clude  that  the  discriminations  should  be  subjected  to  heightened  scru-
tiny, which they  will normally  fail. In other categories, however,  I will
argue  that  the normal  equal  protection  analysis  should  be modified  to
excuse  the discrimination  from heightened  scrutiny in the name  of po-
litical  self-determination.
Finally,  in  Part  II, I  apply  the framework  set  out  above  to  two
vexing examples-a  claim of discrimination  by the  federal  government
against  the District  of Columbia  and the claims  of intrastate discrimi-
nation  on  which  school  finance  litigation  is  founded.  In  both  cases  I
conclude  that  focusing on the problem  of local self-determination  is es-
sential  to  achieving  a persuasive  resolution  of the  claims.
13  A  more  detailed  description  of the  framework  may  be  in  order.  Part  I(B)(4)
considers the discriminations resulting when  two cities within the same state adopt dif-
ferent measures;  I argue that the  universal  practice of utterly ignoring  such discrimina-
tions requires  more explanation than  is generally thought. After exploring the forms  of
discriminatory state action  cognizable under the equal protection clause, I  conclude that
contrasting municipal  approaches  to  fundamental  rights are a very  special  category  of
state action  that  is  excused from heightened  scrutiny  in  order  to  further  the constitu-
tional value  of local  self-determination.  This conclusion  is key  to the rest of the Article;
thereafter I will  argue in  other contexts  that certain kinds  of geographical  discrimina-
tion  similarly  serve  to  effectuate  local  self-determination  and  should  similarly  be  ex-
cused  from  heightened  scrutiny.
In Part  I(B)(5)  I  consider  state  governmental  discriminations  based  upon  state
boundary lines, with particular attention to problems of discrimination in choice of law.
After  a necessary  plunge  into the lore of the  privileges and immunities  clause, I articu-
late a method  for determining  which interstate discriminations operate  to preserve  self-
determination and should therefore be  excused  from heightened  scrutiny, while leaving
the others  to the  usual  fundamental  rights equal  protection analysis.
In Part I(B)(6)  I consider state  governmental  discriminations based upon  political
boundary lines within the state and try to identify the forms of intrastate discrimination
that further  local  self-determination  and  should therefore  be  excused  from heightened
scrutiny.
In  Part I(B)(7)  I address geographical  discriminations by the federal  government.
I  conclude  that  federal  geographical  discriminations  should  normally  be  subject  to
heightened  scrutiny,  but  that certain  forms  of federal  incorporation  of state law  pre-
serve  the state's  opportunities  for  self-determination  and  should  therefore  be  excused
from  heightened scrutiny.
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I.  A  FRAMEWORK  FOR  EVALUATING  GEOGRAPHICAL
DISCRIMINATIONS
Legal  distinctions based on geography may  be divided initially into
two categories.
14 One category,  which I will call "explicit  residence  dis-
criminations,"  consists of distinctions that turn expressly on the place of
residence  of the  affected  groups.  The  other category,  which  I will  call
"territorial  discriminations,"  consists  of distinctions based on geograph-
ical  factors  different  from  residence,  such  as  the  identity  of the  land
forming the location of the regulated  conduct, the situs of things, or the
seat  of institutions, and  affect  residence  classes  at most  indirectly.  Be-
cause they have evoked  less study, I will make this second  category, the
"territorial  discriminations,"  the major focus of attention. I should state
at the outset, however,  that this Article will not be advocating that sig-
nificant emphasis should be placed on the differences  between residence
and  territorial  discriminations  for  the  purposes  of  equal  protection
analysis.
A.  A  Page of History
Two  contradictory  approaches  to  territorial  discriminations  have
competed for judicial attention  over the years. The Supreme  Court dis-
posed of many  claims of discrimination by flatly denying that territorial
classifications  are subject  to  equal protection  scrutiny  at all.15  In other
cases, that same Court treated territorial  classifications  as susceptible to
the usual rationality review  but upheld them on the merits16 or applied
more stringent scrutiny because  fundamental  rights were at stake.17  Al-
though this second  approach  has  dominated the  Court's  analysis  since
early in this  century,  it has  not yet  fully  silenced  its  rival.
The  Court first analyzed the problem  of territorial  discriminations
in  1880,  in  the  case  of Missouri v.  Lewis.18  Frank  Bowman  was  an
14  I believe it was the American sociologist Robert Benchley  who observed that the
world  is  divided  into  two  categories  of people,  those who  divide  everything into  two
categories  and those who  don't.
15  See, e.g.,  Hayes v. Missouri,  120 U.S.  68 (1887);  Barbier v.  Connolly, 113 U.S.
27  (1885).  Other  cases  taking this approach  are  cited in  notes  29,  30, and  41  infra.
"  See,  e.g.,  Reinman  v.  City  of Little  Rock,  237  U.S.  171  (1915).  Other  cases
taking this approach  are  cited in notes  38,  42,  and 56 infra.
17  See,  e.g.,  Reynolds  v.  Sims,  377  U.S.  533  (1964).  Other cases  taking this  ap-
proach  are  cited  in notes  62-64 infra.
16  101  U.S. 22  (1880).  The Court had previously confronted  a city ordinance ap-
plying only to a single named  railroad company and upheld it against equal protection
attack  on  the  grounds  that  the  company  was  the  only  one operating  on  a particular
street and  that local  conditions on that street might  require special  measures. See Rail-
road  Co.  v.  Richmond,  96 U.S.  521,  529  (1878).
1987]268  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW
attorney  disbarred  by  the  Circuit Court of St.  Louis County.  Missouri
law channeled  most appeals  from  St.  Louis  and three other counties to
the St. Louis Court of Appeals instead of the state supreme court. Bow-
man complained  that attorneys disbarred in other counties could appeal
directly  to the state Supreme  Court,  while he  was deprived  of "the su-
periority  of  [its]  wisdom  and  power."19
The Lewis Court  denied that the equal protection  clause was  even
relevant  to  Bowman's  situation,  reasoning  that  the fourteenth  amend-
ment was  never  intended  to  limit the flexibility  of the  states  in  parcel-
ing out authority  to  political  subdivisions.2°  In  fact, the Court went  so
far as  to insist that  "there  is nothing in the Constitution to prevent  any
State  from  adopting  any  system of laws or judicature  it  sees  fit  for all
or any part of its territory."2  In the Court's opinion, the equal protec-
tion clause  meant only that  "no  person or class of persons shall  be  de-
nied  the same protection  of the laws  which is enjoyed  by  other persons
or  other  classes  in  the  same place  and  under  like  circumstances.
22
Since  laws  can  vary  from  state to  state,  the Court  saw  "no  solid  rea-
son" 23 to restrict  such  variations within  a state. Thus, a state conceiva-
bly could adopt the  common law for one portion  of its territory  and the
civil  law  for another  portion.24
The Court did recognize one possible  situation in which  a territo-
rial distinction  might  offend  the equal protection  clause:  if the  classifi-
cation "might  be intended as,  or might have the effect of, a discrimina-
tion against a  particular  race or  class, where  such  race or class  should
happen to be the principal occupants  of the disfavored  district. '25 Bow-
man  himself could  make  no  such  claim.
Several  strands  can  be discerned  in  the Lewis opinion.  First,  the
Court observed  that convenience,  if not necessity, required that the state
be permitted  to regulate  local  affairs  by  creating  political  subdivisions.
Thus,  some  territorial  distinctions  in government  structure  are clearly
justified; this is all the case  itself involved.  Second,  differing local  condi-
'9 Lewis,  101  U.S.  at 27.
20  See id. at 30.
21  Id. at 31.
22  Id. (emphasis  added).
23  Id.
24  For example,  a state that had received  additional territory newly  acquired from
Mexico would  have  strong cause  to do  so, but  a state like  New York  could follow  the
same course  if it  saw  fit. See id. at  31-32.
25  Id. at 32. In other words, a putatively territorial classification  might turn out to
be a  cover  for  racial  discrimination.  Cf  Gomillion  v.  Lightfoot,  364  U.S.  339  (1960)
(altering boundaries  of City of Tuskegee from  a  square  to  an "uncouth  twenty-eight
sided  figure"  that  excluded  almost  every  black  voter  would  violate  fifteenth  amend-
ment);  see also infra notes  35-37 and accompanying  text  (discussing state discrimina-
tion  against  out-of-staters).
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tions  might  sometimes  call  for  geographical  variations  in  substantive
law.  These  variations  also  would  not  violate  equal  protection.  Going
beyond  these examples, the  Court announced  its broader principle-all
territorial  distinctions  are automatically  lawful, unless  they  are  rooted
in discrimination  against some  race or class not geographically  defined.
The breadth  of the Court's  language  is  understandable  in histori-
cal context.  Equal protection  doctrine was then in its first decade.  Only
seven  years had  elapsed since  the Court,  in  its first confrontation  with
the  new  equal  protection  clause,  had  intimated  that  the  fourteenth
amendment  forbade  only racial  discrimination.26  The  Court had  since
shown  a willingness to  expand the clause's  application  and was work-
ing on a doctrine  that would permit nonracial  legislative  classifications,
so  long  as  everyone  coming  within  the  terms  of  the  statute  fared
equally.27  Later, as the vacuity of this formulation  became evident, the
Court would find  it necessary to examine the "reasonableness"  of clas-
sifications.2"  This had  not yet happened  in 1880.
For  several  decades,  the  precedential  authority  of Lewis  impeded
re-analysis  of  territorial  classifications  under  the  new  reasonableness
test. The Court upheld  local variations  in governmental  structure  and
procedure29  and  legislation  limiting  business  activities  in  certain  geo-
graphical  areass  without  examining  their  rationality.  Some  of  the
26  See  Slaughter-House  Cases,  83  U.S.  (16  Wall.)  36  (1873).
27  See,  e.g.,  Kentucky  R.R. Tax Cases,  115  U.S.  321,  337 (1885)  (application to
all  railroad property);  Barbier v. Connolly,  113 U.S.  27, 31-32  (1885)  (application to
all  public  laundries in certain  portions  of city); see generally Oregon v. Mitchell,  400
U.S.  112, 241 (1970)  (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discuss-
ing development  of equal protection  doctrine);  Tussman  & tenBroek, The Equal Pro-
tection of the Laws, 37  CALMF.  L. REv.  341,  342,  345 & n.12 (1949)  (same).
2  See,  e.g.,  Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165  U.S.  150,  155  (1897).
29  See,  e.g.,  Gardner v.  Michigan,  199 U.S. 325,  333  (1905)  (quoting Lewis) (al-
lowing different  process for compiling jury lists in one county); Mallett v.  North  Caro-
lina, 181 U.S.  589, 598 (1901)  (quoting Lewis) (finding  no equal protection violation in
law  allowing  prosecution  appeals  only  from  eastern  district of state);  Mason  v. Mis-
souri,  179 U.S.  328,  335  (1900)  (not citing Lewis)  (allowing voter  registration  system
for St. Louis different from that in rest of state); Chappell  Chemical & Fertilizer Co. v.
Sulphur Mines Co.,  172 U.S.  474, 475  (1899)  (citing Lewis)  (finding  no equal  protec-
tion violation in  denial of jury trial  in one city);  Williams v.  Eggleston,  170 U.S.  304,
309-10 (1898)  (not citing Lewis)  (finding no equal protection violation  in the consolida-
tion of  five towns  leading  to  different control  in .respect  to highways);  Hayes  v. Mis-
souri,  120  U.S.  68, 72  (1887)  (citing Lewis)  (finding  no equal  protection  violation  in
variation  in number  of peremptory  challenges).
30  See, e.g.,  Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison,  194 U.S.  445, 448-49  (1904);  Rippey
v.  Texas,  193 U.S.  504,  509  (1904)  (both  upholding  local  option liquor  laws  against
equal protection  challenge)  (The usual  cases were  cited  by the parties  in Rippey,  but
Justice  Holmes  did not  mention  equal  protection  in  his  opinion.);  L'Hote v. City  of
New  Orleans,  177  U.S.  587,  597  (1900)  (upholding  creation  of  red  light  district)
("[I]nquiry  as to the reasonableness  or propriety  of the  limits is a matter for legislative
consideration,  and  cannot  become  the  basis  of judicial action.");  Budd  v. New  York,
1987]270  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW
opinions  hinted  at  reasons  why  the variations might  be appropriate, 1
but  none suggested  that  a  territorial  distinction  could  be  invalidated  if
unreasonable.  Lewis  and  its  corollary  Hayes v.  Missouri2  were  fre-
quently  quoted  in  general  discussions  of equal  protection,  further per-
petuating  in  dictum the proposition  that  the Constitution  forbade  only
unequal  treatment  of two  persons  "in  the  same place." 33
In contrast,  the  Court  had no  difficulty  recognizing  explicit  resi-
dence discriminations  as classifications calling for equal protection scru-
tiny.'  Much  of the  caseload involved state discriminations  against non-
resident  individuals  and  foreign  corporations. 5  For  many  years  the
143 U.S. 517,  548 (1892)  (upholding elevator  rate regulation only  in large cities); Soon
Hing v.  Crowley,  113 U.S. 703  (1885);  Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27,  30-31  (1885)
(both  upholding  regulation  of laundries  within  defined  territorial  limits);  ef.  Cox  v.
Texas,  202  U.S. 446,  450  (1906)  (stating  that  a tax discriminating  between  sellers of
domestic and  out-of-state  wine  did not involve  a  "classification").
11  See,  e.g.,  Hayes, 120 U.S.  at  72 (stating  that allowing more  peremptory  chal-
lenges  in jury  selection  in  large  cities may  be  necessary  to  secure  an  impartial jury);
Barbier, 113  U.S.  at 30  (stating that restricting laundries  from certain  areas  may  re-
duce  fire  and  drainage  problems).
32  120 U.S.  68  (1887).
"  See, e.g.,  Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe  Co.,  184 U.S. 540, 559  (1902);  Brown
v. New Jersey,  175  U.S.  172, 175-77  (1899);  Holden v. Hardy,  169  U.S. 366,  387-88
(1898).  In  fact  the  currency  of  the  dictum  continued  long  after  the  practice  had
changed.  See,  e.g.,  Truax  v.  Corrigan,  257  U.S.  312,  333,  336  (1921).
3"  See, e.g.,  Board  of Educ.  v. Illinois,  203  U.S. 553,  563 (1906)  (upholding stat-
ute  exempting  only  instate  charities  from  inheritance  tax);  Field  v.  Barber  Asphalt
Paving  Co.,  194 U.S.  618,  622  (1904)  (upholding statute allowing only  resident  prop-
erty  owners  to  protest  improvement  scheme);  Kidd  v.  Alabama,  188  U.S.  730,  732
(1903)  (upholding right of state  to tax stock of foreign incorporated  railroads while not
taxing stock of domestic railroads or foreign  railroads doing business in state);  Central
Loan  & Trust  Co.  v.  Campbell  Comm'n  Co.,  173 U.S.  84,  97-99  (1899)  (upholding
statute establishing different procedures for attaching property of residents and  nonresi-
dents);  see also Pope v.  Williams,  193  U.S.  621,  634  (1904)  (dictum)  (suggesting the
impermissibility  of distinguishing  between  residents based on state of former residence);
Philadelphia Fire  Ass'n v. New  York,  119 U.S.  110,  129 (1866)  (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing)  (arguing the  impermissibility  of imposing  different  tax rates  on foreign  corpora-
tions).  For a different kind of discrimination  favoring "residents,"  see Watson  v. Mary-
land,  218  U.S.  173  (1910).
"  Inhospitable  treatment  of citizens  of sister  states  always  implicated  the  privi-
leges and immunities  clause of article IV, but the contours of that clause were  eccentric,
see, e.g.,  Pope, 193 U.S.  at 632 (right  to vote not a privilege or immunity); McCready
v. Virginia, 94 U.S.  391,  395  (1877)  (right to plant oysters in tidal  river not a privilege
or immunity); Conner v. Elliott,  59 U.S.  (18  How.)  591,  593  (1856)  (right  to commu-
nity property not a privilege or immunity), and it did not protect corporations. See Paul
v.  Virginia, 75 U.S.  (8  Wall.)  168,  178-82  (1869).  For a  while,  the Court  also flirted
with  the  idea that  only  citizenship  discriminations,  not residence  discriminations,  vio-
lated  the  clause,  so that a  state  willing  to sacrifice  its own  nonresident  citizens  could
effectively  discriminate  against out-of-staters.  See La  Tourette v.  McMaster, 248 U.S.
465,  470  (1919). This  absurd formalism has since  been  abandoned. See Austin v.  New
Hampshire,  420  U.S.  656,  662  n.8  (1975).
Discrimination  against  nonresidents  could  have  violated  the  dormant  commerce
clause,  but the scope  of interstate  commerce  was  also technical  and  complex. See, e.g.,
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Court had  trouble  applying  the  equal  protection  clause  in the  case  of
foreign corporations.  The Court was  distracted  by the theory that, until
a  foreign  corporation  had  complied  with  all  the  prerequisites  a  state
imposed  from  time to time as conditions on doing business  in the state,
the corporation was not within the jurisdiction of the state for purposes
of the  clause. 8  This  approach  was slowly  discarded  over  the  first  de-
cades  of the century,  and  by  1910  the Court  had actually  held  a  dis-
crimination  against  foreign  corporations  to  be  a  denial  of  equal
protection."3
Also  around  1910,  the  Court  quietly  extended  its  normal  equal
protection  method  to  territorial  distinctions  in general.  The  Court  al-
ways  upheld  them,  but  it unquestioningly  subjected  them  to  scrutiny
for  arbitrariness  under  the  equal  protection  clause."'  The  new  ap-
proach  was well  articulated in Reinman v.  City of Little Rock. 9 In the
Court's  words:
[S]o  long  as  the  regulation  in  question  is  not  shown  to  be
clearly  unreasonable  and  arbitrary,  and  operates  uniformly
upon all  persons similarly situated  in the particular  district,
the district itself not appearing  to have been arbitrarily  se-
lected, it cannot  be judicially declared that there is a depriva-
tion  of property  without  due  process  of law, or a  denial  of
United  States  v.  E.C.  Knight  Co.,  156  U.S.  1, 12  (1895)  (manufacturing  not  com-
merce);  Paul, 75 U.S.  at  183  (insurance not commerce).
31 See,  e.g.,  Blake  v.  McClung,  172  U.S.  239,  253  (1898);  Philadelphia Fire
Ass'n,  119  U.S. at  119.  See generally Western  & So.  Life Ins.  Co.  v. State  Bd.,  451
U.S.  648,  657-65  (1981)  (tracing  the decline  of this view).
37  See Southern  Ry.  v.  Greene,  216 U.S.  400 (1910).  Even before  Southern Ry.,
the Court occasionally scrutinized-but upheld-discriminations  between interstate  and
intrastate businesses.  See, e.g.,  Cook v. Marshall  County, 196 U.S. 261  (1905)  (finding
that discrimination  favoring interstate wholesalers  satisfied weak standard for tax clas-
sifications); Williams  v. Fears,  179 U.S.  270 (1900)  (taxing business of hiring workers
for employment  out of  state, but  not instate, not unreasonable).
Equal  protection scrutiny  of explicit  residence  classifications has  frequently led to
invalidation in  the  years  since Southern Ry.  See,  e.g.,  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. Co.  v.
Ward,  105  S.  Ct.  1676  (1985);  Evans  v.  Cornman,  398  U.S.  419  (1970);  Moore  v.
Ogilvie,  394  U.S.  814  (1969);  WHYY,  Inc.  v.  Borough  of Glassboro,  393  U.S.  117
(1968);  Wheeling  Steel  Corp. v.  Glander,  337  U.S.  562  (1949);  Power  Mfg.  Co.  v.
Saunders,  274 U.S.  490  (1927).
38 See Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U.S.  184, 191  (1912) (finding  "reasonable  basis"  for
higher auctioneer's  license  fee in Honolulu);  City of Chicago v.  Sturges, 222 U.S.  313,
324 (1911)  (finding discrimination  between cities and other municipalities  in tort liabil-
ity "not so unreasonable  and  extravagant  as  to be a  mere arbitrary mandate");  Welch
v. Swasey,  214 U.S.  91,  105,  108  (1909)  (equal  protection  piggybacked on due process
in challenge  to geographically  limited restriction  on building  height).  Where land was
classified  by its  use rather than  by its  location,  the  Court had  applied the  reasonable-
ness  test  as early  as  Clark  v.  Kansas  City,  176 U.S.  114,  120-21  (1900)  (upholding
statute authorizing municipal  annexation  of nonagricultural  land  only).
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the  equal  protection  of the  laws  ...."'
Although  there  were  a  few  apparent  reversions  to  the  per  se  rule  of
Lewis,  particularly  in  cases  involving territorial  discrimination  in  civil
or  criminal  procedure,41  rationality  review  had  become  dominant.42
In  practice,  however,  the  choice  of  approach  did  not  yet  matter,
because  the  Court was  always willing  to hypothesize  a  local variation
in  conditions  sufficient  to  render  any  territorial  classification  rational.
The only  distinctions  formally  recognized  as  subject  to  more  stringent
equal  protection  scrutiny during this period were those invidiously  mo-
tivated against a racial  or national  group.4 '  But the Court's  1942 deci-
sion  in Skinner v.  Oklahoma ex  rel Williamson44  created  greater  po-
tential  for  divergence  between  the  categorical  and  case-by-case
approaches  to  territorial  discriminations.  In Skinner, Justice  Douglas
openly  launched  the  fundamental  rights  branch  of equal  protection.45
As  subsequently  elaborated,  "strict  scrutiny"  could  be  triggered,  not
only  by classifications  invidious  in themselves, but  also by employment
of virtually  any classification  to infringe upon  the  exercise of a funda-
40  Id. at  177  (emphasis  added) (upholding  prohibition  of livery  stables in  certain
section  of city).
41 See  Young  v.  Masci,  289  U.S.  253,  260-61  (1933)  (dismissing  out  of hand
equdl  protection  claim  based  on  location  of auto  accident);  Ocampo  v.  United  States,
234  U.S. 91,  98-99  (1914)  (applying Lewis to statutory right to equal  protection  in the
Philippines, and upholding variation in criminal procedure  between Manila and  rest of
the  Islands);  cf.  Ohio  ex  rel. Bryant  v.  Akron  Metro.  Park  Dist.,  281  U.S.  74,  81
(1930)  (citing Lewis)  (finding that even if statute's  practical  effect was to prevent state
supreme  court  from  resolving conflicts  between  county  courts  of appeal, no equal  pro-
tection question would arise); Joslin Mfg. Co.  v. City of Providence, 262 U.S.  668, 676
(1923)  (upholding a statute compensating displaced millowners for  expenses of relocat-
ing within New  England,  but not  elsewhere).
4'  See Radice  v. New York,  264 U.S. 292,  296 (1924)  (statute regulating working
hours of women  in large cities);  Fort Smith Light  & Traction Co.  v. Board of Improve-
ment,  274  U.S.  387,  391  (1927)  (statute  territorially  defined to  apply  to single  street
railway  company); Packard  v. Banton, 264  U.S. 140,  143-44  (1924)  (statute regulating
taxis  in  large  cities);  Thomas  Cusack  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  242  U.S.  526,  529-30
(1917)  (limit  on  billboards  in  residential  sections  of  city);  Northwestern  Laundry  v.
City of Des Moines, 239  U.S. 486, 492,  495 (1916)  (statute empowering large  cities to
regulate  smoke,  implemented  by  ordinance  applying only  in  certain  portions  of city);
Haracheck  v.  Sebastian,  239  U.S.  394,  411-13  (1915)  (prohibition  of  brickyards  in
certain  district of city).
Some  cases are  simply too opaque  to interpret. See Walls v. Midland  Carbon Co.,
254  U.S.  300,  315,  324  (1920)  (permitting  regulation  of  gas use  within  10  miles  of
towns);  Stewart  v.  City of Kansas  City, 239  U.S.  14  (1915)  (upholding  variations  in
finance  system disadvantageous  to  large cities).
4  See,  e.g.,  Missouri  ex  rel. Gaines  v.  Canada,  305  U.S.  337  (1938)  (finding
equal  protection  violation  in  state's  provision of  legal  education  to  whites  but  not to
blacks).
44  316 U.S.  535  (1942).
45 Id.  at  541  ("[Sltrict  scrutiny  of the  classification  which  a  State  makes  in  a
sterilization  law  is essential.").
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mental  right.4
The  effect  of this  change  was  demonstrated  shortly  thereafter  by
the willingness  of Justices  Douglas, Black,  and Murphy to strike down
territorial  classifications  infringing  electoral  rights  in  Colegrove  v.
Green. 4 7  Colegrove was  a  malapportionment  case  of  a  now  familiar
kind. The  majority  refused  to take jurisdiction  and  expressed  no views
on the merits.4  Justice Black, in contrast, found "a wholly  indefensible
discrimination  against appellants  and all other voters  in  heavily  popu-
lated districts,  . . exactly  the kind that the equal  protection clause was
intended to prohibit. '49  Yet the discrimination  resulted  not from an ex-
plicit classification regarding  residence, but merely from the drawing of
boundaries  for congressional  election  districts. No Justice alluded to the
possibility that discriminations  based on geographical  location were im-
mune from  equal protection  scrutiny.
The  victory  of the rational  basis  test  over  the per  se  rule  in  the
modern  period  is exemplified  by  Salsburg v. Maryland. 5°  There,  the
Court unequivocally  applied  rational  basis scrutiny to territorial  varia-
tions  in  the excludability  of illegally  seized  evidence  within  a  state. 1
Even in the field of court  procedures,  where the influence  of Lewis had
been greatest,52  the territorial  discrimination  was entitled  only to a pre-
sumption of  reasonableness. 5   At  the  same  time,  however,  the  Court
quoted  the usual Lewis dicta,  and floated a popular new epigram: "The
4n  This  seems to  follow  from  Skinner itself. Some  have  tried to  characterize  the
particular  discrimination  condemned  in Skinner, between  larcenists  (who  would  be
sterilized)  and  embezzlers  (who  would  not)  as  wealth-based  or  class-based.  See  L.
TRIBE,  AMERICAN  CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW  1010-11  (1978);  Karst, Invidious  Discrimi-
nation:  Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process  Formula,"
16 UCLA  L. REv. 716,  734-35  (1969).  But the  opinions give  no hint of this, and  this
feature  of the case  is better regarded  as  coincidental.  See J. ELY,  DEMOCRACY  & Dis-
TRUST  245  n.38  (1980).
47  328 U.S.  549, 569  (1946)'(Black,  J., dissenting).  Their position  prevailed eigh-
teen  years later in  Reynolds  v. Sims,  377  U.S.  533  (1964).
The  same  Justices  who  dissented  in  Colegrove also  dissented  in  MacDougall  v.
Green,  335 U.S.  281  (1948),  which  involved  an explicit  residence  discrimination  in the
distribution  of signatures  necessary  for  a nominating  petition.  Their  position  in Mac-
Dougall prevailed  in  Moore  v. Ogilvie,  394  U.S.  814  (1969).
s See  328  U.S.  at  556.  (Frankfurter,  Reed,  and  Burton,  JJ., finding  the  case
nonjusticiable);  id. at 566  (Rutledge, J.,  declining to exercise jurisdiction).
49  Id. at  569.
50  346  U.S.  545  (1954).
51  See id. at 550-51,  553.
52  See, e.g.,  Gardner v. Michigan,  199  U.S.  325, 333  (1905)  (quoting Lewis) (al-
lowing  different process for compiling jury lists in one  county); Mallett v. North Caro-
lina,  181  U.S.  589,  598  (1901)  (quoting Lewis)  (no  equal protection  violation  in  law
allowing  prosecution  appeals  only  from  eastern  district  of state).
53  See Salsburg, 346  U.S.  at  553  & n.9.  For a  similar  reversal  of attitude,  see
Holt  Civic Club  v. City of Tuscaloosa,  439  U.S.  60,  70-71  (1978)  (applying the  ra-
tional  basis  test  to a  state's allocation  of power  among  its political  subdivisions).
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Equal  Protection  Clause  relates  to  equality  between  persons  as  such
rather  than  between  areas."  The  Court  did  not  notice  any  conflict
between  this language  and  its  application  of  a reasonableness  test-it
seemingly  viewed  Lewis  as  holding  only that  territorial  variations  are
not  unreasonable  per  se.
A trace of ambiguity has continued  to plague the Supreme  Court's
opinions,"5 but  in the great  majority of cases the Court has  applied the
rational  basis  test to  state  and  federal  legislation.5  The  lower  federal
courts  have displayed  some  confusion,57 but  most  frequently  do scruti-
nize  territorial  classifications. 8  In  fact,  a  few  courts  have  invalidated
some  territorial  classifications  as  wholly  irrational.59  Justices  White,
Douglas, and Brennan  were willing  to do so in San Antonio Indepen-
Salsburg, 346  U.S. at  551  & n.6.
5'  See North  v. Russell,  427 U.S.  328,  338-39  (1976)  (quoting Lewis but noting
the state's articulated  reasons for  two-tier trial  court system using lay judges  in smaller
cities); McGowan  v.  Maryland,  366 U.S.  420,  427  (1961)  (curtly relying on Salsburg
to uphold variations  in Sunday  closing laws);  Secretary  of Agric. v. Central Roig  Ref.
Co.,  338  U.S.  604,  616-19  (1950)  (finding  sugar  quotas  for  Puerto  Rico  within  con-
gressional  discretion).
56  See Papasan v. Allain, 106  S.  Ct. 2932, 2943-46  (1986)  (applying rational basis
test  to  unequal  distribution  of school  land  funds  to counties);  Washington  v.  Yakima
Indian Nation,  439  U.S.  463,  501-02 (1979)  (applying rational  basis  test to  "checker-
board jurisdiction" over  Indian lands); Holt, 439  U.S. at 70-71  (applying  rational basis
test  to assignment  of extraterritorial  jurisdiction  to  municipality);  San Antonio  Indep.
School  Dist. v. Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1, 55  (1973)  (applying rational basis  test to varia-
tions  in  educational  funding);  cf  Griffin  v.  County  School  Bd.,  377  U.S.  218,  230-31
(1964)  (finding that some reasons  may support  closing of county  schools,  but not racial
discrimination).
"  See, e.g.,  Reeder  v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm'r, 796 F.2d 1050,  1053-55
(8th Cir. 1986)  (stating per se  rule in case  involving first amendment rights); Walsh  v.
Massachusetts,  618 F.2d 156,  158-59  (1st  Cir. 1980) (applying both rational basis  test
and  per  se  rule);  City  of Highland  Park  v. Train,  519  F.2d  681,  696-97  (7th  Cir.
1975)  (stating  per se rule).
51  See,  e.g.,  Tarter  v.  James,  667  F.2d  964,  968-69  (11th  Cir.  1982);  Laketon
Asphalt  Ref.,  Inc. v.  United  States  Dep't of Interior,  624  F.2d 784,  795-96  (7th  Cir.
1980);  Francis  v. Maryland,  605  F.2d  747,  748-49  (4th  Cir.  1979);  Castillo-Felix  v.
Immigration  and Naturalization  Serv.,  601  F.2d 459, 467  (9th Cir. 1979);  City of New
York v.  Richardson,  473  F.2d  923,  930  (2d Cir.  1973).
59  See, e.g.,  Washington v. Yakima  Indian Nation,  552 F.2d 1332,  1335  (9th Cir.
1977)  (finding no  rational basis  for state's varying  assumption  of jurisdiction  over  In-
dian lands),  rev'd, 439 U.S.  463  (1979);  Long v.  Robinson, 316  F. Supp. 22  (D. Md.
1970)  (finding  that statute  that  classified  16-  and  17-year-olds  as  adults  for  criminal
prosecution in Baltimore,  but as juveniles in the rest of the state, violated equal protec-
tion), affd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971);  Peddycoart  v. City of Birmingham,  354 So.
2d  808  (Ala.  1978)  (finding that  statute granting  governmental  immunity  only  to the
largest  city in  the state  violated  equal  protection);  Bayou  Barber  College  v.  Mincey,
193  So.  2d  610  (Fla.  1967)  (finding that  statute  providing  that  no  barbering  school
shall be licensed in  a county  having a population  less than 750,000  violated equal  pro-
tection); State v. Petrovich,  396 So. 2d  1318 (La.  1981)  (finding that statute permitting
only certain  levee  districts to employ  special counsel without  approval of state attorney
general  violated equal  protection).
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dent School District v.  Rodriguez,"  and  shortly  thereafter,  the Court
summarily  affirmed  a judgment  invalidating  as  irrational  Louisiana's
scheme  for distribution  of tax relief to  parishes." 1
Strict  scrutiny  of  territorial  classifications  affecting  fundamental
rights  blossomed  after  1964 in the  voting rights  decisions. At the  same
time  that the  Court was  invalidating  explicit  intrastate  residence  dis-
criminations, 62  it  found  that  the  allocation  of  disproportionate  voting
strength to political subdivisions  violated  equal protection.63  The Court
also  condemned  ballot access  requirements  for  city  elections  that  were
stricter  than  the  requirements  for  statewide  elections. 4  In  short,  the
Court had retreated  significantly  from  the rule of per se legality of ter-
ritorial  classifications.
The best illustration of this retreat is  the unhesitating readiness  of
eight Justices in Rodriguez to extend strict scrutiny to territorial  classi-
fications  infringing upon other  fundamental  rights.6"  The  entire Court
recognized  the  need  to  examine  the rationality of  the  territorial  dis-
crimination  and the majority explored  it at length.6  Only the weakest
echo of the Lewis dictum survived:  "This  Court  has  never doubted the
propriety of maintaining political subdivisions  within the states and has
never found in the Equal  Protection  Clause  any per se rule  of 'territo-
rial uniformity.'  ",67
60  411  U.S.  1, 63-70  (1973)  (White,  J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall,  however,
characterized  his fellow dissenters  as applying a closer form  of scrutiny. See id. at  129
n.96 (Marshall, J.,  dissenting).
61  See  Parker v.  Levy,  411  U.S.  978  (1973),  affg 346  F. Supp.  897  (E.D.  La.
1972).
" See,  e.g.,  Evans v.  Cornman,  398 U.S.  419  (1970)  (invalidating  application  of
Maryland  voter residency  law that disqualified  persons who  lived on a federal  enclave
from  voting  in  the  state);  Moore  v.  Ogilvie,  394  U.S.  814  (1969)  (holding  that  an
Illinois signature requirement  to become an independent  candidate in  the state discrim-
inated  against  the  residents  of populous  counties  in violation  of the  equal  protection
clause).
"'  See,  e.g.,  Lucas  v.  Forty-Fourth  Colo.  Gen.  Assembly,  377  U.S.  713  (1964);
Reynolds  v.  Sims,  377  U.S.  533  (1964).
"  See  Illinois  State  Bd.  of  Elections  v.  Socialist  Workers  Party,  440  U.S.  173
(1979).
65  A  five-Justice  majority  held  that  education  was  not  a fundamental  right  but
agreed that the  equal  protection  clause  would require  strict  scrutiny  of radically  une-
qual distribution of educational funding if it were. See 411  U.S.  at 17.  Three dissenters
insisted that education  was  indeed  a fundamental  right,  and  that strict  scrutiny there-
fore applied. See id. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 125-26  (Marshall, J., joined
by  Douglas,  J., dissenting).  Justice  White,  who  found the  Texas  system  wholly  irra-
tional and therefore a violation of equal protection,  see id. at  64-65 (White, J., dissent-
ing),  did not expressly  address  the strict  scrutiny  question.
66  See id. at 44-55;  see also Papasan  v. Allain,  106 S.  Ct. 2932  (1986)  (reversing
dismissal of rational basis equal protection attack  on Mississippi's distribution of public
school land  funds  to counties).
67 Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  at 54 n.110.
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B.  A  Volume  of Logic
Territorial  classifications  should  be  no  more  exempt  from  the
mandate  of equal  protection  than  any  other  nonsuspect  classification.
The  state  must  provide  some  explanation  for  declaring  one  law  at
Rome  and  another  at  Athens.  But  when  these  discriminations  hew  to
political  boundary  lines, justifications  for their existence  are easily  hy-
pothesized.  From the time of Missouri v. Lewis, courts have recognized
that  too  rigid  an  equal  protection  analysis  would  deprive  the  state  of
flexibility  in  structuring  its institutions  and  parceling  out  authority  to
local  governments.  The  pivotal  questions  thus  become  how  much
weight these proffered justifications  will bear,  and how much they  need
to  bear.
The  following  section  will  discuss  fundamental  rights  equal  pro-
tection  and  why  its  concerns  extend  to  territorial  discrimination.  Be-
cause territorial discriminations  should  presumptively  be treated no dif-
ferently  than  any  other  nonsuspect  classification,  fundamental  rights
equal protection  questions may arise in several  contexts where they are
commonly  overlooked.  I will  argue that  in  some  of these areas  the dis-
criminations  should  be  regarded  as unconstitutional,  but that in others
the equal protection  methodology  should  be modified to excuse  the dis-
criminations  from heightened scrutiny. The problem is to accommodate
locally  chosen  diversity  without  rendering  equal  protection  as  ineffec-
tive  a safeguard against territorial  discrimination  as it was in the era of
Missouri v. Lewis.
1.  Fundamental  Rights  and  Equal Protection
Several  clauses of the Constitution  may forbid territorial  discrimi-
nation  with  respect  to  fundamental  rights.  Most  obviously,  territorial
classifications drawn by  a state legislature, or by  any of the state's judi-
cial,  executive,  or  municipal  agents,  implicate  the  equal  protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment."'  Those created  by  Congress or by
any agent  of the federal  government  or  its territories  trigger  a form  of
equal  protection  analysis  under  the  due  process  clause  of  the  fifth
amendment.69  But these  are not  the  only  sources  of nondiscrimination
principles.  Individual  grants  of power  to  Congress  sometimes  contain
express  uniformity  requirements,  which  may  impose  limits on territo-
rial  discrimination  by the  federal  government  stricter  than  those  equal
"6  See  Yick  Wo  v.  Hopkins,  118  U.S.  356  (1886);  Ex parte Virginia,  100 U.S.
339  (1880).
69  See Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic  Party, 457 U.S.  1 (1982);  Examining Bd.
v. Flores  de  Otero, 426  U.S.  572  (1976);  Bolling  v. Sharpe,  347  U.S. 497  (1954).
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protection  itself  requires.70  In  addition,  state  discrimination  based  on
out-of-state residence  may violate the commerce  clause or the privileges
and immunities  clause  of article  IV.
Broad  equal  protection  principles  may  also  be  inherent  in  some
guarantees  of substantive  rights  that  are susceptible  to  competitive  in-
jury.  For example,  denying  an arbitrarily  chosen group  access to  a fo-
rum open  to  all  others  may  create  a  greater  obstacle  to  that  group's
reaching  its  desired  audience  than  closing  the  forum  altogether.
71
Moreover,  the very  fact that one group has been permitted fuller  exer-
cise of a right may, as an evidentiary matter, undercut the state's claim
that.it is necessary or reasonable  to restrict its exercise by others. Thus,
scrutiny under the constitutional  provisions directly addressing the right
(I will call  this  "direct  substantive  review")  can  provide  a  fair substi-
tute  for equal  protection  scrutiny  in such  cases.
One  may therefore  question  why equal  protection  analysis  should
ever be applied in cases involving  fundamental  rights  already protected
by  the Constitution.  Indeed,  the "fundamental  rights branch"  of equal
protection  has  been  criticized  roundly.  Although  my  major  purpose
here  is to qualify the doctrine, and not to  praise it, there may be some
value  in  briefly  restating its  defense.
The fundamental  rights branch emerged against the background of
the  "old"  equal  protection,  which,  with  rare  exceptions,  applied  the
most  minimal  scrutiny  to  the  reasonableness  of  a  classification  chal-
70  See, e.g.,  United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S.  74  (1983)  (tax uniformity clause,
U.S.  CONST.  art.  I,  §8,  cI.  1);  Railway  Labor  Executives  Ass'n  v.  Gibbon,  455  U.S.
457  (1982)  (bankruptcy uniformity clause, U.S.  CONsT. art. I, §8,  cl.  4); Head Money
Cases,  112  U.S.  580  (1884)  (port  preference  clause,  U.S.  CONST.  art.  I, §9,  cl.  6);
Petition  of Lee  Wee,  143  F. Supp.  736  (S.D.  Cal.  1956)  (naturalization  uniformity
clause, U.S.  CONST. art. I, §8,  cl.  4). The Supreme Court has sometimes found implicit
requirements  of uniformity  in  other  constitutional  provisions.  See  Knickerbocker  Ice
Co. v. Stewart,  253 U.S.  149 (1920)  (maritime law under article  III and the necessary
and  proper  clause);  Coyle v. Smith,  221  U.S.  559  (1911)  (equal  footing doctrine  with
regard  to admission of new states under article IV,  §3,  cI.  1).  None of these specialized
uniformity  provisions  will be  addressed in this  Article.
71  Thus, the nondiscrimination  principles implicit in  freedom of speech go beyond
a  ban  on  express  content  discrimination,  and  render  suspect  many  discriminations
among speakers. See,  e.g.,  Karst, Equality as a Central  Principle  in the First  Amend-
ment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv.  20, 37  (1975)  (stating that content-neutral  restrictions  may
have  differential  impact  on different  speaker  groups,  resulting in  de facto  content dis-
crimination  offensive  to the first amendment).  Other  constitutional  rights  may  be  less
susceptible to  such competitive injury.  For example,  infringement of a teenager's  right
to  use  contraceptives  is not  intensified  by allowing  adults to  use  them.  The  right to
marry  is  susceptible  to  competitive injury  only  in  the  narrow  sense that if  you  don't
marry  Roxanne quickly someone  else  may. See also Simons,  Equality as a Compara-
tive Right, 65  B.U.L.  REv.  387, 467-70 (1985)  (arguing that fundamental rights equal
protection  and due process approaches lead to same results only when underlying rights
are "comparative"  rather than  absolute).
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lenged as  discriminatory.7 2 The exceptions  expanded  over the  course of
the Warren  Court years  and crystallized  into the two-tier  system  of the
"new  equal  protection."'7 '  The  lower  tier  perpetuated  the traditional
deferential scrutiny afforded  in ordinary cases,  while the second, higher
tier  subjected  exceptional  cases  to a  demanding  "strict  scrutiny."
The exceptional cases were of two kinds:  those involving classifica-
tions  suspect  in  themselves,  like  race  or  national  origin,  and  those
where  otherwise  unremarkable  classifications  affected  the  exercise  of a
fundamental  right, like the right to vote. The Supreme  Court described
this framework  as a  discrete  set of  pigeonholes,  but some writers, most
prominently  Justice Marshall,  envisioned  it as bounding  a two-dimen-
sional continuum-the  "sliding scale"-in  which  the  intensity  of judi-
cial  scrutiny  increased  continuously  as a  function  of both  the  suspect-
ness  of the  classification  itself and the importance  of the  interest being
denied  to  the  disfavored  classy. 4  Over  the  last  decade,  the  Supreme
Court  has burst  the bounds of the rigid two-tier system without openly
replacing it with a  sliding scale method  or with anything  else.75 None-
theless, it remains  safe to  say that the  impact  of a legislative  classifica-
tion  on certain  fundamental  constitutional  rights  will  trigger  a  higher
level  of equal  protection  scrutiny  than the Court employs  in an  "ordi-
nary"  equal  protection  case.
76
72  This  is true at least  in  theory.  As the  dissenters pointed out at the  time, it  is
hard to perceive  the  arbitrariness of the classifications  condemned  in such "traditional"
cases  as Frost v.  Corporation  Comm'n, 278  U.S.  515  (1929);  Truax  v.  Corrigan,  257
U.S.  312  (1921);  or the much  cited  F.S.  Royster Guano  Co. v. Virginia,  253  U.S. 412
(1920).
7'  See  Shapiro  v.  Thompson,  394  U.S.  618  (1969);  Developments  in  the
Law-Equal Protection, 82  HARV.  L. REV.  1065,  1076-77  (1969)  [hereinafter Devel-
opments-Equal Protection].
7" See, e.g.,  Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  at 98-110  (Marshall, J., dissenting);  Dandridge
v.  Williams,  397  U.S.  471,  520-21  (1970)  (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75 See, e.g.,  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.  202, 223-24  (1982);  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976).  For expressions  of dissatisfaction  with the  two-tier approach  by  individual
justices,  see  City  of Cleburne  v.  Cleburne  Living  Center,  105  S.  Ct.  3249,  3260-62
(1985)  (Stevens,  J.,  concurring);  id. at  3263  (Marshall,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and
dissenting in  part); Plyler, 457  U.S.  at 232-34  (Blackmun, J., concurring  in the judg-
ment);  Zablocki  v.  Redhail,  434  U.S.  374,  396-97  (1978)  (Powell, J., concurring).
76  1  should also  point out the existence  of equal protection  approaches that  reject
the notion  of levels  of scrutiny altogether, and call  for a holistic examination  of particu-
lar discriminations to determine directly  whether,  under all  the circumstances,  the gov-
ernment's  action  offends  the  relevant  notion  of "impartiality"  or  "equality."  Justice
Stevens  has  argued  for  such  an  approach.  See,  e.g.,  City of Cleburne, 105  S.  Ct.  at
3261  n.4  (Stevens,  J., concurring);  Clements  v.  Fashing, 457  U.S.  957,  973-76 (1982)
(Stevens,  J., concurring);  Western  &  S.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Board  of Equalization,  451
U.S.  648,  677-78  (1981)  (Stevens,  J., dissenting); Michael  M. v.  Superior  Court, 450
U.S.  464,  502  (1981)  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting);  see also Baker,  Outcome Equality or
Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U.  PA. L. REv.
933  (1983)  (arguing  for  an  "equality  of  respect"  interpretation  of  equal  protection,
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Justice Marshall's sliding scale differs  from the Court's announced
doctrine  not  only  by  inserting  gradations  of strictness  between  mini-
mum and  maximum  scrutiny,  but also  by  allowing  important  "inter-
ests"  that  are  not  independently  constitutional  "rights"  to  trigger
heightened  scrutiny. This contrast may  be  sloganized  by distinguishing
between  the  "substantive  equal  protection"  approach,  in  which  the
equal protection  clause itself  becomes the authority  for elevating  inter-
ests like housing or education to extraordinary constitutional status, and
the "fundamental  rights  equal  protection"  approach,  in which  values
receiving  extraordinary  protection  under  the  equal  protection  clause
must be  derived  from some other source in the Constitution.  Of course,
to  the  extent  that  the  other  source  is  the  doctrine  of  substantive  due
process, these two approaches  may  be hard  to tell apart, but as long as
the Court is willing to  scrutinize the relative distribution of interests it
will  not  protect  directly  as  rights,  "substantive  equal  protection"  is a
broader theory.
The Court purported to reject decisively the substantive  equal pro-
tection approach  in San Antonio Independent  School District  v. Rodri-
guez,7  while approving of fundamental  rights equal protection analysis
with regard to rights "explicitly  or implicitly guaranteed  by the Consti-
tution."7 18  Although  the  Court's  unwavering  fidelity  to  this  standard
may  be doubted
7 9  1  will limit my attention here to the orthodox formu-
lation  of fundamental  rights  equal  protection  as expounded  in Rodri-
guez. Rather  than predict the future of the tier versus sliding-scale con-
troversy,  or  untie  this  Gordian  knot  myself,  I  shall  for  descriptive
purposes  throughout this Article  take advantage  of the common ground
between  those  rival approaches:  that the impact  of a classification  on a
fundamental  right  intensifies  the  level  of judicial  scrutiny  beyond  the
traditional  minimum  to some  version of "heightened  scrutiny."
In  either  form,  a  key  characteristic  of  fundamental  rights  equal
protection  is its ability to focus on discriminations  in the distribution  of
fundamental  rights.  The  state  may justifiably  restrict  the  exercise  of
fundamental  rights, but it must  do so evenhandedly.  A state restriction
on the  exercise  of a  fundamental  right that might  have survived  direct
substantive  review if uniformly applied  may  violate equal protection  if
guaranteeing  right  to  political  participation,  access  to  resources  deemed  necessary  for
full participation  in  the community,  and  protection  against  purposeful  subordination).
The  present  Article  does  not deal  with  such  approaches,  which  require  discussion  of
equal  protection  issues in  an entirely  different  manner  that would  greatly  change  the
analysis.
77  411  U.S.  at  30-34.
78 Id. at  33-34.
79  See,  e.g.,  Plyler, 457  U.S.  at 202;  Griffin v.  Illinois,  351  U.S.  12  (1956).
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it restricts only the  exercise of the right by  a particular group, 0  or the
exercise  of the right in particular  contexts."'  To give a crude  example,
it has been  assumed that  the state  can  impose  a minimum  age restric-
tion on  the right  to  marry; 2  but if the  state imposes  different  age  re-
strictions  on  diff&rent  groups-for  example,  if  high  school  graduates
may marry at seventeen,  but others must wait  until nineteen-then the
discrimination  may  violate  equal  protection  even  if  a  uniform  age  of
seventeen  or  nineteen  would  have  been  constitutional.  The  state  has
authority to vary some  of the contours  of a fundamental  right by assert-
ing  or  failing  to  assert  countervailing  interests,  but  equal  protection
concerns  are raised when  the contours  are not the  same  for  all.
Four major  criticisms of fundamental  rights equal  protection  echo
through the literature.  One  basic ground  of attack is that  protection  of
fundamental  rights has nothing  to  do  with "equal  protection"  at all.83
A second  is  that fundamental  rights  equal  protection  gives judges  an
illegitimate  opportunity to  elevate  above  the  political  process those  in-
terests  that  they  personally  favor."  Third,  fundamental  rights  equal
protection  has been called  redundant, merely duplicating  protection  al-
ready  afforded  by  direct  substantive  review.8 5 Fourth,  in contrast  with
number  three,  fundamental  rights  equal  protection  has  been  described
as too rigid because  it does not permit the state the necessary flexibility
that survives  the more  malleable  particularistic  analysis  of direct  sub-
stantive  review."6  I  will take  these  criticisms up in this  order.
SO  See, e.g.,  Zablocki  v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-91  (1978) (finding that statute
that restricted the  right to marry  of those subject  to court child support  orders  violates
the  equal  protection  clause);  Carrington  v.  Rash,  380  U.S.  89, 96-97  (1965)  (finding
that the denial  of franchise  to armed  services  members  stationed locally  violates  equal
protection).
81  See,  e.g.,  Carey v. Brown,  447  U.S.  455  (1980)  (finding  that statute  distin-
guishing peaceful  labor picketing in residential  areas from other peaceful  picketing vio-
lated  the  equal  protection  clause);  Illinois  State  Bd.  of Elections  v.  Socialist  Workers
Party,  440  U.S.  173,  183-87  (1979)  (finding  that greater  signature  requirements  to
gain  access  to  the  ballot  in  city  elections  than  in  statewide  elections  violated  equal
protection).
82  See,  e.g.,  Zablocki, 434  U.S.  at 398-99  (Powell, J., concurring).
See, e.g.,  id. at 391  (Stewart, J., concurring); P. POLYvIou,  THE EQUAL  PRO-
TECTION  OF  THE  LAWS  189-91  (1980);  Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Four-
teenth Amendment,  77  MicH.  L.  REv.  981,  1075-77  (1979);  Perry,  Modern Equal
Protection:  A  Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79  CoLuM.  L. REv.  1023,  1074-77
(1979).
"  See, e.g.,  P. PoLYvIou, supra note 83, at  189-90; Lupu, supra note 83, at 983,
1076;  Wilkinson,  The Supreme  Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three
Faces of Constitutional  Equality, 61  VA.  L.  REv.  945,  1017  (1975).
85  See,  e.g.,  Shapiro  v.  Thompson,  394  U.S.  618,  659,  662  (1969)  (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); J. NOWAK,  R. ROTUNDA  & T.  YOUNG,  CONSTrrTUTIONAL  LAW  817-819
(2d ed.  1983)  [hereinafter J.  N OWAK].
86  See,  e.g.,  Zablocki v.  Redhail,  434 U.S.  374,  395-96  (1978)  (Stewart, J., con-
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The  first  complaint,  that  fundamental  rights  equal  protection  is
not  "properly  speaking"  equal  protection  at  all,  is  often  accompanied
by  the  vehemence  endemic  to  academic  definitional  disputes.8 7  Of
course,  to  understand  this  argument,  one  must  know  what,  "properly
speaking,"  equal  protection  is.  The  criticism  normally  rests  on  one  of
two  foundational  viewpoints:  unswerving  faith  that  precedent  correctly
limits  equal  protection  review  to  analyzing  the  peculiarities  of  legal
"classifications,"  or the identification  of equal  protection  with some  le-
gal  or philosophical  notion  of "equality."
The first of these axioms, emphasizing  the centrality of "classifica-
tions,"  will crop  up more  than once  in this Article,  and requires  close
attention  for a moment. As  everyone knows,  the equal protection  clause
was drafted with the paradigm  of racial discrimination in mind, but the
breadth  of its  language  cried  out  for wider  application.  Early  on,  the
Supreme  Court  denied  that  the  clause  demanded  total,  unreasoning
identicalness  of treatment.  Rather,  legislatures  could  adopt  reasonable
classifications.  Distinguishing between  reasonable and arbitrary legisla-
tive  classifications  thus  became  the  most  frequent  issue  in  the  equal
protection  caseload. The  highly influential article  of Tussman and ten-
Broek elaborated equal protection  technique  primarily in the context of
such  classifications.
8 8
Let  us  formalize  a  typical  equal  protection  case  as  follows:  the
state,  by  some  form  of government  action  A,  allocates  to group  G the
burden or benefit  B, and to the rest of society G'  the burden or benefit
B'. The classification,  C, is the rule assigning individuals to group G or
group  G'.8"  Following  Tussman  and  tenBroek,  modern  writers  have
looked  to the nature  of the  classification  C,  and  the closeness  of fit be-
tween it and  the legislature's  underlying  purpose,  P.90  In  the original
two-tier system, the  closeness of fit required  by equal protection  analy-
sis depended  on whether the  classification  C  or the difference  between
curring);  Williams  v.  Rhodes,  393  U.S.  23,  43  (1968)  (Harlan,  J.,  concurring);  P.
POLYVIOu, supra note  83, at 189-90;  Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95  HARV.
L.  REV.  537,  585  (1982).
87  See,  e.g.,  Lupu, supra note  83;  Perry, supra note  83.
"  See Tussman  & tenBroek, supra note 27,  at 341.  The authors  recognized  that
equal  protection  constrained  administrative  actions  as  well.  See  id. at  353.  Tussman
and tenBroek also identified the possibility of a "substantive  equal protection"  doctrine,
but  did not  perceive  it  as  a  method  of demanding  more  from  classifications.  Rather,
they viewed it as forbidding particular  legislative purposes. See id. at 361-67. The cases
they viewed as "substantive"  would fall within the suspect classification  category today,
since  the overthrow  of "separate  but  equal."
89  Schematically,  letting S represent  all of society:
S -C-0.1G,  G' }  A {  B,  B"
90  See Tussman  & tenBroek, supra note  27,  at 367.
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B  and B'  involved a fundamental  right or  a "suspect"  class.  In Justice
Marshall's  sliding-scale  model, the  intrusiveness  of review  depends  on
both  the  nature  of the  classification  C  and the  difference  between  B
and  B'.  I will discuss  later in  this Article  claims that  equal protection
concerns are implicated only in cases involving certain kinds of classifi-
cations  C,  or  only  in  cases  involving  certain kinds of actions  A. The
issue  at  present  is  the  criticism  directed  against  fundamental  rights
equal protection  that  whether equal  protection  concerns  are implicated
should properly  depend  only  on  the nature  of the classification  C, and
not on the  difference  between  B  and  B'.9'
The Supreme Court,  in contrast, has  identified  precisely  such  dif-
ferences  as a valid  subject  of equal  protection  solicitude:
"Due  process"  emphasizes  fairness  between  the  State  and
the individual  dealing with the State, regardless  of how other
individuals  in  the  same  situation  may  be  treated.  "Equal
protection,"  on the other hand,  emphasizes disparity in treat-
ment  by  a State  between  classes  of individuals  whose  situa-
tions  are arguably  indistinguishable.92
The roots  of this observation  run deep  in the Court's  history.  Once  it
extended the  clause  beyond the unique problem of race,  the Court was
forced  to  recognize  that  distinctions  wholly  innocuous  in  one  context
might amount to  "clear  and hostile discriminations""3  in another.  The
Court  first  applied  this  broadened  doctrine  to  legislation  directed
against  the  railroads,  an  area  where  "unreasonable"  discriminations
were more likely to be produced by  calculating ill will than by inadver-
tent  error.9'  Soon  thereafter,  the  Court  found  the  importance  of the
91  See,  e.g.,  Perry,  Equal Protection, Judicial Activism,  and  the Intellectual
Agenda of Constitutional Theory: Reflections on, and Beyond "Plyler v.  Doe", 44 U.
PrT.  L.  REv.  329,  340  & n.47  (1983).
92  Ross  v. Moffitt,  417  U.S.  600,  609  (1974).
98  Bell's  Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania,  134 U.S.  232,  237  (1890).
See Gulf C.  & S.F. Ry.  v.  Ellis, 165  U.S.  150,  156-57  (1897);  Chicago,  M. &
St. P. Ry. v.  Minnesota,  134 U.S. 418,  458 (1890);  Kay, The Equal Protection Clause
in the  Supreme  Court 1873-1903, 29  BUFFALO.  L. REv.  667,  701-02  (1980).  For
criticisms  of the "mistake"  theory of equal protection,  see for example,  Baker, Neutral-
ity, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations  of Equal Protection,  58  TEx. L.
REv.  1029,  1034-35  (1980);  Cohen,  Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35  COLUM.  L.  REV.  809,  819  (1935);  Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking,
55  NEB. L. REv.  197 (1976); Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process  of Life and Law, 87  HARV.  L. REV.  1, 6 & n.28 (1972).  As my purpose here
is  to discuss  fundamental  rights  equal  protection,  I will  not dwell  on the  problem of
understanding rationality  review. But cf  A.  CONAN  DOYLE,  The Sign of the Four, in
THE  ANNOTATED  SHERLOCK  HoImus  610,  638  (W.  Baring-Gould  2d  ed.  1967)
("[W]hen  you  have  eliminated  the impossible,  whatever remains,  however  improbable,
must be  the truth.")  (emphasis  deleted).
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right  being denied  a relevant indicator  of arbitrary  discriminationY5  It
is  thus historically  inaccurate  to  view  equal  protection  analysis  as  fo-
cused  solely  on the nature  of classifications.
Nor  is  it immediately  clear  that  fundamental  rights  have nothing
to  do  with  a proper  normative  conception  of equality.  If we  deny the
blind the right to practice  medicine  and the right to vote,  are notions of
equality  implicated to  the  same degree?9"  Or, in our constitutional  de-
mocracy,  is refusal of the franchise  itself a brand  of inequality, a denial
of  respect  and  full  equality  of  status?97  As  other  writers  have  more
eloquently  argued,  the concept  of equality  may plausibly  be thought to
entail  equal  participation  in  those liberties  society  considers  fundamen-
tal. 8  If so, it  is  no misnomer  to  scrutinize  under the rubric of "equal
protection"  a  differential  restriction  on  the  exercise  of  fundamental
rights.9  However  equal  protection  is  viewed,  as  imposing  some  sub-
"' See, e.g.,  Truax v.  Corrigan,  257 U.S. 312  (1921)  (right to enjoy  property and
engage in business  free from tortious  interference); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.  33 (1915)
(right  to  work for  a living  in the  common occupations  of the community).  These cases
long antedated  Skinner v.  Oklahoma  ex  rel Williamson,  316 U.S.  535  (1942)  (strictly
scrutinizing  infringement  of right  to procreation).
"' Professor  Perry,  if  I  read  him  correctly,  would  reserve  heightened  scrutiny
under  the  equal  protection  clause  for  classifications  based  on  "morally  irrelevant"
traits, which  do  not include  traits relating  to a  person's  physical  capacity.  See  Perry,
supra note  83,  at  1065-67.  Nor  do  they  include  classifications  based  on  a  person's
voluntary  acts such as sexual preference. See id. His  theory as to the nature of equality
renders  laws  based  on  such  classifications  wholly  unsuitable  for  equal  protection
analysis.
"  See Reynolds v. Sims,  377 U.S.  533, 567  (1964)  ("To the extent that a citizen's
right  to vote  is debased,  he is  that much  less a  citizen.").
,'  See, e.g.,  Baker, supra note 76, at 963-64; Karst, Foreword:  Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment,  91  HARV.  L.  REV.  1, 26-34  (1977);  cf.  Skinner,
316 U.S.  at 541  ("When  the law lays  an unequal  hand on those who  have committed
intrinsically  the  same  quality  of offense  and  sterilizes  one  and  not the  other, it  has
made as  invidious  a discrimination  as if it had selected  a particular race or nationality
for  oppressive treatment.").
"  This  argument  does  not explain,  however,  the  category of fundamental  rights
equal protection  holdings based  on the conclusion  that a state has "penalized"  the exer-
cise of a  fundamental right. The "penalization"  rhetoric suggests that the Court detects
hostility  to the  class  of persons  who  have  exercised  a particular fundamental  right or
exercised  it in  a particular  way,  making  these  cases  more  like  suspect  classification
cases  than like fundamental  rights cases.  Certainly the situations  in Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S.  618,  660, 661  & n.9 (1969)  (Harlan, J., dissenting),  and Maher v.  Roe,
432 U.S.  464, 487-88  (1977)  (Brennan, J., dissenting),  (although the  plaintiffs lost  in
the latter case)  are  susceptible  to such  an interpretation.  Religious  minorities straddle
the  line between  suspect  class  theory  and  fundamental  rights theory  and may  provide
the aptest  analogy.  See United  States  v.  Carolene  Prods.  Co.,  304  U.S.  144,  152  n.4
(1938);  cf.  Hunter  v.  Erickson,  393 U.S.  385,  389-91  (1969)  (finding that a  charter
amendment making it more  difficult to enact bans  on racial or religious  discrimination
in  housing  than  to enact  other  housing  legislation  violated  equal  protection).  For an
argument  that  the  "penalization"  cases  do  not  really  involve  equality  issues,  see
Simons, supra note  71,  at 462-67.
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stantive notion of equality, as a safeguard  against subjective  hostility,  or
as a prohibition  of disrespectful  inattention  to one's  interests, discrimi-
nations  affecting  fundamental  rights  call  for  closer  scrutiny.
The second  criticism,  involving value  imposition, has  been defused
somewhat  by the Supreme  Court's  repudiation  of the broader  doctrine
of substantive  equal  protection."' 0  Nonetheless  there  may still be room
for  an  independent  criticism  to  the  extent  that  the  Court  picks  and
chooses  among  constitutional  rights  for  elevation  to  a  privileged  status
as  equal  protection  fundamental  rights.  Freedom  of  speech  and  the
right to marry have  achieved  this  status, but thus far  the right to bear
arms, the right to just compensation for takings of private property, and
rights  under  the  contract  clause  have not." 1  Furthermore,  some Jus-
tices  have argued that different  fundamental  rights should  evoke  differ-
ent  levels of heightened  scrutiny  under  the equal  protection  clause.
10 2
Commentators  have  also  noted  the  unpredictability  of  the  Court's
choice  of which analysis,  equal  protection  or direct  substantive  review,
to  employ  in given  cases.103
In large part, this kind  of discretionary judicial  action is the inevi-
table  reflection  of the  preferred  liberties  method  of  direct  substantive
review.  There is presently  a hierarchy  of constitutional rights receiving
varying  degrees  of protection,  and  whatever justifies  this  hierarchy  in
the sphere  of direct  substantive  review  may  be thought to justify  it in
the  equal  protection  sphere  as  well.  Yet  it  is  unclear  how  fully  the
hierarchy  of  equal  protection  mirrors  this  other  hierarchy.  Oddly
enough,  the majority that  rejected  the substantive  equal protection  ap-
proach  in Rodriguez has  never  seen  fit  to provide  its own explanation
of why  some  or  all  rights  "explicitly  or implicitly  guaranteed  by  the
Constitution"  should raise  special  problems  for equal  protection.  Jus-
100 Certainly the  Court thought so. See Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  at 30-34.  Of course,
this repudiation  was contemporaneous with  the undisguised reemergence  of substantive
due  process,  and  any  criticism  of judicial  value  choice  under  the  due  process  rubric
would apply  with similar  force to corollary  holdings under  the equal protection clause.
101  For  example,  the Supreme  Court has held  that a state's legislation  derogating
from  the  obligation  of its  own  contracts  triggers  closer judicial  scrutiny  than  impair-
ment of private contract obligations,  but the Court has not yet applied heightened equal
protection  scrutiny to a state's decision  to impair some public contracts  while respecting
others. See  Exxon Corp. v.  Eagerton,  462 U.S.  176, 195-196  (1983)  (applying rational
basis test  to impairment  of private contracts);  cf  Stearns v. Minnesota,  179 U.S.  223,
262  (1900)  (White, J.,  concurring)  (finding that  impairment  of  public  contract  was
arbitrary and  violated  equal  protection);  Duluth  & I.R.R.R.  v.  Saint  Louis  County,
179 U.S.  302,  305  (1900)  (same).
10I  See  Zablocki  v. Redhail,  434  U.S.  374,  397-400  (Powell,  J.,  concurring)
(1978);  id. at 406  & n.10  (Stevens,  J., concurring).
103  See, e.g., J. NOWAK, supra note  85,  at 817; Lupu, supra note 83, at 1017-18,
1026.  The  one thing  that can  safely  be  said  is  that the  Court does  not reserve  equal
protection  analysis  for cases  uniquely turning  on classification  problems.
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tice Marshall,  who has  never accepted  Rodriguez as either normatively
or  descriptively  correct,  has  continued  to  insist that  importance  to  the
individual,  the  factor on which  the earlier  fundamental  interests hold-
ings  were  based,  still  governs  the Court's  decisions.10'  It may  be that
after  Rodriguez this "importance"  theory  is still  operative,  at least  in
choosing among independently  protected  fundamental  rights;  or it may
be time for the Court to explain which  rights constitute  "just wants"  or
otherwise determine in some  essential way the equality of persons man-
dated by the fourteenth amendment." 0 5 Perhaps the best response to the
second  criticism,  then,  is  that  the  discretion  involved  in  fundamental
rights equal protection  may result from the incompleteness  of its articu-
lation. The approach  may presently  be subject  to abuse, but it does  not
inherently  lead  to abuse.
The third and fourth criticisms, redundancy  and rigidity, are  com-
plementary, and  their tension  reflects  uncertainty  over  how fundamen-
tal rights  equal  protection  is  applied.  If the equal  protection  analysis
duplicated  identically  the  analysis  that  would  otherwise  be  pursued
under some other rubric, then the doctrine would have nothing to offer.
If the equal  protection  analysis  were stricter,  then  some  would  find  it
too rigid. I believe the  correct response  is that equal protection  analysis
can provide  a more  powerful  check on discriminations  respecting fun-
damental  rights  than  direct  substantive  review  affords,  and  that  this
greater stringency is appropriate.  The difference  lies in the observation
of then  Justice  Rehnquist  already  quoted:  "'Due  process'  emphasizes
fairness  between  the State  and  the individual  dealing  with  the State,
regardless of how  other individuals in the  same situation may  be
treated." 108 This emphasis may be hard to justify in principle,  and may
not accurately  represent  the  Court's  conduct  in  every  case,107  but  too
often courts  act  exactly  as Justice  Rehnquist  described. 08  Even  when
104 See,  e.g.,  Harris  v.  McRae,  448  U.S.  297,  341-42  (1980)  (Marshall, J., dis-
senting);  Vance v.  Bradley, 440 U.S.  93, 115  (1979)  (Marshall, J., dissenting); Massa-
chusetts  Bd.  of  Retirement  v.  Murgia,  427  U.S.  307,  318-20  (1976)  (Marshall,  J.,
dissenting).
105  Cf  Plyler  v.  Doe,  457  U.S.  202,  234  (1982)  (Blackmun,  J.,  concurring)
("[A]ccepting  the principle  of the voting cases-the  idea that state  classifications  bear-
ing on certain interests pose the risk of allocating rights in a fashion inherently contrary
to any  notion of 'equality'-dictates  the  outcome here.").
'0 Ross  v. Moffitt,  417 U.S.  600,  609 (1974)  (emphasis added); see also Simons,
supra note  71,  at  467-72  (fundamental  rights  equal  protection  as  an  example  of a
"comparative  right").
107 See,  e.g.,  Minneapolis  Star  & Tribune  Co.  v.  Minnesota  Comm'r,  460  U.S.
575, 585-88  (1983);  Larson  v. Valente, 456 U.S.  228, 245-46  (1982);  First Nat'l Bank
of Boston  v.  Bellotti,  435  U.S.  765,  793-95  (1978);  City of Madison  School  Dist. v.
Wisconsin  Empl.  Relations  Comm'n,  429 U.S.  167,  174-76  (1976).
10"  See,  e.g.,  Members  of City Council  v.  Taxpayers  for  Vincent,  466  U.S.  789,
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courts  engaged  in  direct  substantive  review  notice  an  inconsistency  in
the  state's  treatment  of similarly  situated  persons,  they  do  not  always
treat the discrimination  as directly  relevant to the validity  of the limita-
tion on the plaintiff's rights. Inconsistency  may, as an empirical  matter,
undercut  the strength  of the state's claim  that restricting  the plaintiff's
actions  is  necessary  or  serves  a compelling  interest, but the state is not
called  upon  to  demonstrate the need for this differential  treatment.10 9
When  the  majority  denies  to  some  group  fundamental  constitu-
tional  liberties  that it preserves untrammeled  for  itself, or allows  those
liberties  to  be  exercised  only  in the  modes  that  it  prefers,  direct  and
searching  scrutiny  of the  discrimination  should  be  required.  Hostility,
domination,  or disregard  may  have  led the majority  to subordinate  the
minority's  rights to interests  that  it would  not consider  as outweighing
its own rights. The doctrine  of fundamental  rights equal protection  en-
sures  such  scrutiny  and  allows the  courts  to  invalidate  in their  actual
context  unequal  restrictions  that might  have been  upheld  if viewed  in
isolation  or if universally  applied.1 '
There  is  nothing  novel  in  the  observation  that  equal  protection
analysis  encourages circumspection  by forcing sacrifices to be shared. In
Justice Jackson's  classic  formulation,
The  framers  of the  Constitution  knew,  and  we  should  not
forget  today,  that  there  is  no  more  effective  practical  guar-
anty against arbitrary  and unreasonable  government  than  to
require that the principles  of law  which  officials  would  im-
pose upon  a minority  must  be imposed  generally.""
Universal  renunciation  of a fundamental  right  is particularly  unlikely.
"Everyone  at  some  time  or  other  loves  a  parade,"  as  Harry  Kalven
reminded us. "Equal  protection may, therefore,  require freedom for the
808-812  (1984); United  States v.  Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61  (1982);  H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S.  398,  412-13  (1981).
109  Professor Lupu makes  precisely this point, and applauds.it, arguing that justi-
fication  of  nonsuspect  discriminations  regarding  fundamental  rights  should  never  be
required,  under  due process or equal protection  theories.  See Lupu, supra note  83, at
1001  n.98,  1073.
110  See,  e.g.,  Carey  v.  Brown,  447  U.S.  455,  470-71  (1980)  (finding  that  the
state's  interest  in  "preserving  the  sanctity  of the  home"  may  be  a  reason  to  curtail
picketing in residential  areas, but only if in so  doing the state  does  not "discriminate[]
among pickets  based  on  the subject matter  of their  expression");  Williams  v.  Rhodes,
393  U.S.  23,  30-34  (1969)  (finding  that state  has  "broad  powers  to  regulate  voting
which may  include laws relating to the qualification  and functions  of electors,"  but the
state  may  not  impose  unequal  restriction  so  as  to  give  established  political  parties  an
advantage  over  new  parties).
"" Railway  Express Agency  v. New  York, 336 U.S.  106, 112 (1949)  (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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parades  we  hate." ' 112  Fundamental  rights  equal  protection  is  thus
neither  redundant  nor  overly  rigid-it  is  the  necessary  safeguard
against  discrimination  in the areas that  matter most.
2.  The  Need  for Scrutiny  of Geographical  Discrimination:  With
Apologies  for  Some  Jargon
The  various  forms  of  geographical  discrimination  can  raise  the
dangers  that  fundamental  rights  equal  protection  addresses.  Unfortu-
nately,  I must introduce some additional terminology  regarding  catego-
ries of geographical  discriminations,  in  order  to  anticipate likely  criti-
cisms of the more  unified  treatment of geographical  discrimination that
will follow.  In candor,  then,  I  should distinguish  among  three  catego-
ries  of geographical  discriminations.  The  first  are  "explicit  residence
discriminations,"  which  expressly  restrict  a given  benefit or  burden  to
the residents of a particular  region. For example,  states commonly  limit
free  public  education  in  each  school  district  to  residents  of  that  dis-
trict." ' The second category  consists of "pure location discriminations,"
those  in which  the allocation  of benefits  and  burdens  does  not depend
on  the  residence  of any  person,  but rather  on other  geographical  fac-
tors.  For example,  a form of zoning  that  prohibited  all theatrical  per-
formances within a certain county,  while permitting them in the rest of
the state, would  be  a pure  location  discrimination. 14
The third category  is a hybrid, the "indirect  residence discrimina-
tions,"  resulting  from  the  interaction between  explicit  residence  dis-
criminations  and  pure  location  discriminations.  For  example,  suppose
that a state has two school districts.  Residents of each school district can
attend without tuition only the schools of their district. Suppose further
that after a  scandalous  performance  in one  district, the State  Commis-
sioner  of  Education  issues  a  directive  to  that  district,  forbidding  its
schools  to  stage or to  teach drama.  The directive  on its  face  discrimi-
nates  between  institutions,  not  residents,  but  as  a  result  of the  pupil
allocation system  it creates  an indirect  de jure residence discrimination.
112  Kalven,  The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965  Sup. CT.  REV. 1, 30 (1966).
218  See,  e.g.,  Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S.  321,  329-30  (1983)  (upholding such a
restriction).  The Court  has suggested its approval  of simple residence requirements  for
certain  government  benefits,  even  while  striking  down  durational  residence  require-
ments. See,  e.g.,  Memorial  Hosp.  v. Maricopa  County, 415  U.S.  250,  255 (1974)  (in-
validating one-year  residence requirement as a condition for receipt of free medical  care
but  not  intending  to  "'cast  doubt  on  the  validity  of appropriately  defined  and  uni-
formly applied  bona  fide  residence requirements'  ") (quoting Dunn v.  Blumstein, 405
U.S.  330,  342  n.13 (1972)).
114  Cf Schad  v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61  (1981)  (invalidating on
first amendment grounds a prohibition on live entertainment throughout  municipality).
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Indirect  residence  discriminations  are  frequently  mediated  by  a  geo-
graphically  limited  government  institution.  Attendance  rules,  venue
rules, and voter residence rules can convert  distinctions between  school,
judicial,  and  electoral  districts  into  distinctions  between  residents.  Be-
cause  by  their terms  they  address  things  and  not people,  courts  often
have  treated  them  as  especially  inoffensive  to  equal  protection
principles.
11 5
These  latter two  categories,  the pure  location  discriminations  and
the indirect residence discriminations,  together comprise the class I have
earlier  called territorial  discriminations.  The explicit  and indirect  resi-
dence discriminations,  taken together, may be called "residence  discrim-
inations."  All these categories,  taken together, exhaust the forms  of "ge-
ographical  discriminations."  Examples  of  indirect  residence
discriminations  affecting  fundamental  rights  include  the  reapportion-
ment  cases," '  and  (if education  were  a  fundamental  right)  the school
finance  cases.117  Examples  of  pure  location  discriminations  affecting
fundamental  rights include  defamation  laws  whose  stringency  depends
on the  place where the communication  is received,"18  bans on picketing
in  certain  neighborhoods,119  and  zoning  regulations  excluding  certain
kinds  of families  from  specified  areas.
12 0
It  is important  to  recognize  that when  an  explicit  residence  dis-
crimination  and  a  pure  location  discrimination  combine  to  create  an
indirect  residence  discrimination,  the  constitutionality  of  the  compo-
nents  viewed  separately  does  not guarantee  the  constitutionality  of the
combination.  For example,  a state could  adopt venue  rules limiting  ac-
tions brought  by state residents to the county of the plaintiff's residence.
115  See, e.g.,  Washington v. Yakima  Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 499-502  (1979)
(upholding statute conferring  "checkerboard"  jurisdiction  over Indian  territory against
equal protection  challenge);  Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439  U.S. 60, 70-75
(1978)  (upholding  "police  jurisdiction"  statutes  that  extended  municipal  police,  sani-
tary, and  business licensing  powers  over  those residing within three  miles of corporate
boundaries  without permitting such residents  to vote  in municipal elections); cf.  Griffin
v.  County School Bd.,  377 U.S.  218, 230-31  (1964)  (rejecting dosing of public  schools
and  subsequent  opening of all-white  private schools  in  one county  after desegregation
order, although noting that a state  has wide discretion  to make  laws applicable  only  in
certain  counties).
116  See,  e.g.,  Reynolds  v.  Sims,  377  U.S.  533  (1964).
117  See Rodriguez, 411  U.S. at  1; Serrano v. Priest, 18  Cal. 3d 728,  557 P.2d 929,
135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976),  cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907  (1977).  The Supreme Court has
left  open  the  possibility  that  there  is  a  fundamental  right  to  a  minimally  adequate
education.  See  Papasan  v.  Allain,  106  S.  Ct. 2932, 2944  (1986).
118  See  RESTATEMENT  OF  CONFICT  OF  LAWS  §  377  n.5  (1934).
119  Cf  Carey  v.  Brown,  447  U.S.  455  (1980)  (invalidating  statute  that  forbade
picketing in  residential  areas  because  of its exemption  for  labor picketing).
120  See,  e.g.,  Moore  v.  City  of E. Cleveland,  431  U.S.  494  (1977)  (invalidating
zoning  ordinance that prohibited  certain  categories  of relatives  from living  together).
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Instead,  the state  could  regulate  the dockets  of its  courts  by  assigning
subject matter jurisdiction  in  divorce actions only to the  courts in a sin-
gle county.  These are,  respectively, an explicit  residence discrimination
and  a pure  location  discrimination  with no apparent  constitutional  in-
firmities.121  If the state  adopts  both  rules  simultaneously,  however,  it
creates  an  indirect  residence  discrimination  that  completely  denies  di-
vorce  to  residents  of  every  county  but one.  This result  surely  violates
equal  protection.122  Courts  can  go seriously  astray by  focusing on  the
components  in isolation.
It might  be  suggested  that  heightened  scrutiny  should  apply only
to  residence discriminations  and  never to pure  location  discriminations
limiting  the  exercise  of  a  fundamental  right.  For  example,  a  statute
forbidding  first  cousins  to  cohabit  within  urban  areas  would  not  be
closely  scrutinized  so long as  city dwellers  who had the means  to do so
were  free to cohabit  incestuously  in the country on weekends.  I should
admit  that restricting  fundamental  rights  equal  protection  to  residence
classes would not contradict most of the Supreme  Court's precedents on
territorial  discrimination  respecting  fundamental  rights;  the  reappor-
tionment  cases  and  even  the Rodriguez case  involved  at  least  indirect
residence  discriminations. 2  This  restriction  could  give  some  needed
content  to the confusing motto that equal  protection  "relates  to persons
as  such  rather than  areas."
Such a restriction  might find  support  in theories  of equal  protec-
tion  that  limit  the  scope  of  the  clause  to  combatting  certain  special
kinds of classifications. For example, it could be argued that equal pro-
121  Except, perhaps, to the extent that this created an insuperable  financial obsta-
cle to the divorce of indigents. Cf  Boddie v. Connecticut,  401  U.S.  371  (1971)  (invali-
dating on due process grounds a  statute denying court access  to indigents seeking mar-
riage  dissolution  who  could  not afford court  costs).
"  See id. at  385-86  (Douglas, J.,  concurring);  id. at  387-89  (Brennan, J.,  con-
curring). The  contrary  view,  that the  scheme is  harmless  because  it merely  forces  the
plaintiff to take  up residence  temporarily in  the favored  county, seems  to be  an unrea-
sonable application  of the already  insensitive holding  in Sosna v.  Iowa,  419  U.S.  393
(1975)  (upholding state durational  residency  requirement  for those seeking  divorce  be-
cause  the statute  merely  imposed  a delay  and  did not exclude  anyone from  the state
courts indefinitely).
123  In  Illinois  State  Bd.  of  Elections  v.  Socialist  Workers  Party, 440  U.S.  173
(1979),  the  Court  invalidated  a  ballot access  provision  the  effect  of which was  to  re-
quire greater demonstrated support  for a candidate's  or party's entry into local elections
than  for entry  into  statewide  elections.  The  Court  expressly  characterized  this  as  a
"geographic  classification,"  id. at  183,  and  made no  attempt  to identify  a  disfavored
class  of residents.  I  do  not think it is  possible  to  frame  this  case as  even  an indirect
residence discrimination. The Court's summary affirmance in Parker v.  Levy, 411  U.S.
978  (1973),  afg 346  F. Supp.  897  (E.D. La.  1972),  invalidating  as irrational  a state
revenue-sharing plan that distributed tax funds arbitrarily among parishes,  is the clear-
est example of a pure location discrimination  struck down by the  Court, though it did
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tection  should  be  concerned  primarily  with  classifications  turning  on
the  characteristics  of the  person  rather  than  those  turning on  the  cir-
cumstances  in  which  she  seeks  to  exercise  the  right.1 2 4  A  second,
broader  account would permit scrutiny of classifications  based either on
personal  characteristics  or on  circumstances  beyond  the control  of  the
actor,  but  not those  based  on  her  voluntary  acts. 25  Under  either  ac-
count,  variations  in the availability  of a fundamental  right  in  different
locations  would  not qualify  as  an equal  protection  problem.
Both accounts  are, however,  subject to two major objections-they
can  be  squared  with  neither  reason  nor  precedent.  First,  aside  from
physical  traits like race,  gender,  height, and  age, "characteristics"  can-
not  meaningfully  be  distinguished  from  "circumstances"  and  "acts."
Residence,  political  affiliation,  religious  convictions,  marital  status,
felon  status,  and often  citizenship  all  result from voluntary  interaction
with  external  circumstances.1 26  A  general  rule  of  the  form  "Persons
who  do  X may  not thereafter  do Y"  is  simply identical  to a classifica-
tory  decision  that  "Persons  with  the  characteristic  of  having  done  X
may not  do Y.,,1
27  In fact,  the Court  has rarely  hesitated  to scrutinize
classifications  based  on  "acts"  or  "circumstances."  Innumerable  ra-
tional  basis  equal  protection  cases  have  involved  classification  by
acts, 28  frequently  by  a  chosen  manner  or  line  of business.' 2 9  Funda-
124  This appears to be the theory behind Justice Stewart's concurrence  in Zablocki
v.  Redhail,  434  U.S.  374,  391  (1978).  Justice  Stewart  also  displayed  great  concern
about identifying  classes  in his concurring opinion in Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  at 62 (Stew-
art, J., concurring).  This view  may  also inform Justice Stevens's  concurring opinion  in
Clements  v.  Fashing, 457 U.S.  957,  973  (1982),  that  excused  from  even rational basis
scrutiny  variations  in  the  qualifications  for  candidacy  for  different  statewide  offices,
where  "disparate  treatment  ...  is  entirely  a  function  of the  different  offices  [occu-
pied]."  Id.  at  974-75.  Justice  Holmes  once  wrote  an  extraordinary  opinion  for  the
Court over Justice  Harlan's dissent, holding that a discrimination  between producers of
domestic  wines and liquor merchants not dealing  in domestic wines was  not subject  to
equal protection  scrutiny because the alleged classes were not "classes naturally existing
in  the community,"  unlike farmers  or raisers of livestock. See  Cox  v. Texas,  202  U.S.
446,  450  (1906).  Professor  Perry  argues  for  an  even narrower  view than  the one  de-
scribed  in the  text, namely that equal protection  deals  only with  classification  by mor-
ally  irrelevant  personal  traits,  which  include  neither voluntary  acts  nor  physical  or
mental  capabilities.  See Perry, supra note  83,  at  1065-67.
125  The description above is an attempt  to fathom the meaning of Justice Stevens's
statement  that "general  rules"  regulating  conduct  cannot  raise  equal protection  ques-
tions  at  all.  See  Jones  v. Helms,  452  U.S.  412,  423-24  (1981);  New  York  Transit
Auth.  v.  Beazer,  440 U.S.  568,  587  (1979).
'"  On the  voluntary character  of residence  in particular, see Martinez  v. Bynum,
461  U.S.  321,  330-33  (1983);  Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  at  122 n.83 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).  But see Plyler v.  Doe, 457  U.S.  202,  220  (1982)  (finding that children  of illegal
aliens  are not  in the country  voluntarily).
127  An exception to this statement may be found in the ex post facto questions  that
might  result  from the  timing of  a  rule's enactment.
128  See,  e.g.,  United States  Dep't of Agric.  v. Moreno,  413  U.S.  528,  534  (1973)
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mental  rights equal  protection  cases  have often  involved  classifications
based on voluntary acts 30  or the  circumstances  surrounding  exercise  of
a right. 1"1  Thus, generalities  of equal  protection  theory present  no  ob-
stacle  to  extending  scrutiny  of  territorial  discrimination  beyond  resi-
dence  classifications.
Nor is tolerance of pure location discriminations  required  by prin-
ciples  unique  to  the  doctrine  of fundamental  rights  equal  protection.
The  Supreme  Court  has  made  clear  that  not  every  classification  that
"affects"  fundamental  rights  triggers  heightened  scrutiny  under  the
equal protection clause. 132  Selectively subsidizing some  exercises of fun-
damental  rights,  by  providing  public  schools,  Medicaid  for childbirth,
(unrelated persons living in one  household);  Eisenstadt v.  Baird,  405 U.S.  438, 454-55
(1972)  (remaining single);  Lindsey v. Normet,  405 U.S.  56,  79 (1972)  (tenants appeal-
ing  from  verdicts  under  forcible  entry  and  wrongful  detainer  statute);  Turner  v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346,  362 (1970)  (failing to own freehold interest in property);  Louis-
ville Gas  & Elec. Co. v. Coleman,  277 U.S. 32, 38  (1928)  (duration of mortgage deter-
mining  tax exemption).  This  list  includes  only  cases  striking  down the  classifications
and  ignores the multitude where  the classification  withstood scrutiny.  Of course, as we
have seen,  pure location  discriminations also have  been  subjected  to rationality  review,
though  they generally  survive  this  review in the Supreme  Court. See,  e.g.,  Salsburg v.
Maryland,  346 U.S.  545,  550-51  (1954)  (upholding statute making illegally  seized evi-
dence  generally  inadmissible  in misdemeanor  prosecutions,  but  admissible in  prosecu-
tions  for  certain  gambling misdemeanors  in one county).
12'  See, e.g.,  Stewart Dry Goods Co.  v. Lewis, 294 U.S.  550,  557-58 (1935)  (sales
tax graduated  by sales volume);  Concordia Fire Ins. Co.  v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535,  548-
49  (1934)  (distinguishing  between fire and  casualty  insurance);  Smith  v. Cahoon,  283
U.S.  553,  567  (1931)  (exemption  for  carriers  of  agricultural  goods);  F.S.  Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253  U.S. 412,  414-15  (1920) (tax discrimination  based on place
of doing  business); Atchison,  T.  & S.F. Ry.  v. Vosburg,  238 U.S.  56,  60  (1915)  (dis-
crimination  between  shippers  and carriers);  Connolly  v.  Union  Sewer  Pipe  Co.,  184
U.S.  540,  557  (1902)  (discrimination  between  agriculture  and  other businesses).  The
foregoing  are old cases finding the discriminations irrational.  The modern cases tend to
uphold the discriminations but  continue to scrutinize  them. See,  e.g.,  Rice  v. Norman
Williams  Co.,  458  U.S.  654,  665  (1982)  (distinguishing  "designated"  and  "undesig-
nated"  alcoholic  beverage  importers);  Minnesota  v.  Clover  Leaf  Creamery  Co.,  449
U.S. 456,  461-71  (1981)  (distinguishing  plastic and  nonplastic milk containers);  Barry
v.  Barchi,  443  U.S.  55,  67  (1979)  (distinguishing  harness  and  thoroughbred  racing
trainers); see also Railway  Express Agency,  Inc. v.  New  York,  336  U.S.  106,  114-15
(1949)  (Jackson,  J., concurring)  (distinguishing  vehicular  advertising  for  hire and ad-
vertising of one's own  business  on one's  own  truck).
130  See, e.g.,  Kusper  v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51  (1973)  (prior party affiliation);  Cip-
riano v.  City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701  (1969)  (ownership of real property);  Carrington
v.  Rash,  380  U.S.  89  (1965)  (membership  in  armed forces);  Skinner  v.  Oklahoma  ex
rel Williamson,  316 U.S.  535  (1942)  (larceny).
131  See,  e.g.,  Illinois  State  Bd.  of Elections  v.  Socialist Workers  Party, 440  U.S.
173  (1979)  (obtaining  candidacy  for  local  rather  than  statewide  office);  O'Brien  v.
Skinner, 414  U.S.  524  (1974)  (convicted  misdemeanants  and pretrial  detainees incar-
cerated in their county of residence denied  opportunity  to vote); Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S.  92  (1972)  (picketing in nonlabor  dispute).
131  See,  e.g.,  Regan  v.  Taxation  with  Representation,  461  U.S.  540,  548-49
(1983)  (finding that  congressional  decision  to permit tax  subsidies  for lobbying  by vet-
erans'  groups  but not by  others did not trigger strict scrutiny).
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or tax exemptions for veterans' groups, does  not interfere with the exer-
cise of fundamental  rights by others at their own expense. 1 3  Significant
interference  with the exercise  of a fundamental  right, however, will re-
quire  close  scrutiny  of  the  classifications  defining  the interference.
13 4
The  Court has not  limited  itself  to some  special  category  of classifica-
tions  peculiarly  relevant  to  the  particular  right.  By  coincidence,  the
Court's  holdings  in the  free  speech  area  have  found  equal  protection
violations  only  in  two  instances  of  blatant  content  discrimination.
1 35
Nonetheless, the Court has formulated the implications of equal protec-
tion  more  broadly  as  forbidding  discrimination  among  speakers  or
speech-related  activities in a public forum. 3 '  In the  voting rights area,
the Court has closely  scrutinized  all manner of qualifications  erected  as
total  barriers  to  the  franchise.137  Where  the  state  regulation  keeps  a
candidate  off the ballot,  however,  the Court  has based  its analysis  on
the  voters'  rights,  not  the  candidate's,  and  has  required  a  significant
impact  on the  electorate  before affording  heightened  scrutiny.1 38
Thus,  it  is  the  impact  on  fundamental  rights  that  has  led  the
Court  to  analyze  closely  a motley  assortment  of classifications  not  re-
pugnant  in  themselves  to  the  essence  of  the  right  in  question.  These
include  membership  in  the  armed  forces,13 '  failure  to  pay  a  filing
fee, ' 140  residence  in  a  federal  enclave,41  the  distinction  between  state
181  See  id. at  548-50;  see also Harris  v.  McRae,  448  U.S.  297,  316-18,  321-26
(1980)  (holding that  federal  subsidy of other medical  services  but not abortions  did not
impinge  on right  to  choose  abortion and  so  was  not subject  to heightened  scrutiny).
134  See  Zablocki  v.  Redhail,  434  U.S.  374,  383  (1978).
133  See  Carey  v.  Brown,  447  U.S.  455  (1980);  Mosley,  408  U.S.  at 92.
136  See,  e.g.,  Perry  Educ. Ass'n v. Perry  Local  Educators'  Ass'n, 460  U.S. 37,  55
(1983);  Carey, 447  U.S.  at  460.  At  the  same  time,  it  has  held  that a  party  validly
excluded  from  a  private  forum  cannot  bootstrap her  way  in  via  the equal  protection
clause,  because  no  fundamental  right  is  being  infringed.  See  Minnesota  State  Bd.  v.
Knight, 465  U.S. 271,  280-81  (1984); Perry, 460 U.S.  at 54. Moreover,  the Court has
recently indicated that heightened equal protection scrutiny does  not extend to discrimi-
nations  affecting  commercial speech.  See  Posadas  de  Puerto  Rico  Assoc.  v.  Tourism
Co.,  106  S.  Ct.  2968,  2979  n.9  (1986)  (citing  Dunagin  v.  City of Oxford,  718  F.2d
738,  752-53  (5th  Cir. 1983)  (en  banc),  cert. denied, 467  U.S.  1259  (1984)).
137  See,  e.g.,  Dunn v.  Blumstein, 405  U.S.  330  (1972)  (durational  residence  re-
quirement);  Evans  v.  Cornman,  398  U.S.  419  (1970)  (residence  in  federal  enclave);
Kramer  v. Union  Free School  Dist., 395  U.S.  621  (1969)  (lack of property  ownership
and  not  being a parent  of  a child attending  school);  Carrington  v.  Rash,  380  U.S.  89
(1965)  (membership  in  armed  forces).
13I  See Anderson  v.  Celebrezze,  460 U.S.  780  (1983);  Clements  v.  Fashing. 457
U.S.  957 (1982)  (plurality  opinion);  Illinois State  Bd. of Elections  v. Socialist Workers
Party,  440 U.S.  173  (1979);  Buckley  v.  Valeo,  424 U.S.  1 (1976);  Bullock  v.  Carter,
405  U.S.  134  (1972).
139  See Carrington, 380 U.S.  at  89.
140  See Bullock, 405  U.S.  at  134.
141  See Evans, 398 U.S.  at  419.
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and city  elections,142  and  being  a  "resident  having  minor issue  not  in
his  custody and  which  he  is under obligation  to  support by  any  court
order  or judgment. '14 3  If  these  classifications  all  require  heightened
scrutiny, then nothing in the nature of fundamental  rights equal protec-
tion  precludes  its  application  to  pure  location  discriminations  or other
territorial  discriminations.
Arbitrarily limiting equal protection analysis to residence  discrimi-
nations would  also  produce  grave  practical  injustice.  Most distinctions
based on geographical  location will in fact fall most heavily on residents
of  the  disfavored  locality,  particularly  indigent  residents,  who  cannot
afford  to travel  for the purpose  of exercising  a fundamental  right.  Dis-
criminations  in the area  of family  privacy,  for example,  have  their se-
verest impact on residents  of the disfavored  locality, even if those travel-
ing  through  may  also  be  temporarily  inconvenienced.  Restrictions  on
freedom  of  speech  would  injure  most  seriously  resident  speakers  and
the resident  audience,  as well as those passing through or attempting to
reach  the resident audience.  Strictly scrutinizing  residence  discrimina-
tions would do little  to safeguard fundamental  rights if nearly coexten-
sive  location  discriminations  escaped  close  examination.
The importance  of  closely  scrutinizing  pure  location  discrimina-
tions is supported by the exception that proves the rule:  the de minimis
geographical  limitations tolerated as time, place and manner restrictions
under the first amendment.  "To be reasonable, time, place, and manner
restrictions  not only must serve significant  state interests  but also must
leave open adequate alternative channels  of communication. 1
1144 Oppor-
tunities  foreclosed  by  a place  restriction  must  be available  "reasonably
nearby. ' 1 4 5  Here,  ironically,  the  discrimination  is  the  saving
grace-picketing  may  be banned on  the courthouse  steps  because it  is
permitted  a block away. The key element of ample alternative channels
for the exercise of the rights in question disappears  when the regulation
extends  over a substantial area.  Excluding a category of protected  activ-
14'  See  Socialist Workers Party, 440  U.S.  at  173.
148  Zablocki  v.  Redhail,  434 U.S.  374,  375  (1978).
1"  Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,  75-76 (1981); accord Hef-
fron  v. International  Soc'y for  Krishna  Consciousness,  452  U.S.  640,  654  (1981).
145  Schad, 452 U.S.  at 76.  I must confess  that I wrote the text above  before then
Justice  Rehnquist's opinion  in City  of Renton  v.  Playtime  Theatres,  106  S.  Ct.  925
(1986),  which,  if taken seriously  as a  statement  of first amendment  law,  would  effec-
tively  eviscerate  the  concepts  of "time,  place  and  manner,"  "content  neutrality,"  and
"narrow  tailoring."  It is reasonable  to hope that the distortions introduced in that opin-
ion will apply only to the  category of "sexually  explicit materials,"  particularly in view
of the more  conventional  approach  taken  by the four-Justice  plurality  (three of whom
silently  concurred in Renton) in Pacific Gas  & Elec.  Co. v.  Public Util. Comm'n,  106
S.  Ct.  903  (1986),  decided  the same  day.
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ity from  a public  library  may  be  a minor restriction,  but excluding  it
from  an  entire  district  severely  infringes  the  rights  of those  affected,
especially  when the  same conduct  is  permitted  in the rest of the  state.
3.  General  Position-Random  Intrastate  Variations
Once  a  classification  is  created  affording  different  scope  for  the
exercise  of fundamental  rights in  different  parts of the  same state,  the
equal  protection  clause  may  be  implicated.  Suppose,  for example,  that
the  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania  adopts  a statute  permitting  mar-
riage without  parental  consent  at the  age  of sixteen west  of the 78°W
meridian,  but  forbidding  such  marriage  until  the  age  of twenty-three
east  of that  line.14 "6  The more  stringent  age  limit  is arguably  constitu-
tional when viewed  in  isolation, 14 7  particularly  given the  inevitable  ar-
bitrariness  of any age  limit."  But its juxtaposition with  the more  lax
standard elsewhere  in the  same state  creates  a discrimination  demand-
ing heightened scrutiny.149 The different  requirements  may  be justified
by  "local  conditions,"  and the  state should be  afforded an opportunity
to demonstrate their propriety. But separate age  limits in,  for example,
urban  and  rural  areas  should  be  no  more  immune  from  heightened
scrutiny than  separate  age limits for children  of clerks  and children  of
farmers.
Thus,  geographical  classifications  affecting  fundamental  rights,
like all others,  should  presumptively  be subject  to heightened  scrutiny.
As  I  shall  soon  be  explaining  at  extraordinary  length,  however,  dis-
criminations whose contours run along political boundaries raise special
questions  that  must  be considered  separately.150  For the present,  then,
the most  we  can  state  is the  following  general  rule:  when  (1)  a state
imposes  a  geographical  discrimination  with  respect  to  fundamental
'"  Use  of longitude  to  create  territorial  classifications  is  not  as  farfetched  as  it
may  sound. See,  e.g.,  United  States v.  Tulare  Lake Canal  Co.,  677  F.2d 713,  718-19
(9th  Cir.  1982)  (upholding  statute  applicable  only  west  of  100°W  meridian,  which
bisects  six states),  vacated as moot,  459  U.S.  1095  (1983).
147  See Zablocki, 434 U.S.  at  399  (Powell,  J.,  concurring).
148  See Oregon  v.  Mitchell, 400  U.S.  112, 294-95  (1970)  (Stewart, J., concurring
in part  and  dissenting  in part); see also Louisville  Gas  & Elec.  Co.  v.  Coleman,  277
U.S.  32,  41  (1928)  (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting the  inevitable arbitrariness  of many
types of legal  distinctions).
"" The  precise  standard  of review  applied  in  such  cases  is  unclear.  Compare
Zablocki v.  Redhail, 434 U.S.  374,  383 (1978)  ("critical  examination") with id. at 400
(Powell,  J., concurring)  ("fair and  substantial relationship") and id. at 406  n.10 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring)  (level  of scrutiny  somewhere between  "so  strict  that a holding  of
unconstitutionality  is virtually  foreordained". and one  that  is  satisfied  by  "a  rational
expectation  of occasional  and random  benefit").
'50  To foreshadow  my  conclusion  once again,  I  believe  that some,  but not all, of
these  should  escape heightened  scrutiny.
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rights  within  its  borders,  and (2)  it  discriminates  between  substantial
regions151  the  boundaries  of  which  do  not  coincide  with  those  of the
state and its political subdivisions,  and (3)  the disparity is such  that its
imposition  on  nonsuspect  classes  that  were  not geographically  defined
would normally  trigger  heightened  scrutiny, then the geographical  dis-
crimination  should  also  be  subjected  to  heightened  scrutiny.
4.  First Special  Position-Independent  Action  of Political
Subdivisions
The  equal  protection  clause  by  its terms  restricts  the states them-
selves,  not the executive or legislative officials  of municipalities or other
political subdivisions. Nonetheless,  federal jurisprudence  has always at-
tributed  municipal  action  to the parent  state for purposes  of the four-
teenth  amendment.'52  The equal  protection  imperative  has  "reference
to actions of the political body  denominated a State, by whatever instru-
ments  or  in whatever  modes  that  action  may  be  taken.'
1
1
5 3  Municipal
corporations  cannot hide behind their separate legal identity, for in fed-
eral  contemplation  they  are  merely  state  instrumentalities  or  agents,
and  "[t]he  actions of local government  are the  actions of the State.' 54
When two different municipalities in the same state impose differ-
ent  restrictions  on the  exercise  of  fundamental  rights  within  their  re-
spective  borders, however, courts are not accustomed to scrutinizing this
as a mode of state action. 55 They  do not attribute both ordinances  back
to  the parent  state  and  examine  the resulting variation,  even  where  a
statute  passed  by  the state  explicitly  imposing  those  same territorially
limited restrictions  would  evoke  rational  basis  or heightened  scrutiny.
A lengthy  detour is necessary to explore  how  municipal variations
in the treatment  of fundamental  rights have  come to  escape equal pro-
151  The requirement  that the  area be  substantial  is a de  minimis exception  corre-
sponding to the time, place and manner limitation in first amendment law. See Clark  v.
Community  for Creative  Non-Violence,  468 U.S.  288 (1984);  Heffron v.  International
Soc'y  for  Krishna  Consciousness, 452  U.S.  640  (1981).
15'  See,  e.g.,  Home Tel.  & Tel.  Co. v. City of Los Angeles,  227 U.S.  278,  294-96
(1913);  Yick  Wo v.  Hopkins,  118 U.S.  356,  373  (1886).  This  identity had  previously
been  recognized  in  cases  involving  the  contract  clause  of the  Constitution.  See,  e.g.,
Home Tel.,  227 U.S.  at  295; Murray  v.  Charleston,  96 U.S.  432,  448  (1878).
113 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.  339, 346-47 (1879);  see also Yick  Wo,  118 U.S. at
373-74  (stating  that  municipal  authorities  charged  with  the administration  of ordi-
nances  represent the  state).
Avery  v.  Midland  County,  390  U.S. 474,  480  (1968).
155  Obviously,  two municipalities  are  not necessary  to  create  this  situation.  One
home rule municipality and  inaction by the rest of the state are enough.  Cf.  Fort Smith
Light  & Traction  Co.  v. Board  of Improvement,  274 U.S.  387,  391  (1927)  (equating
state  power  to  delegate  authority  to  a  municipality  for  local  lawmaking  with  state
power  to enact  law  limited to  that municipality).
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tection  review. The  superficially  plausible  explanation turns out to rest
on  a  fallacy,  and  so  a  deeper explanation  must  be  sought.  It would be
revolting  to have no  better reason  for a rule  of law than that  so it was
laid  down  in the  time of Justice  Field.
a.  The Single Decisionmaker Fallacy
One possible  explanation  for this phenomenon  is to give an "anti-
attribution"  or  "single  decisionmaker"  account  of  equal  protection.
Under  such  a theory,  equal  protection  principles  can be  violated  only
when  (1)  actions  are  taken  by  a  single  government  official  or multi-
member  decisionmaking  body  and  (2)  those  actions  simultaneously  re-
sult  in  the  imposition  of  different  treatment  on  two  or more  classes.
This  account  subsumes  the  vast  majority  of litigated  equal  protection
cases,  which  involve  either  legislation  expressly  defining  the  class  to
which it applies or executive  or judicial officers  informally sorting indi-
viduals  by their race or other criteria  and discriminating accordingly.  It
covers the simplest model of an equal protection  problem, the paradigm
of explicit legislative  classification.15  Under the "single  decisionmaker"
approach,  the  independent  actions  of  two  state  officials  will  never  be
attributed  back to the  state for  comparison.  No equal  protection  ques-
tion arises  until we  identify one  person or  body within the umbrella  of
the  state  affording  favorable  treatment  to  one  group  and  unfavorable
treatment  to another.
This  single decisionmaker  approach  is  not a  mere straw man  en-
gendered by  diseased  academic imagination. Justice  Stevens provided  a
classic statement  of this analysis  in obiter dictum in his opinion  for the
Court  in New York  City Transit Authority v.  Beazer.1 57  The Transit
Authority  had  adopted  a  policy  dictating  that  none  of  its  employees
could be methadone  users, and Justice Stevens was prepared to give the
back of his hand to  Beazer's  equal  protection  challenge:
The Equal Protection Clause  of the Fourteenth  Amend-
ment provides that no State shall "deny  to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  The  Clause
announces  a  fundamental  principle:  the  State  must  govern
impartially.  General  rules  that  apply  evenhandedly  to  all
persons  within  the jurisdiction  unquestionably  comply  with
this principle. Only when a governmental unit adopts a rule
that has a special impact on less than all the persons sub-
1  See, e.g.,  Tussman  & tenBroek, supra note 27,  at 346; Developments-Equal
Protection, supra note  73,  at  1076-77.
257  440  U.S.  568  (1979).
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ject to its jurisdiction  does the question whether this princi-
ple is violated arise. 158
The single  decisionmaker theory  has a superficial  plausibility, and nu-
merous  statements  of  equal  protection  doctrine,  if  taken  literally  and
out of context,  suggest that  it  is well  established.
One can without difficulty  fashion arguments  to support the single
decisionmaker  theory.  First, the equal  protection  clause  concerns  itself
with "classifications,"  and no classification  occurs until some  state actor
divides her audience into two nonempty subsets.  Second,  the equal pro-
tection  principle  requires  only  similar  treatment  of  similarly  situated
persons, and two individuals subject to two different decisionmakers are
not similarly  situated.  Third, the  equal  protection  clause  forbids  only
intentional discrimination,  and the prohibited intent to discriminate  can
be  found  only  within  a  unified  consciousness  not  distributed  between
separate  actors  addressing  separate  classes.
The  weakness  of  these  arguments  should  be  self-evident.  Equal
protection  concerns  itself  with  inequality  of  treatment,  regardless  of
whether  an act of "classification"  has occurred.159 From the beginning,
the Supreme  Court has recognized  that the equal  protection  imperative
deals  with substance,  not form-it  addresses  state action  "by  whatever
instruments  or in  whatever  modes  that  action  may  be taken."1 6 0  The
fourteenth  amendment  is  "a  pledge  of  the  protection  of  equal
laws"6  6-not  just facially neutral  statutes, but a system of laws that in
practical  operation  affords  equality  of rights  to persons  similarly  situ-
ated.  Statutory  classifications  are not  examined in isolation, but rather
are probed  in the  context  of the state's  legal  system  to determine  their
character.  As  Chief  Justice  Hughes  wrote  in  Gregg Dyeing Co.  v.
Query:
162
The  question  of  constitutional  validity  is  not  to  be  deter-
mined  by artificial  standards. What  is  required  is that state
158  Id. at 587-88  (dictum) (emphasis added).  The  language is dictum because  the
Court  did not uphold  the classification  "without further inquiry,"  but  analyzed  its ra-
tionality  at length.
15"  See,  e.g.,  Griffin v.  Illinois,  351  U.S.  12,  17-18  (1956); id. at 34-36 (Harlan,
J., dissenting)  (impact  on  the  poor of generally  applicable  payment  requirement  for
acquiring a trial transcript  needed  for appeal);  Shelley  v. Kraemer,  334 U.S.  1, 20-21
(1948)  (judicial  enforcement  of private covenants  based  on race);  Snowden v.  Hughes,
321  U.S.  1, 8 (1944)  (purposeful discrimination  against a  single individual);  Cumber-
land  Coal  Co.  v.  Board  of Revision,  284  U.S.  23,  28  (1931)  (assessing  property  of
differing  value equally).
160 Ex parte Virginia,  100 U.S.  339,  346-47  (1879).
161  Yick  Wo v.  Hopkins,  118 U.S.  356,  373-74  (1886).
162  286 U.S.  472  (1932).
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action,  whether  through  one  agency  or  another,  or through
one enactment  or more than one,  shall be consistent with the
restrictions of the Federal  Constitution. There  is  no  demand
in that Constitution  that the State shall  put its requirements
in  any one statute. It may distribute them as it sees fit, if the
result, taken  in its totality, is within the State's constitutional
power. 
16
The  Supreme  Court  has  continued  to  look  to  the  totality  of  a state's
relevant  laws, rather than to single enactments,  when evaluating claims
of discrimination  affecting  fundamental  rights  or  classes  of persons.
16
4
Recently,  in  American  Motorists Insurance Co.  v.  Starnes," 6 5  the
Court  provided  an  apt  illustration  of  this  principle  by  examining  a
state's  venue statutes,  its rules  of civil  procedure,  and its informal court
practices  in  order  to  decide  whether  a  challenged  venue  statute  sub-
jected  foreign  corporations  to  discriminatory  treatment.
The  need for such  fuller  examination is  evident. Did Justice  Ste-
vens  really  mean  that  once  a  state  agency  validly  has  been  assigned
authority  over  a given class,  that  agency's treatment  of the class  is free
of  all  equal  protection  limitations?"'6  If  so,  then  once  a  girls'  high
school  has  been  lawfully  made  separate,
1
17  its  principal  can  make  it
unequal.  A prison warden  can  deny all her inmates the right to vote.
168
If a jury is convened  to  sentence only one  defendant,  it can  impose the
death  penalty  because  she  is  black. 6 9 The  equal  protection  rights  of
18I  Id. at  480.  The  quotation  in  the  text  comes  from  the Court's  discussion  of
discrimination  in violation  of  the commerce  clause. The  Court  also upheld  the statute
against  an  equal  protection challenge,  stating, "The  same  considerations,  with  respect
to  discrimination,  apply  to  the  claim  that the  statute  in  question  violates  the  equal
protection  clause  of the  Fourteenth  Amendment."  Id. at 482.
I"  See California Medical Ass'n  v. Federal  Election  Comm'n, 453 U.S.  182, 200-
201  (1981);  Michael  M. v.  Superior Court,  450  U.S.  464, 476-77  (1981)  (Stewart, J.,
concurring);  id. at 483  (Blackmun, J., concurring);  Williams  v.  Rhodes,  393 U.S.  23,
34  (1968).
185  425  U.S.  637,  643-45  (1976).
16  See New  York  City Transit Auth.  v. Beazer,  440  U.S.  568,  587-88  (1979).
167  Cf Vorchheimer  v. School  Dist., 532  F.2d  880 (3d  Cir. 1976)  (public  school
system's  regulations  establishing  gender-based  admission  requirements  for  two  public
high schools  did not  violate equal protection  clause), affd by equally divided vote, 430
U.S.  703  (1977)  (per  curiam).  But cf. Mississippi  Univ.  for Women  v.  Hogan,  458
U.S.  718,  720 n.1,  723-24  n.8 (1982)  (finding that statutory exclusion  of men  from one
of state's  nursing schools  unlawfully  burdens males  due to convenience  of location  and
unique opportunity  to get credit  for  working.).
I"  See O'Brien  v. Skinner,  414 U.S.  524  (1974)  (violation of equal protection  to
deny  convicted  misdemeanants  and  pretrial  detainees  incarcerated  in  their  county  of
residence  opportunity  to  vote).
169  Cf  Furman  v.  Georgia,  408  U.S.  238,  256-57  (1972)  (Douglas,  J.,  concur-
ring)  (expressing  the opinion  that discretionary  death penalty  statutes are unconstitu-
tional  because  their  effect is to single out minorities  for  punishment).  I admit, though,
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juveniles  vis-a-vis adults  are  implicated  by statutory  classifications,  but
not  by  the rules  and  practices  of a juvenile  court.
Within the area of fundamental  rights, manipulating  the jurisdic-
tion of a government  unit should not defeat equal protection.  Imagine  a
state agency set up to regulate the activities of private corporations. The
Deputy  Director  for  For-Profit  Corporations  drafts  a  code of conduct
for  business  corporations,  which  is  then  promulgated  by  the  agency
Head. The  Deputy Director  for Non-Profit Corporations  drafts a code
for nonprofits,  similarly issued.  If the latter Code forbids nonprofit  cor-
porations to engage  in  lobbying and door-to-door  solicitation, while the
For-Profit  Code  leaves  businesses free  to indulge  in those  activities,  se-
rious first  amendment and equal  protection  questions  arise. 170  Yet this
example  is  functionally  indistinguishable  from  separate  promulgation
by  the Deputy  Directors  pursuant  to  delegations  from  their  Head  or
regulation  by separate departments. To treat these situations differently
would be the most stubborn exaltation  of form over  substance. "Let  not
thy  left  hand  know  what  thy  right  hand  doeth"  is  not  a  principle  of
constitutional  law.
The single  decisionmaker  approach  is  not necessitated  by  the  Su-
preme Court's recent emphasis on the role of discriminatory  purpose  in
race  and  gender  cases.1 71  There,  the  event triggering  dose  scrutiny  is
the  employment  of a  suspect  classification:  the  rule of Washington v.
Davis'
7 2  is simply  a test for detecting  when facially neutral  action is in
fact based on a suspect classification.  Where the  suspect classification is
explicitly  employed,  no  further  inquiry  is  needed.
1 73  In  fundamental
rights  cases,  heightened  scrutiny  results  not  from  the  character  of  a
classification  but  from  the  state's  impingement  on  a  fundamental
right-as long as the restriction of a fundamental right  is apparent, no
that this  case  can be  analyzed  in  another way: racial  discrimination  might be detected
where a  decisionmaker,  coincidentally  having  authority  only over  blacks,  intentionally
treats them differently than she would have  treated whites. The comparison  would then
be with hypothetical decisions  by the same decisionmaker,  not with actual  decisions  by
other decisionmakers,  which would be  relevant only as circumstantial  evidence of likely
motivation.
170  See  Secretary  of State  v. Joseph  H. Munson  Co.,  467  U.S.  947,  967  (1984);
Regan v. Taxation with Representation,  461  U.S.  540, 552  (1983)  (Blackmun, J., con-
curring); Village  of Schaumburg  v. Citizens  for a  Better  Environment,  444  U.S.  620,
633,  639  (1980).
1  See,  e.g.,  Personnel  Adm'r v. Feeney, 442  U.S.  256,  279  (1979);  Washington
v. Davis,  426  U.S.  229,  241-42  (1976).
112  426  U.S.  229  (1976).
170  See,  e.g.,  Wayte  v.  United  States,  105  S. Ct.  1524,  1531  n'.10  (1985)  ("A
showing of discriminatory  intent  is not  necessary  when the  equal  protection claim  is
based on  an overtly  discriminatory  classification.").
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other "intent"  is  required." 7 4  Thus, reasoned examination  of the  single
decisionmaker  fallacy  suggests  that  it  is  an  ill-considered  overgeneral-
ization  from  the character  of the  usual  equal  protection  case.1
7 5
174  See,  e.g.,  Illinois  State  Bd.  of Elections  v.  Socialist  Workers  Party,  440  U.S.
173,  183-87  (1979);  Reynolds  v. Sims,  377 U.S.  533,  565-68  (1964).
178  If there are  readers who  would prefer  confirmation  of  this reasoning from the
Supreme Court, such evidence  is available.  In its early twentieth century battles  against
discriminatory  taxation,  the Supreme Court  frequently had occasion  to articulate equal
protection  analysis  inconsistent  with  the  single  decisionmaker  approach.  First,  the
Court juxtaposed  state  taxes  levied  against  nonresidents  in  lieu  of local  taxation  with
local taxes levied  by municipalities  against their residents.  See General American Tank
Corp. v. Day, 270  U.S.  367  (1926).  To  avoid  unconstitutional  discrimination  against
nonresidents,  the  Court held  that the rate  of state  tax must be substantially  equivalent
to  the  average  of  the  varying  local  rates.  See  id. at  373-74.  A  devotee  of  the  single
decisionmaker  approach might reinterpret  these cases by pointing out that the state had
jurisdiction  to  tax  both  residents  and  nonresidents  but  had  only  taxed  nonresidents;
there  was thus a  discrimination  that could  be justified as  "compensating"  for the taxes
levied  by  third parties,  the municipalities. The  Court, however, denied  that a  discrimi-
nation  existed.  Rather,  it  perceived  a  "scheme  of  complementary  tax  statutes"  and
stated that there  was no federal  concern  "with the particular  method adopted  by Loui-
siana of allocating the  tax between  the State and its  political subdivisions."  Id. at 372-
74.
The  "single  decisionmaker"  theorist  could  not  explain  away  another  series  of
cases,  in which  the  Court found  merit in  complaints  of discrimination  from a  class  of
taxpayers subjected  to heavier taxation  by a state body whose jurisdiction extended  only
to that  class.  The jurisdiction  of the  limited agency  in  these  cases was  not geographi-
cally  defined;  rather  the  agency  had jurisdiction  to  oversee  the  taxation  of the rail-
roads.  Alternating  between  equal  protection  and  state  constitutional  bases,  the  Su-
preme  Court  repeatedly  rejected  the  idea  that  inequalities  in  assessment  could  be
justified by  the independence  of the  assessing  bodies.
In  Greene  v.  Louisville  & Interurban  R.R.,  244  U.S.  499  (1917),  the  plaintiff
railroads argued that railroad property  had been  assessed  by the state Board of Valua-
tion and Assessment  at 75%  of value, while local  assessors had  assessed  the property  of
individuals and  other corporations  at no  more  than  52%  of value. The  discrimination
corresponded  to a  cleavage  between  the jurisdictions  of the  respective  assessing  bodies;
the case "proceed[ed]  on the theory that the Board of Valuation and Assessment treated
all taxpayers  alike over  whom  they had jurisdiction."  Id. at  506. The  Supreme Court
held  (for jurisdictional  purposes)  that the  railroads'  claim that  collection  of the tax as
assessed  "would violate the  equal protection provision of the  14th Amendment, presents
without  question,  a  real  and  substantial  controversy  under  the  Constitution  of the
United States." Id. at 508.  The Court did not resolve this issue,  however, but held that
the  combined  action  of  the  assessing  bodies  violated  the  uniformity  provisions  of the
state constitution:
Is discriminatory  taxation,  contravening  the  express  requirements  of the
State  Constitution,  beyond redress  in the courts of the United States, their
jurisdiction  being properly invoked,  when the discrimination  results from
divergent  action  by  different  assessing  boards  whose  assessments  are  not
subject  to  any process  of equalization  established  by the  state, and where
the  diverse results are the  outcome, not, indeed,  of any  express agreement
among the officials  concerned,  but of intentional, systematic, and persistent
undervaluation  by one  body of officials, presumably known  to and ignored
by the  other body,  so  that in  effect the  two  bodies  act  in concert?  In  our
opinion,  the  answer must  be  in the  negative.
Id. at  514.
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b.  The Special Status of Political Subdivisions
The  failure  to extend any scrutiny  whatsoever  to territorial  varia-
tions  inhering  in  municipal  ordinances  is  therefore  an  anomaly.  The
usual  rule  is  that  equal  protection  applies  to  "all  action  of the  State
denying  equal  protection  of the laws;  whatever  the agency  of the State
taking  the  action,  or  whatever  the  guise  in  which  it  is  taken." 17  If
territorially  defined  political  subdivisions  are  to  be  treated  differently
than  functionally  defined  arms  of  the  state  for  equal  protection  pur-
poses,  there must  be  a reason.
An historical explanation is not hard to find-Missouri v. Lewis1 77
itself  placed  territorial  distinctions  utterly  beyond  the  realm  of  equal
protection  analysis  for  a  generation.  Yet  even  that sweeping  decision
rested  on arguments.  One may discern three ultimate  bases for its abso-
lute rule. First, a pseudo-textual  argument:  the equal protection  clause
applies only  to classes  of persons,  not to the places at which  those per-
sons find  themselves.  Second,  the ability of a state to govern its internal
affairs  depends on its  flexibility in  creating political  subdivisions  of its
territory  and regulating their local government.1 78  Third, the Constitu-
tion's  tolerance  for  diversities  in  the law  of different  states  implies  a
similar tolerance  for variations  in the law  within a  state.
7 9
The third argument  is plainly wrong,' 80 and  the first has not sur-
Although  Greene was decided on state law grounds, the  Court adopted its holding
as part  of the  federal  law  of  discriminatory  assessment  violating  the  equal  protection
clause. In Southern Ry.  Co. v. Watts, 260 U.S.  519 (1923),  discussing an equal protec-
tion challenge  based  on an assessment  structure just like that in Greene, Justice Bran-
deis stated:
The  rule is well  settled  that a  taxpayer,  although  assessed  on  not  more
than  full  value,  may  be  unlawfully  discriminated  against  by undervalua-
tion  of property  of the  same class,  belonging to others.  This  may  be true
although the  discrimination  is practiced  through the action  of different  of-
ficials.  But, unless it is shown that the undervaluation  was intentional and
systematic,  unequal  assessment  will  not  be  held  to  violate  the  equality
clause.
Id. at 526  (citations  omitted).  Again,  in Baker v. Druesdow, 263  U.S.  137  (1923),  he
stated as an equal  protection principle:  "Where  illegal discrimination  was practiced,  it
is immaterial whether it was effected  by a single assessing  board or through the action
of two  independent  boards."  Id. at  142  (citing  Greene and Southern Ry.).  Thus, the
Supreme  Court too  has  insisted that the  substance  of state  power, not the  form  of its
distribution  to different  bodies,  determines the legality of disparate treatment under the
equal  protection  clause.
"' Cooper  v. Aaron,  358 U.S.  1, 17  (1958);  accord Ex parte Virginia,  100 U.S.
339,  347  (1880).
177  101  U.S.  22  (1880).
178  See id. at 30-31.
179  See id. at 31.
18I  Variations between states  escape equal protection analysis for  a unique reason.
See infra notes  220-23  and  accompanying  text.
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vived, i1 8  but  the second  argument  bears  closer  examination.  The Lewis
Court  rejected  the  notion  that  the  fourteenth  amendment  imposed  to-
tally  centralized  government  on  each  state;  instead,  the  states  retained
their  right to create  political  subdivisions  that would  govern their own
local  affairs.  The  plaintiff had  not really  questioned  this  proposition,
but he  argued that the equal protection clause  condemned disparities  in
the structures  of the various  subdivisions.  If one county  received  direct
appellate  review  of the decisions  of its circuit court in the state supreme
court  in  disbarment  cases,  then  all  other  counties  must." 2  His  basic
theory required total  symmetry  in the structuring of subdivisions-each
subdivision  must be a replica of every other, despite variations in popu-
lation,  land  area, or  other local  conditions." 8 3
The essence of the Lewis Court's decision  was the desire  to permit
the states  to tailor local regulation  to local conditions.  To emphasize the
breadth  of  its  holding,  it  hypothesized  that  the  State  of  New  York
might  adopt  the  civil  law  for  New  York  City  and  the  common  law
upstate.
184  It also offered  a more  realistic  example:
If a Mexican  State should  be acquired  by  treaty  and added
to an adjoining State,  or part of a State, in the United States,
and the  two should be erected into a new  State, it cannot  be
doubted that such  new  State might allow the Mexican  laws
and judicature to continue unchanged in the one portion, and
the  common  law  and  its  corresponding  judicature  in  the
other portion.  . . . It would  not be  based  on any respect  of
persons  or  classes,  but  on  municipal  considerations  alone,
and a regard  to the welfare  of all classes  within the particu-
lar  territory  or jurisdiction. 5
Implicit in this  example  is a dimension  lacking  in the New York  City
hypothetical.  The  continuation  of Mexican law might well  be justified
not only  by  considerations  of orderliness  and efficiency  but also by the
wishes  of the  population  affected.  Some  territorial  variations  may  re-
flect  a  desire  of the  state to  further  its policies  by  taking into account
local  conditions,  but others  may  be intended  to effectuate  local  self-de-
termination.  Similarly, the creation of political subdivisions  has been a
vehicle  for granting  local  control.
The Court's  opinion in Lewis does  not emphasize, or even implic-
181  See supra notes  26-67  and  accompanying  text.
182  See Lewis,  101  U.S.  at  27.
s Indeed,  Bowman  was a resident of St. Louis, which  had  been given  a  special
court of appeals unavailable  in most  other counties.  See id. at 25.
I" See  id. at  31.
185  Id.  at  32.
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itly  recognize,  local self-determination.  The issue  was irrelevant to  the
case, because the variation  being challenged  was a structural one in the
relations  between  county courts  and the state supreme  court. But there
is a more important reason for the Court's avoidance  of home rule rhet-
oric.  The  Court  was  emphasizing  an  opposing  viewpoint-unlimited
state control  over  political subdivisions-that  was characteristic  of fed-
eral constitutional law in its time, and that persists  (though in a schizo-
phrenic  form)  today.""6
"Municipal  corporations  are  mere  instrumentalities  of  the  State
for  the  more  convenient  administration  of  local  government.  Their
powers  are  such  as  the  legislature  may  confer,  and  these  may  be en-
larged,  abridged, or entirely withdrawn at its pleasure.11 7  So far as the
federal  Constitution  is  concerned,  municipal  officials  need  not  be
elected,"' 8  and  the  consent  of  the  residents  is  not  needed  if  the  state
chooses  to restructure  or abolish local government, or to enact local leg-
islation itself. 1 9  The  Court has often denied  that  municipalities,  when
exercising  power  delegated  by  the  state,  can  be  recognized  as
"sovereign."1o90
Despite this loudly proclaimed  and effectively  enforced  doctrine  of
municipal  transitoriness,  the  Supreme  Court  has  also  given  constitu-
tional significance  to the traditional  function of political subdivisions  as
vehicles  for local  self-determination.  Cities  and  counties  could be gov-
erned  by state-appointed  prefects,  but in  fact they are not.
[I]n  providing  for the  governments  of their  cities,  counties,
towns,  and  districts, the  States characteristically  provide  for
representative  government-for  decisionmaking  at the  local
188  See Reynolds  v.  Sims,  377  U.S.  533,  575  (1964).
187  Meriwether  v. Garrett,  102 U.S.  472,  511  (1880)  (Field,  Miller,  & Bradley,
J.J.). This  is a statement  of Justice  Bradley's  position  contemporary  with  his opinion
for  the  Court  in Lewis;  it  merely  echoes  similar  expressions  in,  for  example,  Mount
Pleasant v. Beckwith,  100 U.S. 514,  524-25  (1880);  United  States v. Railroad  Co.,  84
U.S.  (17  Wall.) 322,  329  (1872); Maryland v.  Baltimore & O.R.R.,  44 U.S.  (3 How.)
534, 550 (1845),  and is repeated in,  for example, Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 575; Hunter v.
Pittsburgh,  207  U.S.  161,  178-79  (1907);  Williams  v.  Eggleston,  170  U.S.  304,  310
(1898).  One  unsurprising modern  qualification  should be mentioned-the  state  cannot
abridge  local  government  powers  in  a racially discriminatory  fashion.  See Washington
v.  Seattle  School  Dist.  No. 1, 458  U.S.  457  (1982).
181  See Sailors  v.  Board of  Educ.,  387  U.S.  105,  108  (1967);  Fortson v.  Morris,
385 U.S.  231,  234  (1966);  Baltimore &  O.R.R.,  44 U.S.  at  550.
"'  See  Hunter, 207  U.S.  at  178-79;  Kies  v.  Lowery,  199  U.S.  233,  238-40
(1905);  Rippey  v.  Texas,  193  U.S.  504,  509-10  (1903);  Railroad Co.,  84 U.S.  (17
Wall.)  at 331-32;  Baltimore &  O.R.R.,  44 U.S.  at  550-51.
190  See,  e.g.,  Community  Communications  Co.  v.  City of Boulder,  455  U.S.  40,
53-54  (1982); Waller  v. Florida, 397 U.S.  387,  392 (1970); Reynolds, 377 U.S.  at 575;
United  States  v.  Kagama,  118  U.S.  375,  379  (1886).
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level  by representatives  elected by the people.  And, not infre-
quently,  the delegation  of power to local units is  contained in
constitutional  provisions  for  local  home  rule  which  are  im-
mune  from  legislative  interference.'91
Both in  fact  and  in  law, the  traditional  description  of municipali-
ties as "mere  instrumentalities  of the State  for the  convenient  adminis-
tration  of their affairs"' 92  is  inaccurate.  Since early  colonial times, mu-
nicipalities  have  served  both  as  administrative  subunits  carrying  out
state  policy  and  as  independent  structures  for  local  policymaking  re-
flecting  the will of the smaller community.'93  Their actions in the latter
capacity  have  served  the  highest  ends  of  political  liberty;  as  de  Toc-
queville  observed,  "in  the  United  States  municipal  liberty  derives
straight  from the  dogma  of the  sovereignty  of the  people."' 9  The state
has the raw power to displace  or to channel  municipal lawmaking poli-
cies,  or  to  abolish  the  municipalities  altogether.  But  within  the limits
provided  by  state  law,  local  governments  are  designed  to  further  the
policy  preferences  of the local electorate,  not merely to divine the unex-
pressed  will of the state legislature." 9 5 They  differ in this respect  from
administrative  agencies,  which  must  always justify  their  policy  deci-
sions,  however  tangentially,  as effectuating  goals  chosen  by the  legisla-
ture. 98  As a result,  the Supreme  Court  has often  permitted other  con-
stitutional interests to be outweighed by the role  of local government  in
achieving  self-determination.1 9 7  The Court  has even  characterized  local
191  Avery  v.  Midland  County, 390  U.S.  474,  481  (1968).
192  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beckwith,  100 U.S.  514,  529  (1880).
193  See,  e.g.,  G.  HASKINS,  LAW  AND  AUTHORITY  IN  EARLY  MASSACHUSETTS
69-80  (1960);  1 E.  MCQUILLEN,  THE  LAW  OF  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  §§1.10-
.16,  1.33-.38  (3d ed.  1971); A  DE TOCQUEVILLE,  DEMOCRACY  IN AMERICA  64-68  (G.
Lawrence  trans.  1969).
19  A.  DE  TOCQUEvILLE,  supra note  193,  at  67;  see also Frug,  The  City as a
Legal Concept, 93  HARV.  L.  REV.  1057,  1068-72  (1980)  (arguing that the  desire  to
increase participatory  democracy  can be achieved  best through decentralization  of polit-
ical  power,  possibly  through  city  government).
'"  See,  e.g.,  Washington  v.  Seattle  School  Dist.  No.  1, 458  U.S.  457,  478-82
(1982);  Community  Communications  Co.  v.  City  of  Boulder,  455  U.S.  40,  54-56
(1982).
19  See,  e.g.,  Motor Vehicle Mfgs. Ass'n  v. State Farm Mutual  Ins. Co.,  463 U.S.
29, 40-44 (1983);  Immigration and  Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S.  919, 953
n.16  (1983).
1  See,  e.g.,  Lockport  v. Citizens  for  Community  Action at the  Local  Level,  430
U.S.  259,  268-69  (1977)  (upholding requirement  that  change  in  city  government  be
approved  by majorities both of city residents and noncity  residents in light of "the  wide
discretion  the states have  in forming and  allocating governmental  tasks  to local subdivi-
sions, and the discrete  interests that such local governmental  units may have qua units);
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 300-06  (1976) (upholding a "metropolitan  area rem-
edy"  against  HUD  for  past  housing discrimination  but noting  that it must  be imple-
mented  "without  preempting  the  power  of local  governments  by  undercutting  the role
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populations  as  possessing  the attribute  of sovereignty,  which  they  may
exercise  without  procedural  limitation through  a referendum."' 8
If  the  distinction  between  political  subdivisions  and  functionally
defined  arms of the state for equal protection  purposes is to continue  on
any grounds other than historical accident,  then it must be based on the
local  self-determination  goal  of political  subdivisions.  A  centrally  ap-
pointed  city prefect  would have no greater need for  flexibility in adapt-
ing state policies to  local conditions  than a state  agency would  have  in
addressing particular  industries or other segments  of the population  op-
erationally  defined.  Indeed,  the  agency's  need  for  flexibility  has  been
the recognized  driving force behind the distortion  of constitutional  sepa-
ration-of-powers  doctrines  to  accommodate  the  administrative  pro-
cess. 99  But  a  municipal  government  pursuing  locally  chosen  policies
within  a  state-determined  framework  needs  greater  flexibility  to  pre-
vent  the  local  preferences  of  other  municipalities  from  narrowing  its
own  range  of  choices.  Unlike  administrative  agencies,  which  ideally
should accommodate  one another in carrying  out aspects of a legislative
will, local governments are designed to pursue contrasting policies, each
within its own  sphere.  These  variations  are not irrational,  or enforced
for their  own  sakes,  but are  the  necessary  result  of maximizing  local
self-determination  in  a  democratic  society.  Rational  basis  scrutiny
would place only slight restrictions on this process, but strict scrutiny  of
variations  in  local  choices  respecting  fundamental  rights  would  make
local  self-determination  in  such  contexts  impossible.
Is local  self-determination  inconsistent  with the guarantee  against
of those  governments  in the  federal  housing  assistance  scheme");  Milliken  v.  Bradley,
418  U.S.  717,  741  (1974)  (holding  that school  district  lines  "may  be  bridged  where
there has been a constitutional  violation calling for interdistrict  relief"  but they may not
be  "casually  ignored or  treated as  a  mere administrative  convenience  ...  contrary  to
the  history of  public  education  in  our country");  Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  40-44  (finding
that strict scrutiny is inappropriate  in  a  case that  challenges  state and  local judgments
on how to raise and disburse taxes and  how to administer educational  policy); Abate v.
Mundt, 403 U.S.  182, 185-87  (1971)  (upholding a reapportionment  plan that produced
a  deviation  from equality  of 11.9% in light of "the long tradition  of overlapping  func-
tions and  dual personnel"  in  the  county government).
'19  See Gordon  v. Lance, 403 U.S.  1, 7 (1971);  Hunter v. Erickson,  393 U.S.  385,
392  (1969).  In  Eastlake v. Forest City  Enters., 426  U.S.  668, 676-79  (1976),  the Court
distinguished  prior  decisions  invalidating  on  federal  constitutional  grounds  delegations
of legislative  power  to  narrow  segments  of the  population  from  the  "reservation"  of
power  to  the  entire  population of a  city.  The  distinction  is  surprising  from  a federal
constitutional  point  of  view;  one  would  have  thought  that  the  sovereign  body  with
power  to reserve was the entire population of the state, and that restricting the referen-
dum to city residents,  however consistent  with good  political theory, was a delegation to
a  segment.
'*9  See, e.g.,  L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL  CONTROL  OF  ADMINISTRATIVE  ACTION  68-72
(1965).
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denial  of rights  embodied  in  the  notion  of  fundamental  rights  equal
protection?  If local  populations  could  be viewed  as a  unit,  or  if their
decisions always  reflected  unanimity, then we might argue that the var-
iations  in  rights  between  political  subdivisions  were  freely  chosen  by
the inhabitants and  therefore  subjected  them to no constitutionally  cog-
nizable  disadvantage.  But local  populations  are not  homogeneous,  and
our  traditions  of  municipal  democracy  permit  a  majority  or  a
supermajority  to impose its policy preferences  on  a dissenting minority.
Thus, actual  consent is not available  as a defense  to  the charge  of ine-
quality. Still,  local self-government,  even without unanimity,  avoids one
great  defect  condemned  by  fundamental  rights  equal  protection-the
decision  of  a  majority  (or  a  ruling  coalition)  to  afford  itself  greater
scope  for  the  exercise  of a fundamental  right  than  it allows  to others.
The legislature  that permits labor picketing but not picketing  to protest
racial discrimination,  or that erects  unique obstacles  to the  marriage of
indigents  with child  support obligations, or that  denies the franchise  to
residents  of  a  particular  enclave  within  the state,  has  withheld  from
others  the  exercise  of rights  it  guards  jealously  for  itself.  In  contrast,
when  local  self-determination  leads  to  a  stricter  rule  than  obtains  in
other jurisdictions,  the members  of the  local  majority  have  bound  the
community  to  a self-denial  that  they  too  must  observe.200
This  factor  is  not  in  and  of  itself  sufficient  to  demonstrate  that
local self-government  is inoffensive  to  fundamental  rights equal  protec-
tion.  Even  if the  local  majority  cannot  be  considered  as  denying  the
dissenters  any  advantage  that  it  preserves  for itself,  the state  majority
might  be  thought  of as  infringing  the  dissenters'  rights  by  subjecting
them  to  the  decisions  of this  particular  local  electorate.  After  all,  the
boundaries  of political subdivisions  are determined  by a combination of
state and  local  legislative  decisions,  and membership  in the  local  com-
munity of the  governed  is  involuntary. Individuals  can choose member-
ship in another subdivision  only by change of residence, an action with
extraordinary  costs,  and one whose practical  availability to different in-
dividuals varies with their circumstances.2 0 1  And ultimately, no one can
200  It  is  true that the  majority  may  be  bound  only  in  a  technical  sense, because
they  have  adopted  a limitation  on  a right  that  does  not  affect  the situations  in  which
they  need  or desire to  exercise  it, but this  problem  can  be  dealt with  by  fundamental
rights equal protection  analysis  of the classification  imposed on the exercise of the right
within the  community  and  does  not require  comparison  with the standards  prevailing
outside  the  community.
201  In  his  well-known  article,  Charles  Tiebout suggested  a simple  model  of local
government  services in which  the different  packages of public goods offered by  different
municipalities  were  fixed,  and  individuals  exercised  their preferences  by  moving to the
municipality  whose  package  pleased  them  the  most.  See  Tiebout,  A  Pure Theory  of
Local Public Expenditures, 64 J. POL.  EcoN.  416 (1956).  Tiebout recognized that this
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avoid  assignment  to  one  of the  state's  political  subdivisions  except  by
leaving the state altogether. Thus, when the state confers  legislative au-
thority  with respect  to fundamental  rights  on local governmental  units,
it  is  assigning  individuals  to  groups  and  instructing  those  individuals
that the legal obligations defining the scope of their rights will be deter-
mined  by  the preferences  of a  majority  of the group to which  they  are
assigned. Such  assignments  unquestionably  raise  equal protection  con-
cerns.  If the state were to define  an individual's  fundamental  rights  by
the  expressed  preferences  of her  race,  her  economic  class,  her  profes-
sion,  her  age  cohort,  or  those  sharing  her  level  of educational  attain-
ment  (to  give  both  otherwise  suspect  and otherwise  nonsuspect  exam-
ples), serious equal protection  objections would arise. If it is offensive to
equal  protection  for the  state  to  say,  "You  are  a  carpenter,  and  it  is
appropriate for the contours  of your right to sexual privacy to be deter-
mined by a majority of the carpenters, while the rights of actors will  be
determined  by a majority of the actors,"  then it might be equally offen-
sive to say,  "You  are a resident of Pittsburgh,  and it is appropriate for
the contours  of your  right to sexual  privacy to be determined  by  a ma-
jority  of the  Pittsburghers,  while  the rights  of  Philadelphians  will  be
determined  by  the majority  in Philadelphia."
It  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  a society  in  which  value judgments
were not made at a local level  by public institutions. To the extent that
local variations were desired,  individuals might  be free to band together
voluntarily  into private  associations,  reaching  decisions  that would  in-
fluence  conduct  in  the  community  through  social  pressure,  perhaps
even  without  recourse  to  the  aid  of  state  contract  and  property  law.
Those  who  sought  to steer  clear  of entanglement  with  the private  as-
sociations  might  be legally  entitled  to do  so.  In such  a society,  for the
state  to  bind  residents  to  the  collective  decisions  of  their  neighbors
might  be highly  offensive  to  principles  of equal  protection.
But this does  not describe our society. Throughout  our history  we
have relied  on territorially  defined local governments with coercive state
powers as a vehicle  for diversified popular self-determination.  If an ap-
peal to the history  of our institutions has any role to  play in the elabo-
ration of constitutional principles, then local self-determination  through
model  overlooked  significant  moving  costs,  see  id. at  422-23,  and  he  eliminated  the
pressures generated  by the unequal  distribution of employment opportunities by assum-
ing a population of coupon-clippers. See id. at 419. Subsequent  economic literature has
emphasized  these  divergences  between  Tiebout's model and  reality, see, e.g.,  Inman  &
Rubinfeld,  The Judicial  Pursuit  of  Local Fiscal  Equity, 92 HARV.  L. REv.  1662,  1685
& n.48  (1979),  as  well as the  barriers  to mobility caused  by racial  discrimination  and
class-exclusionary  zoning, see id., and community ties. See Dunn, Measuring  the Value
of Community, 6 J. URn.  ECON.  371  (1979).
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political  subdivisions  has  at  least  some  claim  to  distinctive  treatment
that  would  save it  from  condemnation  by  equal  protection.
It should be noted that, from  the standpoint of the affected individ-
ual,  allowing  local self-determination  does  not always  result in  a dimi-
nution  of rights. If we were to require uniform statewide  policymaking
regarding fundamental  rights, a local majority  favoring greater  exercise
of constitutional  rights could no  longer act on that preference within  its
local sphere  unless it could muster a statewide  majority. Thus, in abso-
lute  terms,  preserving  local  government  autonomy  expands  the  spec-
trum of opportunities  for exercise of constitutional  rights within a state.
It  does  not  contract the  spectrum,  for  by  definition,  equal  protection
analysis  only guarantees  statewide  availability  of opportunities  already
provided  somewhere  within  the  state.202
Moreover, the very arbitrariness  of geographical  boundaries  makes
them  a  less  threatening  basis  for  allocating  powers  of self-determina-
tion.  States allocate this authority geographically  for obvious  reasons  of
administrability  and  common  interest,  as  well  as  to  give  voice  to  the
familiar  feelings  of community.203  Gerrymanders  and exclusionary  tac-
tics are unfortunately  all too  common  and can  be  effective  in the  short
term.2'  But absent such subterfuge,  a state  that carves up  its territory
into subdivisions,  each given  the same  opportunities  for the  exercise  of
governmental  power,  has  distributed  in  an  impersonal  and  impartial
fashion  the authority  to define  rights.  In these  circumstances,  the dan-
ger is  at  a minimum  that  assignment  to  a  political  subdivision  would
constitute  a  sacrifice  of an  individual's  fundamental  rights  because  of
disfavor,  disrespect,  or  inattention.
Thus, there  are strong practical  and historical  reasons for permit-
ting variations  in fundamental  rights  to  arise through  local self-deter-
mination,  and  there  are  reasons  for  believing  that  these variations  do
not offend the  underlying purposes  of fundamental  rights equal  protec-
202  The argument  above presupposes  a static model and does  not consider whether
the existence of variations  within the  state would over time lead to a further expansion
or to  a contraction  of the  range  of opportunities  afforded.
202  I  do  not  wish,  however,  to argue  that  constitutional  toleration  for municipal
self-determination  is compelled  by claims based on a moral or philosophical  conception
of Community  in a strong sense.  In modem American  society,  such genuine  Communi-
ties  are  not generally  coextensive  with  municipalities-a  Community  may  spill  over
political  boundaries,  or  one  city  may  contain  many  separate  Communities,  confined
within  neighborhoods,  or within  social  strata, or  otherwise  nonspatially  defined.  See,
e.g.,  T.  BENDER,  COMMUNITY  AND  SOCIAL  CHANGE  IN  AMERICA  148-49  (1978);
Frug, supra  note  194,  at  1061-62.  The  correlation  between  political  subdivision  and
Community  is too weak  to carry the  argument.
204  Even in Lewis, the Supreme  Court made  the suggestion, brought to fruition  in
Gomillion  v.  Lightfoot,  that  geographical  distinctions  demonstrably  motivated  by
prejudice  would not  be  treated  as deferentially.  See Lewis,  101  U.S.  at 32.
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tion.  We  must  next  consider  whether  local  self-determination  can  be
accommodated  within  fundamental  rights  equal  protection
methodology.
c.  Accommodating Self-Determination and Equal Protection
If failure  to  scrutinize  intercity  variations  in substantive  law  has.
some justification  in terms  of self-determination,  the question remains
how  this justification  can  be  evaluated  through  equal  protection  doc-
trine. First, should  these variations  be exempt  from  rational basis scru-
tiny as they  seemingly have been, or is it merely that they always with-
stand  the scrutiny?  This  question  is  almost entirely  academic.205 At a
hazard,  I would suggest that minimal  rationality  is too  lax a standard
to waive,  and too  slight an interference  to  cause concern,  so that  nomi-
nally  subjecting  these  variations  to  a  rationality  test  is  preferable.208
They  will,  however, virtually  always pass.  The  differences  result from
differing  local  policy choices  and reflect the operation of grassroots  de-
mocracy.  If each  choice  is  in  itself rational  enough  to  withstand  due
process scrutiny in isolation,  then reasonable communities  can disagree,
and  their juxtaposition  is  rational.207
Heightened  scrutiny  makes  the distinction  a  real  one.  The mere
fact  of  a  difference  in  the  policy  preferences  of  the  majority  in  two
communities  is  surely  not a  factor compelling  enough  to justify  differ-
ences in the standards for exercise of a fundamental  right in those com-
munities.  If a majority of each  race voted in favor of racial  separation,
this would not itself be compelling  enough  to justify its implementation
205  See  Gunther,  Foreword: In  Search of Evolving  Doctrine on  a  Changing
Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,  86  HARv. L. REV.  1, 8 (1972)  ("mini-
mal scrutiny  in theory  and  virtually none  in fact").
206  Making the equal protection  claim cognizable  but frivolous  rather than ruling
it out of bounds  would not  be a significant  spur to litigation.  Courts  are quite  capable
of suppressing  frivolous equal protection  claims. See, e.g, Andrews  v. Maher, 525 F.2d
113,  116-18  (2d Cir. 1975)  (dismissing as insubstantial  a claim that a state violated the
equal  protection  clause  by  providing  governmental  offices  only  in  limited  number  of
locations  and  then  refusing  to  reimburse  welfare  recipients  for  expenses  incurred  in
traveling to those  offices).
207  There may  be anomalous  exceptions.  In  rare instances, the pattern  of laws  in
outside communities may  render a local  ordinance in City X so  ineffectual or so  impos-
sible of compliance  that it  would  constitute  a mere  arbitrary oppression.  Cf  Bibb  v.
Navajo Freight Lines,  359 U.S.  520 (1959)  (invalidating as an unreasonable burden on
interstate  commerce  a  state statute that required  trucks and  trailers operating  on state
highways to be  equipped with  specified type  of mudguard  that  was illegal in one state
and different  from  those permitted  in  45 other states). In that  case,  the disparity could
be condemned  as irrational;  the question  remains  academic,  however, because  even the
rational basis test would  not require a court  to blind itself to the existence of conflicting
laws  in  neighboring  communities  if  City X's  ordinance  were  challenged  in  isolation
under the due  process or  equal protection  clauses.
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under  strict  scrutiny.2 08  If a majority  of each  sex  voted  to  bar women
from  certain  professions,  that  in  itself would  not be  sufficient  to  over-
come intermediate  scrutiny.20 9 The desire of a majority  of any group  to
disenfranchise  the group would not be  enough  to overcome  the group's
right  to  equal  participation  in  voting.21 0  Effectuating  majority  prefer-
ence  is,  in  the  abstract,  an  important  goal  in  a  democracy  and  may
justify  variations  in  government  structure  to  facilitate  it.211  When
weighed  against individual  violations  of constitutional  rights,  however,
this abstract  interest  is not  compelling  in the  context  of nonterritorial
classifications  and therefore  should not  be treated  as  compelling  in the
context of territorial  classifications.  Mischaracterizing  the nature of the
interest to  avoid  an undeniable  anomaly  is not the solution.  "Open  de-
bate of the bases for the Court's action  is essential to the rationality and
consistency  of  [its]  decisionmaking  process. "212
Moreover,  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  say  in  any particular  in-
stance  that  a state's  acceptance  of local decisionmaking  on  a matter of
fundamental  rights was narrowly tailored  to achieve  the alleged interest
in self-determination. 23  Imagine,  for example,  a city ordinance prohib-
208  Cf Wygant  v. Jackson  Bd.  of Educ.,  106  S.  Ct. 1842,  1847,  1850  n.8 (1986)
(plurality  opinion)  (stating  that  preferential  layoff schemes  based  on  race  could  not
affect  the  rights  of  workers  who  were  injured  by  the  plan,  even  if a  majority  of the
union members of both races approved the plan); Regents  of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438  U.S.  265,  307  (1978)  (opinion  of Powell,  J.)  (stating  that  desire  of  majority  to
favor  minority,  without  more,  is  not  compelling  interest);  Castaneda  v. Partida,  430
U.S. 482,  499-500  (1977)  (finding that control  of government  by  local Hispanic major-
ity  would  not immunize  discrimination  against  Hispanics  in  the  grand jury selection
process);  Green  v.  County  School  Bd.,  391  U.S.  430  (1968)  (rejecting  "freedom  of
choice"  desegregation  plan).
209  Cf  Mississippi  Univ.  for  Women  v.  Hogan,  458  U.S.  718,  727-30  (1982)
(stating  that legislature's  desire  to benefit  women, without  showing  of specific  need  to
redress  discrimination,  did  not justify gender  discrimination  disfavoring  men).
210  See  Lucas  v. Forty-Fourth  Colo.  Gen.  Assembly,  377  U.S. 713,  731-32,  736-
37  (1964)  (approval  by  a  majority  of  the  voters  in  every  county  did  not  validate
malapportionment).
211  Cases upholding minor deviations from the one-person, one-vote rule to accom-
modate local  government structure  analyze them as  legitimate  exceptions to the rule  of
strict scrutiny,  not  as  applications of the rule. See,  e.g.,  Brown v.  Thomson,  462  U.S.
835, 842-46  (1983); Mahan  v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 325-328  (1973). But see Abate v.
Mundt, 403  U.S.  182,  185  (1971)  (stating  that state interests  offered as justifications
for  deviations  from  the one-person,  one-vote  rule must be  "carefully  scrutinized").
212  Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  at  110 (Marshall, J.,  dissenting).
213  For  an  unusually  careful  statement  of the  standard  of  review  from  Justice
Powell,  see Wygant  v. Jackson  Bd.  of Educ.,  106 S.Ct.  1842,  1850  n.6  (1986):
The  term  "narrowly  tailored,"  so  frequently  used  in  our  cases,  has  ac-
quired a  secondary  meaning. More  specifically,  as commentators  have  in-
dicated,  the  term  may  be  used  to  require  consideration  whether  lawful
alternative  and less  restrictive means  could have  been  used. Or, as  Profes-
sor Ely has noted, the classification  at issue  must "fit"  with greater  preci-
sion than  any  alternative means.
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iting the sale or rental of erotic though  nonpornographic  video cassettes
to persons  under the  age of twenty-one.  Adoption  of such  an ordinance
in  one city,  while the  video  rental  market  goes  unregulated  in the rest
of the state,  might be  defensible  as permitting each  self-governing  com-
munity  to  strike  for  itself  a  balance  between  freedom  to  disseminate
cinematic works and protection of the morals of the young. But suppose
further that  the state legislature  has  already  enacted  a variety of state-
wide  measures  aimed  at  regulating  erotica  and  protecting  the  young.
The  state  has  a  statute  prohibiting  operation  of  adult  bookstores  or
movie  theatres  within  1000  feet  of a school,  and a basic obscenity  stat-
ute.  In a  compromise  with the  cable television  industry,  the state also
has enacted  legislation  forbidding the  broadcast of X-rated movies  over
cable  networks  except  between  the  hours  of  11  p.m.  and  6  a.m.,  but
authorizing  such  broadcast during  those  hours.  Within that context,  it
cannot seriously be maintained that the resulting territorial  variation in
the  right  to  rent  video  cassettes  is  narrowly  tailored  to  achieve  the
state's  "compelling  interest"  in deferring  to  local preferences  regarding
the  balance  between  first amendment  and  youth-protection  goals.  To
accept  that argument  in the  face of the state's haphazardly  asserted  in-
terest  would  deprive  strict scrutiny  of all its  content.
If accommodating  the  preferences  of local  majorities  is  not neces-
sary  to  achieve  a  "compelling  interest"  and  the  single  decisionmaker
theory provides no  avenue of escape, then a court faced with local ordi-
nances  variably  constricting  fundamental  rights has two  choices.  First,
it may  apply  heightened  scrutiny,  with  the  knowledge  that  this  will
frequently  remove  regulation  of fundamental  rights  from the sphere of
local  authority. This  might not be an  undesirable  result.  It would en-
sure  that  most restrictions of fundamental  rights  are made  only at  the
level  of highest  legislative authority,  the state legislature,  and as I will
argue  later, on a statewide  basis.214 Alternatively,  the court may recog-
nize  the  need  to  modify  its  analysis  of the  equal  protection  concerns
arising  from intercity  variations  in  substantive  law. It may excuse the
variation from  strict scrutiny,  not because the localities have a  compel-
ling need for autonomy in the particular  case that outweighs  the injury
to equal  protection  values,  but rather  because,  as a general matter, the
legitimate  interest  of the people  in self-determination  at the local level
justifies a limited  exception  to  equal  protection  analysis.
Thus,  what  I  am  proposing  is  that  intrastate  variations  in  the
(quoting  Ely, The  Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination,  41  U.  CHI.  L.
REv.  723,  727  n.26  (1974)).
214  See Sandalow,  The Limits of Municipal  Power Under  Home Rule: A Role for
the Courts,  48  MINN.  L.  REV.  643,  708-21  (1964).
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scope  of fundamental  rights  that result from  the independent  decisions
of self-governing  political  subdivisions  should  be excused  from  height-
ened scrutiny and subjected  only to the rational  basis test. They should
be  so  excused  because  they  are justified by  their  contribution  to  the
goal  of local  self-determination,  though  not in a way  that would  with-
stand heightened  scrutiny under the equal protection  clause.2 5  An ex-
ception to the strutiny that would  otherwise  be applied is therefore re-
quired  when  geographical  classifications  affect  fundamental  rights.
This  modification  of equal  protection  methodology  is  neither  ex-
treme nor unprecedented.  In practice,  the  same  result  is achieved uni-
versally  today  by the unquestioned  failure of the  courts to  analyze any
variation  between  the independent  actions  of two municipalities  in the
same state under the rubric of equal protection.  As a matter  of theory,
similar modifications  of equal  protection  have been made  in other con-
texts  to  further  interests  in  self-determination.  First,  the  Supreme
Court  has  made  numerous  exceptions  to  strict  scrutiny  of  departures
from the "one-person,  one-vote"  rule in  voting rights cases-exceptions
intended  to  accommodate  local  government.2 16  Second,  the  Supreme
Court has treated  the requirement that  a voter be a bona  fide resident
of the political  subdivision  as  "exempt  from strict judicial scrutiny,"  in
order  to  "preserve  the  basic  conception  of  a  political  community. 2 1
7
Third, the  Court has asserted  interests  in local  government  autonomy
as a justification  for restricting  remedies  in cases  of racial  discrimina-
tion  by  state  and  local  officials.218  Lastly,  the  Court  has  already
adopted a "dual  standard"  of equal protection in cases of state discrimi-
nation against aliens,  in order  to facilitate  "the  community's  process of
political  self-definition"2 19 as a preliminary  step toward  state and mu-
nicipal  self-government.
15  The use of the terms "excuse"  and "justification"  in this context does not refer
to notions of excuse and justification traditionally  employed in the field of criminal  law.
21"  See, e.g.,  Brown  v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835,  842-43 (1983);  Mahan v. Howell,
410  U.S.  315,  325-28  (1973).
217  Holt Civic Club  v. City of Tuscaloosa,  439  U.S.  60,  82 (1978)  (Brennan,  J.,
dissenting).  Then Justice  Rehnquist's  opinion  of the  Court  in Holt is in  accord  with
this  exception,  but does  not  vouchsafe  a  rational  explanation  for  its  action.  See  id. at
66-70. Justice Marshall  had  suggested in dictum in Dunn  v. Blumstein,  405 U.S.  330,
343-44  (1972),  that bona fide  residence requirements  might  be "necessary"  and there-
fore might withstand strict scrutiny,  but he was  not contemplating  the fact situation of
Holt, which can  only be  characterized  as  applying  an exception.
2$  See,  e.g.,  Milliken v.  Bradley,  418 U.S.  717,  741,  744  (1974).
219  Cabell v.  Chavez-Salido, 454  U.S. 432,  439-40  (1982); see also Note, A Dual
Standard  for State Discrimination  Against Aliens, 92  HARv.  L. REv.  1516  (1979)
(describing  the  Supreme  Court's  dual equal  protection  standard  for reviewing  classifi-
cations  that  disadvantage  aliens,  while  attempting  to  resolve  inconsistencies  in  the
standard).
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Accommodating  local  preferences  by  excusing  independent  local
decisions  from  heightened  scrutiny  would  similarly  further  constitu-
tional  values  of political  self-determination.  The  resulting  inequalities
cannot  be  denied.  The  exception would  uphold  all-but-irrational  terri-
torial  variations  in  the  scope  of  fundamental  rights,  so  long  as  each
local  law  itself withstood  review.  But the trade-off between  uniformity
and  autonomy  is  inevitable,  and  in  a nation  historically  committed  to
self-government  from  the  town  meeting  on  up,  the  necessary  loss  of
territorial  uniformity  is  not  too  high  a  price  to  pay  for making  local
self-determination  possible.  Thus,  the  traditional  failure  to  scrutinize
closely  varying municipal ordinances within the same state can be justi-
fied  in modern  terms  and should  continue.
5.  Second  Special  Position-Interstate  Variations
We  should  next  consider  situations  in  which  state  action  causes
fundamental  rights to vary  from state to state.  To begin  with the  obvi-
ous,  the equal  protection  clause  of the fourteenth  amendment  does not
require that  a state restrict  a fundamental  right  within its borders  only
in  those situations where all the other states limit the right within  their
own  borders.  A variation  in  the treatment  of furidamental  rights  be-
tween  neighboring  states  triggers  no  standard  of review,  not  even  the
most minimal test of rationality.22  A textual  argument  for denying  re-
view  rests  on the  language  of the equal  protection  clause  itself:  "Nor
shall  any State  ...  deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection  of the  laws."22  The  clause  addresses  only  actions taken  by
an  individual  state,  not differences  between  states.222  The  elements  of
our constitutional  history support  this literal reading. The independent
sovereignty  of the  states  over  matters  within  their respective  jurisdic-
tions  has  been  one  of the  key  principles  of federalism. 223  Thus,  inter-
220  For  a  visionary  plea that  they  should,  at least  in  the  voting  rights area,  see
Miller and Bowman,  Toward an Interstate  Standard  of Equal Protection  of the Laws:
A Speculative Essay, 1981  B.Y.U.  L. REV.  275. To adopt that approach  would essen-
tially  be  to  abolish  the  authority  of the  states  to  legislate  at  all  in  ways  that  affect
fundamental  rights,  except  to help  determine the  most  tolerant common  denominator.
22'  U.S.  CONsT.  art.  XIV,  §1.
222  See Gurley v. Rhoden,  421  U.S. 200, 211-12  (1975)  (characterizing a contrary
claim  as  patently  frivolous).
213  See,  e.g.,  Heath  v.  Alabama,  106 S.  Ct.  433, 437-40  (1985);  Edgar v. MITE
Corp.,  457  U.S.  624,  642-43  (1982);  Nevada  v.  Hall,  440  U.S.  410,  423-24  (1979);
Pennoyer  v. Neff,  95 U.S.  714, 722  (1878);  see also Braybrooke,  Can Democracy Be
Combined With  Federalism or With  Liberalism?, in  LIBERAL  DEMOCRACY:  NoMos
XXV  109,  111  (1983)  (stating  that  existence  of two  or  more  states in  federal  union
implies  that  "local"  issues  in  each  state  are  withdrawn  from  agenda  of every  other
state).
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state variations resulting  from  the juxtaposition of the independent  ac-
tions of two  sister states  pose no equal  protection  problems.
Is  this  the  price  we  pay  for  federalism,  or  is  it  one  of  the  great
virtues  of  federalism?  The  glass  is  either  half empty  or  half  full,  de-
pending on  the viewer's  standpoint. Federalism  permits the  majority in
each  state to choose how  far  above  the constitutional  minimum  the ex-
ercise of fundamental  rights will extend  locally. Some states  will afford
more freedom than the mean;  others will afford  less than the mean. All
states,  in  making  these  choices,  will  be  exercising  the  independently
valued  freedom  of  local  self-determination  within  their  respective
spheres.
Uncertainties  in the  field of conflict  of laws,  however, make  these
spheres  difficult  to delineate  and thereby jeopardize  the benefits  of in-
dependent  choice.  Fundamental  rights  equal  protection  could  serve to
aggravate  the  difficulties. The  act of choice of law transforms  the pris-
tine independence  of statute  making  by  two  states  into  discrimination
by  the  courts  of one  of them.  Whenever a  state  exercises  some  discre-
tion in applying its  own or  another state's  law to cases  deemed  appro-
priate,  it becomes  subject  to  equal  protection  claims. 24
a.  The Choice of Law Problem
In an  oversimplified  model  of interstate  variations,  each  state  de-
cides  for  itself the  permissible  range  for  the  exercise  of  fundamental
rights  within  its  borders.  In  reality,  transactions  tend  to  spill  across
state  borders,  and  often  several  states  have  plausible  interests  in  as-
signing  legal  consequences  to  a  harmful  event.  For example,  a televi-
sion  program  produced  in California  and broadcast  from  Delaware to
Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey,  might  defame  a  citizen  of
Illinois.  Earlier in this  century,  the Supreme  Court incorporated  rigid
common law choice of law rules  into federal  constitutional  law in order
to  police  state  assertions  of prescriptive jurisdiction.225  The  traditional
choice of law framework has been largely discredited,  however, and re-
placed  by  a cacophony of mutually  incompatible  methodologies. 2 28  The
Court has  wisely  refrained  from singling  out  any  of these  methodolo-
224  See  Currie  & Schreter,  Unconstitutional Discrimination in  the  Conflict of
Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69  YALE  L.J. 1323,  1323-24  (1960).
2215  See,  e.g.,  Home  Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281  U.S.  397  (1930);  New  York  Life  Ins.
Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357  (1918);  cf. Mutual  Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S.  209,
214 (1922)  ("[T]he Constitution and the first principles of legal thinking allow the law
of the place where  a contract is made to determine  the validity and the consequences of
the  act.").
22  See J. MARTIN,  CONFLiCT  OF LAWS:  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  166-67  (2d ed.
1984).
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gies  as  constitutionally  required.2 2  As  a  result,  the  Constitution,  by
means  of the  due  process  and  full faith  and  credit  clauses,  now  places
only minimal  obstacles  to the application  of its own  law by a state that
arguably  has  some relation  to a  transaction.22
When  do  state  choice  of  law  decisions  raise  equal  protection
problems?  From a forum  state's point of view, we can distinguish three
categories  of cases:  (1)  wholly  foreign  cases,  in which  the forum  state
has  so little  connection  to  the dispute  that  the due  process  or  the  full
faith  and  credit  clause  forbids  the state  to  apply  its  own  law;229  (2)
multistate  cises,  in which  those clauses  permit both the forum and one
or  more  other  states  to  apply  their  laws;230  and  (3)  wholly  domestic
cases,  in which  the  due  process  or  full  faith  and  credit  clause  forbids
any state but the forum  to apply its own law.231 Conflicts experts  disa-
gree  as  to  how  large these  categories  should  be,  and  as  to which  cases
should  fall  within them. The  factors  that will,  under various  theories,
determine the category to which a case belongs include the residences  of
the various  parties, the locations  of various  acts  constituting the trans-
actions,  the situs of items  of property,  and the  locations where various
impacts of the transactions are felt. Adopting a rigid set of choice of law
rules  as  a  matter  of constitutional  law  would  increase  the  size  of the
wholly  foreign  and  wholly  domestic  categories  at  the  expense  of  the
multistate category.  Under current law, however, this intermediate  cat-
egory  is  enormous.
232
A  state's  refusal  to  apply  its  own  law  to  cases  within  the  first,
wholly  foreign  category  should never  create  an equal  protection  viola-
tion. The same  is true  of a decision  to apply its own  law in the third,
wholly  domestic  category.  This  follows  from  the  more  general  claim
that classifications  forced  upon  state  action  in a  given  context  by  the
Constitution  itself  are  ipso  facto  justified  under  the  equal  protection
clause.233  Where  a clause  of the  Constitution,  expressly  or  by judicial
227  See, e.g.,  Phillips Petroleum  Co. v. Shutts,  105  S.  Ct. 2965, 2986  (1985)  (Ste-
vens,  J., concurring  and  dissenting);  Allstate  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hague,  449  U.S.  302,  307
(1981)  (plurality opinion);  Jackson,  Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of
the Constitution, 45  COLuM.  L. REv.  1, 26-27  (1945).
228  See J.  MARTIN,  supra note  226, at 338-39.
229  See,  e.g.,  Phillips Petroleum Co.,  105 S.  Ct. at  2977-81.
230  See, e.g.,  Allstate Ins., 449 U.S. at 313-19.  I will use the term "multistate"  in
an  idiosyncratic  way,  to  describe  cases  where  choice  between  forum  law  and  foreign
law  is  possible,  excluding  those  cases  where  the  forum state  could  not apply its own
law  but rather  must choose  among  the  laws of several  foreign  states.
231  Conceivably,  there  is a  narrower  category  of cases  in  which  the due  process
clause affirmatively requires  the state  to apply its own  law. See id. at 327  (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
232 See J.  MARTIN,  supra note  226,  at  166-67,  338-41.
223  This  claim  is  not uncontroversial.  It implies,  for  example,  that  the  twenty-
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construction, singles out the distinction between two government actions
as so significant  that the Constitution permits one action and proscribes
the other, the equal protection  clause  should not be used  to convert the
permitted  action into a forbidden  one by  arguing that there is no consti-
tutionally  sufficient difference between  them. If there were no sufficient
difference,  then the permitted  action ought never to have been regarded
as  tolerable  in  the  first  place.  Absent  clear  indication  that  the equal
protection  clause  was  intended  to  repeal  another  constitutional  provi-
sion,  boundaries of government  power  drawn by the Constitution  itself
should  not be regarded  as  offensive  to  constitutional  ideals of equality.
Thus,  the  few  geographical  discriminations  required  by  the  full  faith
and  credit  and  due  process  clauses  should  never  trigger  heightened
equal  protection  scrutiny,  regardless  of their  impact  on a fundamental
right.
This  leaves  an  enormous  range  of  multistate  cases,  in  which  a
state  will  have  a  sufficient  interest  that  it  could validly  exercise  pre-
scriptive  jurisdiction,  but  in  which  other  states  have  similar  or  even
greater  interest.  In  many  of  these  instances,  the  interest  of the  sister
state  in  governing  the  transaction  will  be  demonstrably  greater  than
that of the forum  state. Nonetheless,  neither constitutional  doctrine nor
many modern  choice  of law theories would disable  the forum  from ap-
plying  its own  law in such  circumstances.  For example, in the  view of
some  conflicts scholars, the forum state  always has an interest in apply-
ing its rules  of liability to an out-of-state  defendant  who has injured  a
forum  state resident  in the defendant's  home state.'"  Under this view,
if Alabama  had very strict libel laws,  it might justifiably  desire  to im-
pose  liability  for  defamation  of  one  of its  residents  by  a  New  York
newspaper  of limited circulation  only in New York,  even  if the  people
of New York had decided to maximize the freedom of the press in their
state  by  abolishing  the tort of defamation.28 5 Instead,  however,  a state
sixth amendment's conferral of the right to vote on 18-year-olds  forestalls the argument
that denying  the vote  to  17-year-olds  violates equal  protection and  that the fourteenth
amendment's  conferral  of  citizenship  on  children  born  in  the  United  States  forestalls
the  argument  that  denying  citizenship  to  children  born  abroad  to  American  citizens
would  violate  equal  protection.  For a  contrasting  view,  see  Eisenstadt  v. Baird,  405
U.S.  438,  452-53  (1972),  which  appears to  say that even  assuming that the  constitu-
tional right  to use  contraception  recognized in  Griswold v. Connecticut,  381  U.S.  479
(1965),  extends only  to married  persons, it would be unconstitutionally  irrational  for a
state  to  forbid  such  use  by  unmarried  persons  while  permitting  its  use  by  married
persons.  Cf. Memorial  Hosp. v. Maricopa  County, 415 U.S.  250,  256  n.9  (1974)  ("It
would  seem  inconsistent  to  argue  that the  [county's]  residence  requirement  should be
construed to bar longtime  [state] residents, even if unconstitutional  as applied to persons
migrating  into Maricopa  County  from  outside  the state.").
234  See,  e.g.,  J.  MARTIN,  supra  note  226,  at 220-23.
283  How strict libel laws can be is an issue currently in flux. After Gertz v. Robert
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may  choose  to  defer  to  the  law  of a  sister  state.  Alabama  might  con-
clude  that  imposing  its  tort  sanctions  on  the  newspaper  would  too
greatly  frustrate New York's  legitimate local policy and thus might de-
cline  to  extend  its laws  so  far.  If not  compelled  by  the  full faith  and
credit or  due process  clauses,  this  exercise of comity  would represent  a
voluntary accommodation  to the  coequal  sovereignty of a sister state  in
a federal  system.2"" This comity is an important  virtue in our constitu-
tional scheme.237 The fact that the Supreme Court has proved unable to
provide  useful  guidance  through  the letter  of the  full  faith  and credit
clause  should not  discredit  the  states'  efforts  to  carry  out its  spirit.
It is arguable that this exercise of comity,  however admirable, nev-
ertheless  violates  the  equal  protection  clause.  Potential  litigants  could
contrast  Alabama's  failure  to  impose  liability  in  the  above  example
with  its  treatment  of  defamation  of  residents  by  instate  newspapers,
defamation  of nonresidents  by  instate  newspapers,  interstate  broadcast
of television signals  defaming nonresidents, and so forth.2"8  By  applying
New York law in the case hypothesized, Alabama  could be discriminat-
ing  against instate  defendants,  against  publications  originating  instate,
or against publications  received  instate.  Various  choice  of law theories
reject  the  appropriateness  of making each  of these  factors  dispositive.
If subjected  to strict scrutiny, could  Alabama  ever hope to  demon-
strate  that  such  discriminations  are  necessary  to  achieve  a compelling
state  interest?  The  state has  only  highly  abstract  interests  in applying
its  law  less  broadly  than  the maximum  that  the  full  faith  and  credit
clause  tolerates:  to  extend  a  supererogatory  comity  to  sister  states,  to
encourage  reciprocal  courtesies,  to diminish  forum shopping,  and, per-
haps,  to be  a little  fairer  to  parties  who  might not have  expected  that
the state's  law would govern their transactions.  Even if these are com-
pelling  interests,  unless  Alabama  adheres  to  a  well  defined  choice  of
law methodology  that the Supreme  Court shares, it will not be  able to
demonstrate  to that Court's satisfaction  that its choice  of law classifica-
Welch,  Inc.,  418  U.S.  323  (1974),  it appeared  that strict liability  for media  libel  was
never permissible. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,  105 S. Ct. 2939,
2949  (1985)  (White,  J.,  concurring);  L.  TRIBE, supra note  46,  at  640-41.  But  the
limits of Gertz have  been destabilized  by the  Court's  recent holding  in Dun & Brad-
street. See 105  S. Ct. at 2952 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2959 &  n.11  (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).  Although  the  Court  has  never  applied  equal  protection  analysis  to  libel
cases,  the distinction between  absolute immunity  and strict liability for unintended  def-
amation is so intrusive  that heightened  scrutiny seems appropriate.  I will use this as a
convenient  hypothetical, while  recognizing  that  its  accuracy  is debatable.
8 See Nevada  v. Hall,  440  U.S.  410,  424-27  (1979).
237  See id. at 425-26.
238  The  classifications  resulting  from  choice  of law  decisions  in  these  cases  will
frequently  take the form  of geographical  discriminations,  whether  based purely  on the
location of conduct  or on residence.
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tions are  "precisely  drawn"  or "narrowly  tailored"  to achieve  those in-
terests.2"9  Thus,  geographical  classifications  adopted  to  assign  some
multistate  cases  to another  state's  law will inevitably  succumb  to strict
scrutiny,  and  possibly  to  less  intrusive  forms  of "heightened"  scrutiny
as well.
A  state's  exercise  of  territorial  restraint  in  these  circumstances
should  not be condemned  by equal  protection  merely  because  the state
had the power to reach further. If moderation  in exercising  prescriptive
jurisdiction  provokes  fatal  equal  protection  challenges,  then  the  only
safe harbor  is  boundless  self-assertion.  States  would  be  encouraged  to
respond in choice  of law as many have in personal jurisdiction-to  ex-
tend a long arm as  far as  the Constitution  permits.' 0  In situations  re-
sembling the defamation  pattern, the result would  be very threatening
to fundamental  rights. An individual's rights would be restricted by the
maximum number of conflicting  state  laws,  invoked  at the  choice  of a
government241  or private  plaintiff, who  would shop  for the forum that
would apply the law least  favorable to the individual's  rights under the
particular  circumstances  of the  case.
We  may compare  this hostile environment  to the results produced
by  more  restrictive  choice  of law rules.  For example,  consider a  tradi-
tional choice  of law rule:  a defamation  action is governed  by the law of
the  state  where  the  defamatory  communication  is  received.242  Putting
aside  its  merits  as  a  choice  of law  rule,  what  danger  does  it  pose  to
equality  of  rights?248  Under  current  law,  the  state  of the  injury  can
289  Professor Simson agrees, and concludes that residence-based  choice of law deci-
sions relying on interest analysis  always violate equal  protection,  whether  fundamental
rights are involved  or not. See Simson, State Autonomy in Choice of Law: A Suggested
Approach, 52  S.  CAL.  L. REv.  61,  86-87  (1978).
240  See, e.g.,  R.I.  GEM.  LAWS  §9-5-33 (1985);  see also Kulko v.  Superior  Court,
436  U.S.  84  (1978)  (finding that due  process  forbade  particular  exercise  of personal
jurisdiction  under  California  long-arm  statute  that  authorized  jurisdiction  as  far  as
Constitution  permits).
24'  Today, pure location discriminations typically control  state  assertions of crimi-
nal jurisdiction.  State criminal  laws  are  aimed  at either  conduct  occurring  within the
state  or  conduct  inflicting  injury  within  the  state.  See  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF
CONFLICT OF  LAWS  §  9  (1971).  Here  the discrimination  is especially  blatant:  because
states  do not enforce  one another's  criminal laws,  the state  will not apply  foreign  law
but will leave the  perpetrator of an out-of-state crime untouched  or, on request, extra-
dite her for trial and punishment by the other state. Yet there will be occasions where a
state could,  consistently with due  process  and  full faith  and  credit,  apply  its criminal
laws, including its criminal libel laws, to conduct occurring wholly within another state.
See Garrison  v. Louisiana,  379 U.S.  64  (1964)  (stating modern  constitutional  standard
for  criminal  libel  law).
242  See RESTATEMENT  OF  CONFLICT OF  LAWS  §377  n.5  (1934).
248  When  the defamatory  statement  is received  in  many states, the resulting com-
plexity of the case may impose serious burdens on the defendant,  chilling the exercise of
first amendment rights.  See Pielemeier,  Constitutional  Limitations on Choice of Law:
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exercise  both  prescriptive  and  adjudicatory  jurisdiction  to  subject  the
defamer  to  its law  in its  courts.  Variations  between  the  treatment  the
defendant  would  receive  in  those  courts  and  the  treatment  she  might
receive  in the courts  of other states are no concern  of the equal protec-
tion clause,  because  independent  action of two states  is  involved.  Simi-
larly,  when  Alabama  applies  the  law  of New  York,  the  state  of the
injury, rather than its own stricter law, it does  not thereby  express dis-
respect for the exercise  of free speech within its own borders  but rather
recognizes  the right of the people of New York independently  to deter-
mine their own  policy concerning the competing interests of speech  and
reputation  in  their own  territory.  Alabama  acts  neutrally  by  adhering
to  the  law  of  the  state  of  the  injury,  whatever  it  may  be-more
favorable,  less favorable, or the same as Alabama law. It has not deter-
mined that one  rule is right  for Alabama  and  a different rule right for
New  York;  rather,  it  has  determined  that  the  people  of  New  York
should make  their own  decisions  about communications  received  within
their borders, whether those  decisions be right or wrong. And it is sim-
ply  reaching, the  same  result  in  its  own  court  that would  have  been
reached  if the  case  had  been  brought  in New  York.
Special  problems  arise,  however, when  a forum state's  decision  to
apply foreign  law  turns on the residence  of the parties,  and  results  in
worse treatment for  the nonresident.  Discrimination  against  nonresi-
dents  evokes  particular  concern  in our constitutional  system,  not only
under  the  equal  protection  clause,  but  also  under  the  privileges  and
immunities  clause  of article  IV.
Because  the  privileges  and  immunities  clause  problem  has  at-
tracted significant  attention,244  it will  be useful  to examine that  prob-
lem  and  then  consider  its  implications  for  equal  protection  analysis,
before  finally  deciding  on  the  proper  treatment  of  choice  of law  dis-
criminations affecting  fundamental  rights. I will conclude that the priv-
ileges  and  immunities  clause  does  require  some  judicial  scrutiny  of
choice  of law practices that discriminate against  nonresidents,  and that
the  same factors  that feature  in the privileges  and  immunities inquiry
should  inform the equal  protection  analysis.
b.  The Privileges and Immunities Perspective
The  privileges  and  immunities  clause  entitles  "[t]he  Citizens  of
The Special Case of  Multistate  Defamation, 133 U. PA.  L. REv. 381,  393-94 (1985).  I
will  consider here only the  locally  circulated  defamation.
144  See, e.g., Currie  & Schreter, supra note 224; Ely, supra note 5; Simson, supra
note  5.
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each  State  . . . to all  Privileges  and Immunities  of Citizens  in the sev-
eral  States."24  Its  language  refers  to citizens,  but the  Supreme  Court
has  held  that  it  condemns  discriminations  among  citizens  phrased  in
terms  of residence  as  well  as those  explicitly  turning on citizenship. 246
The Court  has also departed  from the literal language of the clause by
limiting  its coverage  "to  those  'privileges'  and  'immunities'  bearing  on
the vitality  of the nation as a single entity. 24 1 7  Even such privileges  and
immunities  can  be withheld  from  nonresidents  when the deprivation  is
justified  by  problems  peculiar  to  their  status.248  Thus  privileges  and
immunities  cases  involve  a two  stage inquiry:  a threshold  examination
of the kind of right at stake and a careful scrutiny of the reasons for the
discrimination.
Some  commentators  argue  that  a  state's  discrimination  against
nonresidents  should  also  trigger  heightened  scrutiny  under  the  equal
protection  clause,  principally  because  nonresidents,  like  aliens,  are not
represented  in the state  government  and  are therefore  at the  mercy  of
its  self-interested  decisions. 249  The  Supreme  Court,  however,  has  re-
jected  this  approach  and  analyzes  these  problems  differently.  First,  it
has  repeatedly  refused to articulate  a higher level  of scrutiny under the
equal  protection  clause  for  discriminations  against  out-of-staters.2
5
0  It
has  employed  the  privileges  and  immunities  clause, where  applicable,
to police  such  discriminations.251 Second,  the Court has interpreted the
privileges  and  immunities  clause  as  serving  a  broader  purpose  than
merely compensating  for  lack of representation.  "The primary purpose
245  U.S.  CoNsT.  art. IV,  §2.
246  See,  e.g.,  Hicklin v. Orbeck,  437  U.S.  518,  524  n.8  (1978).
247  Baldwin v.  Fish  & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371,  383 (1978); accord Supreme
Court v. Piper,  105  S. Ct.  1272,  1276  (1985);  United Bldg. & Constr. Trades  Council
v. Mayor  of  Camden,  465  U.S.  208,  218  (1984).  The  precise  meaning  of the  quoted
phrase  remains  unclear.
248  See  Piper, 105  S. Ct.  at  1278-79;  Toomer  v. Witsell,  334  U.S.  385,  396
(1948).
249  See J. ELY,  supra note 46, at 86;  Simson, supra note 239,  at 86.  Conceivably
this  argument  would  extend to  heightened  scrutiny  of municipal  ordinances  discrimi-
nating  against  nonresidents  of the municipality  (including fellow  citizens  of the  state).
But see United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S.  at  217-18;  County Bd. v.
Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977)  (per curiam). Our present concern,  however, is with state
discrimination  based on  nonresidence  in  the  state.
280  See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S.  321,  328 n.7  (1983)  (applying equal protec-
tion  rational  basis  test;  privileges  and  immunities  clause  inapposite  because  alien  in-
volved);  G.D. Searle  & Co. v.  Cohn, 455 U.S.  404, 408  & n.6 (1982)  (applying equal
protection  rational  basis test;  privileges  and  immunities  clause inapposite  because  cor-
poration  involved);  Baldwin, 436  U.S.  at  388-89  (applying  equal  protection  rational
basis test;  privileges  and immunities  clause inapposite  because  no "fundamental  right"
involved);  McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil  Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S.  645 (1976)  (apply-
ing rational  basis  test;  privileges  and  immunities  clause inapposite).
281  See,  e.g.,  United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 461  U.S.  at 213-14.
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of  this  clause  ...was  to  help  fuse  into  one  Nation  a  collection  of
independent,  sovereign  States. 252  It  "remov[es]  from  the  citizens  of
each  State the disabilities of alienage in the other States." '53  Third, the
Court has  also  incorporated  this fuller  vision  of national  unity into its
equal  protection  analysis,  as  illustrated  by  its  decisions  involving  dis-
crimination  against newer residents of a state. An approach  based solely
on  lack  of  representation  would  abandon  the  out-of-stater  once  she
resettles  and  becomes  eligible  for the franchise  in the new  state.254
In fact,  the Court has usually drawn exactly this line when inter-
preting the privileges and immunities clause.255 Although the Court has
described  the  privileges  and  immunities  clause  as  protecting  a  citizen
"when  he  is  within  or  when  he  removes  to  another  State,' 2 58  it has
chosen  to vindicate the continuing interest in national unity through the
equal  protection  clause.  The  "right  to  travel"  cases  invalidated  dura-
tional  residence  requirements  for important  rights  and  privileges  that
the state could have denied  to nonresidents.  These holdings were  based
on "the nature  of our Federal Union and our constitutional  concepts of
personal  liberty. '25 7  More  recently,  the  Court has  labelled  the  state's
desire  to  favor  long-term  residents  over  new  arrivals  as  "constitution-
ally  unacceptable,"  and  has applied  the rational  basis  test  with  more
vigor  than candor  to permanent  discriminations  based  on former  resi-
dence  elsewhere.258
2 Toomer, 334  U.S.  at 395.
"'  Paul  v.  Virginia, 75  U.S.  (8  Wall.)  168,  180  (1868).
25  Thus, the  political representation  concern  would take  a new resident  as far  as
Dunn  v.  Blumstein,  405  U.S.  330  (1972),  which  invalidated  a  durational  residence
requirement  for  voting, but not as far as  Shapiro v.  Thompson,  394 U.S.  618  (1969),
which invalidated  a durational  residence requirement for welfare benefits,  in the face of
possible  congressional  authorization.
25' See,  e.g.,  United  Bldg.  & Constr. Trades  Council v.  Mayor of Camden,  465
U.S.  208,  217  (1984);  Zobel  v.  Williams,  457  U.S.  55,  59  n.5  (1982).
256  Blake  v. McClung,  172 U.S. 239,  256  (1898);  see also Zobel, 457 U.S.  at 73-
75 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that statute that denies non-Alaskans settling in
the state  the same opportunity to share in state rebate program as  afforded longer term
residents  violated  the  privileges  and  immunities  clause).
2'7  Shapiro  v.  Thompson,  394  U.S.  618,  629  (1969);  Memorial  Hosp.  v.  Mari-
copa  County, 415 U.S. 250,  254-55  (1974); accord Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343-44. But see
Sosna  v.  Iowa,  419 U.S.  393  (1975);  Chimento  v.  Stark,  414 U.S.  802  (1973),  affg
mem.  353  F. Supp.  1211  (D.N.H.  1973).
25  See, e.g.,  Zobel, 457 U.S. at 65; see also Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,
105  S.  Ct.  2862  (1985)  (finding unconstitutional  state statute that granted tax exemp-
tion only to Vietnam  veterans who  resided in the state before a specific  date); Williams
v. Vermont,  105  S.  Ct.  2465  (1985)  (finding unconstitutional  Vermont statute that re-
quired  car  buyers who  bought and  registered cars outside of Vermont  before becoming
Vermont residents  to pay full  use tax, while car buyers  who were residents  at the time
of purchase received  a credit  for taxes  paid in a state that would  reciprocate); cf  Attor-
ney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez,  106 S.  Ct. 2317  (1986)  (four-Justice plurality  relying
on right to  travel  precedents;  two  concurring Justices relying  on Zobel line of cases).
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Once  choice  of law  methods  changed  from  supposedly  inevitable
territorial  principles  to the  exercise of free choice on policy grounds, the
use  of residence  as  a decisional  factor  began  to  look like  a discrimina-
tion highly vulnerable to constitutional  challenge. Professors Currie and
Kay  explored  this  darker  side  of  their  interest  analysis  approach  to
choice of law in the late  1950's.259  They  tentatively  concluded that the
residence  discriminations  applied  in  choice  of law  might  often  be  re-
garded  as  constitutionally  inoffensive  so  long  as  nonresidents  are sub-
jected to the laws of their own domicile.260  Thus, even if New York had
abolished  the  tort  of  defamation,  it  could  entertain  defamation  suits
against  nonresidents  under their  own  states'  laws.  Dean  Ely  has pur-
sued  this  suggestion  in  his  own  direction.28 1  In  accordance  with  his
"representation-reinforcing"  interpretation of the privileges  and immu-
nities  clause, he argues  that nonresidents  do not need the protections  of
that clause  when their legal  obligations  are  defined  by their own  state
government rather than by a state in which they lack political represen-
tation.2 6 2  Ely  does not admire this "law of the domicile"  conflicts meth-
odology,  but  he  offers,  if  only  as  a  devil's  advocate,  a  defense  of  its
constitutionality.263
One difficulty with this representation-based  defense is that it pro-
ceeds  on too high  a level  of generality to  redeem choice  of law method-
ology  as it might actually  be practiced.  If the forum state were  to per-
The Court  had long before  characterized discrimination  based on out-of-state resi-
dence  as unconstitutional  when indulged  in for  its own  sake,  see,  e.g.,  WHYY,  Inc. v.
Borough  of Glassboro,  393  U.S.  117,  120  (1968)  but  had not  intrusively  scrutinized
proffered justifications  when  the  discrimination  was  alleged  to  serve  a  purpose  other
than  favoritism. See,  e.g.,  Western  & S.  Life Ins.  Co.  v. State  Bd.,  451  U.S.  648,  672
(1981).  The Court's  recent  decision  in Metropolitan  Life Ins. Co.  v. Ward,  105  S.  Ct.
1676  (1985),  may  suggest a more  rigorous scrutiny  even of  discrimination  against  for-
eign corporations.  It is possible, however, that the majority  simply bungled the applica-
tion of the  conceivable  rational basis test, viewing  the issue too  narrowly because  of its
procedural  peculiarities.  See  id. at  1679-80.  Then Justice  Rehnquist's  contemptuous
dismissal  of a similar  challenge in  Northeast Bancorp,  Inc. v. Board of Governors,  105
S. Ct.  2545,  2555-56  (1985),  may  underline the aberrational  character of the Metropol-
itan Life decision.  Unfortunately,  Justice  Powell,  the author of Metropolitan Life, did
not  participate  in  Northeast Bancorp and  so  had  no  opportunity  to  refute  Justice
O'Connor's claim that the  two cases were  irreconcilable. See id. at 2556 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
1'9  See  B.  CURRIE,  SELECTED  ESSAYS  ON  THE  CONFLICT  OF  LAWS  445-583
(1963).
260  See id. at 572  & n.183.
2"61  See Ely, supra note  5,  at  190-91.
262  See id. at  189-90;  see also J.  ELY,  supra note  46, at  83-84.
263  See  Ely, supra note  5,  at  211-17.  Ely  views  Austin  v. New  Hampshire,  420
U.S.  656 (1975),  as an obstacle to his analysis, but believes  it was wrongly  decided. See
Ely, supra note 5,  at  186-89.  For a discussion of Austin, see infra text accompanying
notes  282-91.
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mit all of a  nonresident's  rights  and obligations  to  be governed  by the
laws  of  her  domicile,  the  representation  argument  might  have  force.
Indeed,  a  court  might  find  that  the  nonresident  had  suffered  no dis-
crimination  at all,  because  the body of law imposed  on her was on the
average  no  less  favorable  than  the  body of law  imposed  on local  resi-
dents.26'  But American  states are unlikely  to revert wholesale  to accept-
ance  of a  personal  law  that  a  citizen  carries  with  her.2 5  The  modus
operandi  of modern  choice  of law is d~peqage: courts choose  law issue
by issue in the unique configuration  of the litigation  before  them. 26 6  In
a system  of dbpecage, resort  to domicile  law on a  single  issue may  be
highly unfair  to the nonresident.  Defenses,  for example,  are tailored to
rules of liability. Failure to  discriminate  on the  basis of residence  with
regard  to  one  issue  can  never  violate  the  privileges  and  immunities
clause,  but  it may  fatally  alter  the  effect  of applying  the  law  of  the
domicile  with  regard  to  another  issue.  A  state  that  requires  proof  of
malice  by  libel  plaintiffs,  for example,  can  reasonably  provide  fewer
privilege  defenses  than  a  state  imposing  strict  liability.  If the  forum
gives every  plaintiff the benefit of its own strict liability rule and rele-
gates defendants  to the privileges of their domicile,  it cannot argue that
nonresident  defendants  have  only  their  legislatures  to  blame  for  their
predicament.  Rather,  denying  them  the  benefits  of  forum  law  puts
them at  an unfair  disadvantage.
Reference  to the law of a nonresident's  domicile  can  also frustrate
the broader purpose of the privileges  and immunities clause:  to fuse the
states into a single nation  by eliminating differential  treatment  of citi-
zens  of  other  states.  Even  if  the  clause  was  necessitated  by  the
powerlessness of nonresidents,  the solution the Framers  chose was inte-
gration  of visitors  into the local  system,  not  extraterritoriality. 67  Both
the wording of the clause268  and its interpretation6 9  suggest  as a para-
3" The  Supreme  Court  has employed  such  an  average  burden  analysis  in  privi-
leges and  immunities  clause  cases  involving  differential taxation  of residents  and non-
residents.  See,  e.g.,  Austin, 420  U.S.  at 665; Travis v.  Yale  & Towne Mfg.  Co.,  252
U.S.  60,  80-81  (1920);  Shaffer v. Carter,  252  U.S.  37,  55-57  (1920);  Traveller's Ins.
Co. v. Connecticut,  185 U.S.  364,  368  (1902);  cf. Kane v.  New Jersey,  242 U.S.  160,
167 (1916)  (holding that requirement that nonresident drivers appoint an agent within
the  state for  receipt of process was not a discrimination  against  nonresidents because it
merely  "put[]  nonresident  owners  upon  an  equality  with resident  owners").
15  See Ely, supra note  5,  at  192.
266  See,  e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  CONFLICT  OF  LAWS  §§  5,  6,  & 9
(1971).  Currie and Kay, as  well as Ely,  pursue their analysis in this form. See, e.g.,  B.
CuRRIE,  supra note  259, at  569;  Ely, supra note  5,  at  187  n.41.
217  See  Paul v. Virginia,  75 U.S.  (8  Wall.)  168,  180-81  (1868).
1"  "The  Citizens  of each  State shall  be entitled  to all  Privileges and  Immunities
of Citizens  in the Several  States."  U.S.  CONST.  art. IV,  § 2.
269  See, e.g.,  Toomer v.  Witsell, 334 U.S.  385, 396  (1948)  (stating that the  clause
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digm  the right  of a citizen  of state A, while  physically  within  the bor-
ders  of state  B,  to  interact  with  citizens  of state  B  on the  same  legal
terms  as  those  that  govern  their  interaction  among  themselves.  Al-
though  this  seems  to  reflect  an underlying  assumption  of territoriality
too  naive  for  modern  conflicts  thinkers,  such  attitudes  were  prevalent
during the  period  when the  clause  was  drafted  and first  expounded.
Nonresidents  who  are  known  to  carry  their  domicile's  law  with
them  cannot participate  as equals in the  life of the  state.  (Imagine,  for
example,  a lawsuit in which litigants  from  different states  were subject
to  different  rules  regarding  the  privilege  for  defamatory  statements
made  in the  course of court proceedings.)  Even where the nonresidents'
own  law  is  more favorable,  its  incompatibility  with local  practice may
occasionally  place  them  at  a  competitive  disadvantage.  Automatic  ap-
proval  of  recourse  to  the  law  of  the  domicile  maintains  rather  than
reduces  existing  differentials  in  treatment  between  residents  and non-
residents.  Thus, this methodology  does  not foster "a  national  economic
union."
2 70
These  considerations  suggest  that  inhospitable  choice  of law  deci-
sions ought sometimes to be regarded  as violations of the privileges  and
immunities  clause.  As  a  matter  of  precedent,  however,  the  Supreme
Court  has  never  invalidated  a  choice  of  law  decision  under  that
clause.27 1  If the Court were  eager  to  avoid  all the difficulties  applica-
tion of the clause  would entail, it could conceivably  reject  challenges  to
choice  of law distinctions  at the threshold. Under  its current approach,
the  Court  might  claim that  choice  of  law  decisions,  however  idiosyn-
cratic,  "merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed  of individ-
ual  States, [rather than] bearing on the vitality of the Nation as a single
entity," 1 2 7  and  therefore  escape the  clause  altogether.  But if the Court
is  willing  to  grasp  the nettle,  it should  recognize  that  unrestricted  li-
cense  to  deny  the  benefits  of forum  law to  nonresidents  would  impair
the national  unity  goals  of article  IV,  and it should  move  beyond  the
"guarantees  to citizens  of State A  [the  privilege]  of doing business in  State B on terms
of substantial equality with the citizens of that State");  Ward v.  Maryland, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.)  418,  430  (1870)  (stating that the  clause  "protects  the  right of a  citizen  of one
State  to pass  into any  other State  of the  Union for  the  purpose  of engaging  in  lawful
commerce").
10  Supreme  Court v. Piper,  105 S. Ct.  1272,  1276  (1985).
171  See J. MARTIN,  supra note 226,  at 332.  The age and the particular  rationale
of Conner  v. Elliot,  59  U.S. (1 How.)  591  (1855),  upholding a restriction  of Louisi-
ana's community property law to residents, make that decision  an uninformative  prece-
dent. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 65.6  (1975),  discussed infra at text accompa-
nying  notes 282-91,  did not really  involve choice of law  because  nothing in Maine  law
suggested  that Austin  should pay  tax  to New  Hampshire.
17'  Baldwin v. Fish  & Game Comm'n,  436  U.S.  371,  383  (1978).
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threshold to require justification  of the distinctions.273  Because  my par-
ticular  concern  in this Article is  discriminations  affecting  fundamental
rights  in the equal  protection  sense, which  almost  always  are "funda-
mental"  enough  for article  IV  protection,27 4 and  because  many  choice
of law decisions  affect  the ability of nonresidents  to compete  as  equals
in a commercial  setting, it is unnecessary  for present purposes  to decide
whether  choice  of  law  decisions  always  involve  privileges  protected
under the  clause.
275
Once  the Court makes  the threshold  determination  that a  "privi-
lege"  or "immunity"  is  involved,  the state can  still defend  its  differen-
tial treatment of residents and nonresidents  by showing  that valid  "rea-
sons  do  exist  and  [that]  the  degree  of  discrimination  bears  a  close
relation  to  them. 278  The  standard  of review  is  ill-articulated,  but it
appears to be neither as deferential  as a rationality test nor as intrusive
as strict scrutiny. Justice Brennan  describes the relevant  inquiry in the
"substantial  relationship"  language  associated  with intermediate  scru-
tiny under the equal protection  clause.277 Not surprisingly, then Justice
Rehnquist  has written for the Court in less  demanding  terms.2 7 8  Most
recently, Justice Powell employed the language  of intermediate  scrutiny
with a  soupcon  of less restrictive  alternative  analysis,  emphasizing the
state's  duty to  seek  methods  of achieving  its  goals  that do  not rely  on
residence  classifications.2 79  Thus,  for  a  discrimination  to  be  lawful
under  the  clause,  the  state  must  show  that  it  serves  a  purpose  other
273  Conceivably, the Court could employ its vigilance at the threshold, distinguish-
ing in some way  between  bona  fide choice  of law  decisions and discriminatory  denials
of equality. Because the dividing  line would  probably remain  like that  proposed in the
text, and because  the "test"  for justification  under the privileges  and immunities  clause
is ill defined,  I doubt there  is much practical  difference  between  the two approaches.  I
regard  the  method I propose,  messy as it is,  as  conceptually  clearer.
274  Cf  Doe v.  Bolton, 410  U.S.  179, 200  (1973)  (holding that  privileges and im-
munities clause protects the rights of persons who enter a state seeking  abortion services
that are  available there).  But see Baldwin, 436  U.S.  at  383  (right to  vote  not funda-
mental for  purposes  of the  clause).
275  For  example,  the  privileges  and  immunities  clause  may  be  involved  on  the
grounds  that  choice  of  law  decisions  inherently  involve  a  nonresident's  right  to
"[p]rotection  by  government"  or  the  right  "to  institute  and  maintain  actions  in  the
courts  of the  State."  See  Corfield  v.  Coryell,  6  F.  Gas.  546,  551-52  (C.C.E.D.  Pa.
1823)  (No. 3,230).
276 Toomer  v.  Witsell,  334 U.S.  385,  396  (1948).
277  See Hicklin v. Orbeck,  437 U.S. 518, 527-28  (1978);  Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm'n,  436  U.S. 371,  402  (1978)  (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278  See  United  Bldg.  & Constr. Trades  Council  v.  Mayor  of Camden,  465  U.S.
208,  222  (1984).
27, See  Supreme Court  v.  Piper,  105  S.  Ct.  1272,  1279  (1985).  But it is well  to
heed  the observation  of Justice  Blackmun that the  "[c]lause  is not one the  contours  of
which have  been  precisely  shaped  by the  process  and wear  of constant  litigation and
judicial  interpretation."  Baldwin, 436  U.S. at  379.
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than  disfavoring  nonresidents,  and  that  the  means  are  substantially
adapted  to the  ends.
Applying  this  standard  to  unfavorable  choice  of  law  decisions
based on residence, the state  should be permitted to show that the pres-
ence  of a  nonresident  creates  a substantial  problem justifying displace-
ment of forum  law.  Normally  the problem  will arise out of fairness  or
comity  concerns  because  the  forum has  reason  to  believe  that  another
state  has  a  greater interest  than  the  forum in providing  the  governing
law.280  The  forum  state  should  point  to  circumstances  making  these
concerns  realistic:  the mere  fact that a  nonresident  is a  party,  or  that
the other state would  cheerfully apply its own law if it were the forum,
should  not be  enough.  Otherwise,  the  interest  in  national  unification
and equal  participation  in the economic  and social  life of the  states  by
nonresidents  would be sacrificed  to adherence  by some  states  to jingois-
tic  choice of law methodologies.  For example,  New York should not be
permitted  to apply  a  stricter  New Jersey  libel  rule  to a  case  where  a
New Jersey  resident  employed  as a reporter in New  York by  a news-
paper  circulated only in New York defames a New York resident. This
requirement  necessarily implies that  the federal  courts  will weigh  state
interests more  freely in privileges  and immunities cases than they do in
full  faith  and  credit  cases.  But  they  still  would  not  need  to  select  a
single  conflicts  approach  as correct.
Even  if the  state  asserts  a  legitimate  purpose,  it must show  that
application  of law  of the  domicile  is  substantially  related  to  achieving
that purpose. The substantial relationship test requires that the state be
acting with a  modicum of consistency,  rather than  oppressing nonresi-
dents  by  singling  out particular  issues within a  case  in a manner that
subjects  them to a less favorable law. If the state is pursuing a coherent
choice  of law  strategy  sincerely designed  to  protect expectations  and to
defer  to  greater  interests,  then  it should  have  no trouble  passing  this
test. The Supreme Court itself regards states  as having a greater inter-
280  I  have  not mentioned  a further purpose  that the  discrimination  might  serve:
prevention  of forum shopping.  I must confess  to some skepticism  about this motive  for
discrimination  against  nonresidents.  For  application  of the  law  of  the  domicile  to  be
effective  in preventing  forum  shopping, it would  have  to be  true that every other  state
(at least every other state where the suit could be  brought) would have  applied the law
of the  same party's domicile.  Generally, this  means that there  is reason  to believe  that
this domicile state has a greater interest. If the state's interest is only in diminution, not
eradication,  of forum  shopping,  a  parallel  argument  can  be  made with  somewhat less
force.  Nor have  I included as a separate factor the subjective  expectations  of the parties:
(1) the  notion is inevitably circular; (2) legitimate  expectations  must be unusually  weak
today given the chaos  in conflicts law; and  (3)  most importantly, legitimate expectations
could  arise  only  if the  parties  had  reason  to  believe  that the  domicile's  interest  was
greater  than  that of the  forum.
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est  in the  conduct  and  welfare  of their  own  residents  than  in that  of
nonresidents. 28  Thus, it should recognize that a state exercising  comity
has  no alternative  to  including  residence  as  a  factor  in  choice  of  law
decisions.
I do not contend  that the standard just described  provides a bright
line rule under which privileges  and immunities  issues in  choice  of law
will be child's play to resolve. Since  we left Beale's  false Eden,  nothing
in this  field  is  child's  play.  I  do  suggest,  however,  that  this  standard
represents  the  appropriate  accommodation  of  protection  for  nonresi-
dents  and  ecumenism  in  choice  of law  methodology.
The  standard  above  might  still  be  regarded  as  too  permissive,  in
light  of the interpretation  some  commentators  have  given the Supreme
Court's opinion in Austin v. New Hampshire. 2 2 Austin,  a Maine resi-
dent,  challenged  a New  Hampshire income tax that  was  imposed  only
on New Hampshire income  of nonresidents.  The  Court invalidated the
scheme,  even  though  the tax  would  have  been  reduced  to  zero  if the
Maine  legislature  had refused  to credit  its payment toward  satisfaction
of  Maine's  own  income  tax.283  Justice  Blackmun  dissented,  arguing
that  Maine,  not  New  Hampshire,  was  the  source  of  the  problem. 24
The  Court  rejected  this  defense,  however,  holding  that the  privileges
and immunities clause  required more than state conduct inviting retali-
atory action  to restore  equality.285 "Nor,  we may add,  can the constitu-
tionality  of one State's  statutes  affecting  nonresidents  depend  upon the
present configuration  of the  statutes of another  State. 288
Austin does  not necessarily  invalidate the law-of-the-domicile  ap-
proach.  First, Austin was  not  really  a  choice  of law  case:  nothing  in
Maine  law  required  payment  of  taxes  by  Maine  residents  to  New
Hampshire. 28 7  Second,  the  Court's  ire  in  Austin  was  provoked  by  a
state scheme that imposed a financial  burden on nonresidents  only, and
then allowed their home legislatures  to eliminate  that burden,  but only
to the extent of restoring  equality  between  nonresidents  and  residents.
21 See, e.g.,  Phillips Petroleum  Co. v.  Shutts,  105 S.  Ct.  2965, 2979 (1985);  All-
state Ins.  Co. v.  Hague, 449 U.S.  302, 314-17  & nn.  19-20  (1981);  Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S.  393,  406-07  (1975).
282  420  U.S.  656  (1975).  See,  e.g., J. MARTIN, supra note  226, at  377-78,  633;
Ely, supra note 5, at  186-87  ("If Austin  is right as written,  the  dominant contempo-
rary  choice-of-law  theory  is unconstitutional.").
283  Austin, 420  U.S.  at  666-67.
284  See id. at 668-69  (Blackmun, J.,  dissenting).
285  See  id. at 666-67.
286  Id.  at  668.
287  See  Ely,  supra note  5,  at  186.  Ely  describes  New  Hampshire's  action  as
"tax[ing]  an  out-of-stater at the  rate his  home legislature  had  selected."  Id. It is  thus
precisely  the kind of lifting of a legal rule out of its context that I have criticized above.
See J.  MARTIN,  supra note  226,  at  377-78.
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The New  Hampshire scheme  did not achieve  the average reciprocity  of
advantage  between  citizens  and  noncitizens  in  New  Hampshire  af-
forded  by  a true  law-of-the-domicile  approach.2 88  The  calculated  one-
sidedness  of New Hampshire's  scheme should  be  regarded  as essential
to  the  Court's  holding.289  Even  this  narrower  reasoning,  however,
would  appear to  invalidate  one  version  of Currie's suggested  solution:
allowing  the nonresident  the lesser of the protections  of forum  law  and
her  domicile's  law.290
My  conclusion  from  this  lengthy  digression  is  that,  contrary  to
Dean Ely's preferred approach,291  the  privileges and immunities clause
should  be  restrictive  enough  to  protect  nonresidents  from  hostile  dis-
criminations  in  choice  of law,  even  when  the  discriminations  take  the
form  of incorporating  the law of their domicile.  Armed  with this con-
clusion, what can we say about the relation between  fundamental rights
equal  protection  and residence-based  choice  of law rules?
c.  Fundamental Rights Equal Protection and Choice of Law
I  argued  earlier  that some apparent  discriminations  in the  choice
of law  ought  not to  trigger  heightened  scrutiny  for  two  reasons:  first,
because they  can reflect  a  praiseworthy  form of deference  to the  sover-
eign  lawmaking  power  of the  people  of a  sister state;  and  second,  be-
cause they respond to inevitable  variations in the scope afforded  to fun-
damental  rights  by  different  states,  rather  than  creating  inequalities
themselves.  The  Constitution  itself  makes  residence  or  presence  in  a
state  a basis  for  subjection  to  laws  adopted by  that state  as  a  political
community, and recognition  of this fact  is not in itself offensive  to prin-
ciples of equal  protection.  To the extent  that this argument  applies  to
particular  discriminations,  they  should  escape heightened  scrutiny.
Residence  discriminations  capable  of  disfavoring  out-of-staters
may  not serve  these purposes-states  have  an obvious  incentive  to em-
ploy  residence discriminations  in order to bias  the outcome of litigation
between  residents  and nonresidents, or otherwise  to reserve  the benefits
of local law  for their constituents. Those residence  discriminations  that
88  This  latter  approach,  of course,  would  give out-of-staters  the benefit  of more
favorable domicile  law  as  well  as  the  burden  of less favorable  domicile  law.
289  The  Court's  opinion  in Austin  drew  on  a significant  body  of  prior  law  on
taxing discrimination  under the privileges and immunities  clause. In those earlier cases,
the  Court  required  only  substantial  equality  between  residents  and  nonresidents:  an
approximate parity in the tax burden on the nonresident and on the average resident of
the  state.  See Austin, 420  U.S.  at  665 n.  10; Traveller's Ins. Co. v. Connecticut,  185
U.S.  364,  368-69  (1902).
290  See B.  CURRIE,  supra note  259,  at 569-72.
29'  See  Ely,  supra note  5, at  189-91.
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survive  the  proposed  scrutiny  under  the  privileges  and  immunities
clause,  however,  have already  been validated  as reasonably  serving the
goal  of  deference  to  a  more  interested  sister  state.  Accordingly,  they
should  not  trigger  heightened  scrutiny  when  the  subject  matter  of the
choice  of law  involves  a  fundamental  right.
Thus  the  privileges  and  immunities  clause  effectively  supersedes
fundamental  rights equal protection in the analysis of residence  classifi-
cations  in choice  of law, so far  as claims  of discrimination  against citi-
zens  of sister states are concerned.  The equal  protection clause  still has
an independent  role  to play,  however, when state residents  or corpora-
tions  or resident  aliens  are  disfavored  by  residence  classifications,  be-
cause they  are not protected  by  the privileges  and immunities clause.29 2
Similarly, pure location discriminations  require independent  equal pro-
tection analysis.
Though out-of-state resident  aliens and corporations do not vote in
any  state,  still  they  are  members  of a  self-governing  community  that
may have  a greater interest  in determining  their rights  and duties than
the forum  state has. Family law for aliens and libel and shield laws  for
media corporations  might  be cited as possible  examples.2"'  Once more,
deference to the sovereignty  of a sister state over its noncitizen  residents
ought  to be  encouraged  and  ought  not  to  trigger  heightened  scrutiny.
Because  the  state  will  still  have  an  incentive  to  disfavor  nonresident
aliens and corporations,  residence discriminations  cannot simply  be as-
sumed to reflect  such  deference.294  On the other hand, the demands  of
national unity are not as great with regard to aliens and corporations as
with  regard  to  citizens.  Thus  a  somewhat  more  deferential  version  of
the inquiry pursued  under the  privileges  and immunities clause  should
be employed:  only if the forum state purports to be deferring  to a state
with greater  interest, only if that characterization  is rational,  and only
if the  choice of law decision  adopts enough  of the domicile's law that it
may reasonably  be  said to  further that  goal,  should the forum's  adop-
tion  of domicile  law be  excused  from  heightened  scrutiny.
Discriminations  against the state's own residents  also require  sep-
arate  treatment,  because  they  raise  no  questions  under  the  privileges
292  See  supra notes  35  and  250.
2,1  See,  e.g.,  Hanley  v.  Tribune  Publishing  Co.,  527  F.2d  68  (9th  Cir.  1975)
(dispute over  application of California or Nevada  retraction law in  a libel  suit  by Ne-
vada  plaintiff  against  California  publisher);  Mazzella  v.  Philadelphia  Newspapers,
Inc.,  479  F. Supp.  523  (E.D.N.Y.  1979)  (applying Pennsylvania  shield  law).
214  See,  e.g.,  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. Co. v. Ward,  105  S. Ct.  1676,  1683  (1985)
("A  State's  natural  inclination  frequently  would  be  to  prefer  domestic  business  over
foreign.").
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and immunities  clause. 95  A state has little incentive  to disfavor  its own
electorate,  and hostility  to a fundamental  right  is more likely  to  be  re-
flected  in a  restrictive  substantive  rule applicable  to residents  and non-
residents  alike than  in  a discrimination  against  local  residents.  In  the
rare instances  where  a  discrimination  favoring  nonresidents  on its  sur-
face  impairs  their  position  of  equality  in  the  state,  nonresidents  can
vindicate  the interest  in national  unity by  challenging the  scheme.  Ac-
cordingly,  the  same  slightly more  deferential  test  articulated  for  aliens
and corporations  should be applied  to determine  when  a residence  dis-
crimination  favoring  out-of-staters  escapes  heightened  equal  protection
scrutiny.
Similarly,  even  pure  location  discriminations,  which  never  raise
privileges  and  immunities  issues,  should  be judged  by  the  same  stan-
dard.  Choice  of law  decisions  in which the  location  of a particular  act
becomes  a decisive  factor are likely  to reflect  a defensible  choice of law
methodology, though there may  be instances where the  chosen  act is so
marginal that  it cannot justify the discrimination. 9  The  greater dan-
ger is that the state will abuse  the method of dbpecage, for example,  by
denying  a  local  defense  for  defamatory  statements  originating  out  of
state while  applying  the  local  standard of care.  As  I  have argued  ear-
lier, a location  discrimination  can have  a differential  impact  almost  as
onerous  on residents  of the  disfavored  locality  as an explicit  residence
discrimination  would have.  Pure location discriminations  should  not be
excused  from heightened scrutiny until the court has determined, by the
inquiry  outlined  above,  that  they  represent  genuine  deference  to  the
interests  of another  state,  and  not a  trap  for an  out-of-state actor.
As an illustration,  consider the traditional defamation  privilege  for
statements  made  in the course  of judicial  proceedings.29 7  Suppose  that
Alabama  not only  imposes  liability  for  negligent  defamation,  but  also
abolishes  the judicial  proceedings  privilege  altogether.  Suppose further
that New York  provides  an  absolute privilege  for all  statements  made
in judicial proceedings.  Finally, suppose an Alabama resident alien sues
some New York resident aliens in Alabama, alleging that they  defamed
her in the  course  of an earlier lawsuit  in New York. If Alabama  con-
dudes that the rules  for both liability and privilege in such cases should
295  See,  e.g.,  United  Bldg.  & Constr. Trades  Council  v.  Mayor  of Camden,  465
U.S.  208,  217  (1984).
29  For example,  the traditional  rule that the place  of contracting  has an overrid-
ing interest in determining  the effect  of the contract  has  been derided by modern  com-
mentators, who  question whether it has  any interest at all. See B.  CURRIE, supra note
259,  at  582-83;  Simson,  supra note  239,  at  83.
292  See,  e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TORTS  §  586  (1977)  (attorneys'  privi-
lege);  id. § 587  (parties'  privilege).
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be  dictated  by  the  state  in  whose  courts  the  prior  litigation  occurred,
then the pure location  discrimination  is rational and  should  be  upheld.
First,  Alabama  could  rationally conclude  that  the  prior  forum  has  a
greater interest  in striking an  appropriate  balance between  zealous  ad-
vocacy  in  pursuit  of justice  and  protecting  itself from  being  used  as  a
vehicle  for malicious defamation,  even of Alabama residents;  second, the
adoption of the prior  forum's law as  to  both the  claim and the defense
reasonably  furthers the goal  of deference  to forum policy.  Accordingly,
heightened  scrutiny  should  not  be  applied,  and  the  discrimination
should be upheld as rational. In contrast, if Alabama  concludes that the
domicile  of  the  plaintiff  dictates  rules  for  both  liability  and  privilege,
then heightened  scrutiny is required.  The result of Alabama's  choice of
law rule is to treat all litigation  between its residents and those of New
York-and  especially  such  litigation  in  Alabama's  own  courts-as  an
unequal  contest. Alabama  residents are free  to defame,  and New York
residents  are disabled  from replying  in kind. It  is  not rational  to  con-
clude  that New  York  has  an  overriding  interest  in  subjecting  its  resi-
dents to  such  an ordeal.29  Thus,  whatever  other purposes  Alabama's
choice  of law  rule might  serve  in  this  context,  it  does  not  rationally
serve  the  purpose  of  deferring  to  the  policy  choices  of  a  state  with
greater  interest.  Accordingly,  it will  not  be  excused  from  heightened
scrutiny  of its  impact  on first amendment  rights.
d.  Interstate Variations Not Resulting from Choice of Law
Thus  far  I  have  been  discussing  geographical  discriminations
along  state  boundary  lines  by  which  a state  exercises  its  prescriptive
jurisdiction  only with respect to transactions involving its own residents
or occurring  within its borders. The state may  dispose of other cases  by
applying  the  law of  another  state,  or  by renouncing jurisdiction.  Re-
nunciation  of jurisdiction  is the usual  rule in criminal  cases.'"  It may
also appear in civil  cases under the doctrine of forum non conveniens 00
or  through  unwillingness  to  enforce  the  "penal"  statutes  of  another
sovereign.
When  the  state  does  choose  to  exercise  prescriptive  jurisdiction
over  out-of-state  transactions,  and  does  so  by  adopting  a  special  rule
'"  A plaintiff-centered  choice  of law  methodology  cannot be accepted  as rational
merely  on a  general  theory  that a  plaintiff's  state always  has  the greatest  interest  in
providing  the rule  of decision  even  if there  exist other,  more  favorable  rules.  Such  a
theory would  automatically  validate  all  discrimination  against  nonresident plaintiffs.
29  See  W. LAFAVE  & I.  ISRAEL,  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  §  16.2(c)  (1984).
0 See Stein,  Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court Access Doc-
trine, 133  U. PA.  L.  REV.  781,  785  (1985).
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differing  from  its local  law,  normal  equal  protection  principles  should
apply.  The state  cannot  defend  its  actions  as  deference  to the  self-gov-
erning authority of sister states, because the state has presumed to make
their  choices  for them. When  the resulting discrimination  affects funda-
mental  rights, whether  it  favors  in-staters  or out-of-staters,  heightened
scrutiny  is  appropriate.  For  example,  if  Alabama  imposed  a  malice
standard  for libel  by in-state  newspapers,  and a strict liability standard
for out-of-state  newspapers  regardless  of the law  of their  domiciles,  the
favoritism  toward  local  publishers  would  cry  out  for  intensive  equal
protection  review.
6.  Third  Special  Position-Special  Laws  and  Local  Option Laws,
with  a  Digression  on Circuit  Conflicts
When  the  state as  a whole  takes  actions that  create  disparities  in
the  scope  of  fundamental  rights  between  geographical  regions  within
the  state  whose boundaries coincide  with those of political subdivisions
of the state,  these  actions  may  also  raise  equal  protection  problems.  I
have argued earlier that  "random"  geographical  discriminations, whose
contours  are  not  defined  by  political  boundaries,  deserve  scrutiny  as
close  as  that  afforded  to  other nonsuspect  classifications.  On  the  other
hand, I have argued that discriminations  attributable to the state within
the federal  constitutional framework but resulting  from independent ac-
tion  of  self-governing  political  subdivisions  should  escape  heightened
scrutiny. These  examples  are polar  extremes  on a  spectrum that  must
now  be  confronted.
Two traditional  methods  for tailoring  state  policies to  local  condi-
tions  are "special"  legislation  and  "local  option"  laws."'1  In  the local
government  context,  the  term  "special"  legislation  refers  to  statutes
passed by the state legislature, but operative  only within certain  named
municipalities,302  or only  within  a "class"  of municipalities,  frequently
a  class  defined  by  population. 0 8  I  will  use  this term  to  describe  any
"I1  See,  e.g.,  2  E. MCQUILLEN,  THE LAW OF  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  §4.48
(3d ed. 1979).  Special legislation  can also refer to other forms of discriminatory classifi-
cation  not involving  geography.  See  1  C.  ANTIEAU,  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATION  LAW
§2.14,  at  2.37-.38  (1982).  Geographically  defined  special  legislation  is  sometimes
known  as  "local"  legislation,  but I will not use this term here  to avoid  confusion with
"local  option"  legislation.
30  See,  e.g.,  McGowan  v. Maryland,  366 U.S.  420 (1961)  (upholding state Sun-
day closing law with variant  provisions for  one county); 2  E. MCQUILLEN, supra note
301,  at  §4.56  and  cases  cited  therein.
SoS  See,  e.g.,  North v. Russell,  427 U.S. 328 (1976)  (upholding system of first tier
trial before lay judges in cities of lesser population);  2 E. MCQUILLEN, supra note 301,
at  §4.57-.72  and  cases  cited  therein.
[Vol.  135:261TERRITORIAL  DISCRIMINATION
state statute limited  in its applicability  to one or more political  subdivi-
sions,  but  less  than  the  whole  state.304  "Local  option"  laws,  which  I
will  discuss  later,  provide  that  their  dictates  will  apply  only  in  those
communities  that  accept  the  option  or,  conversely,  that  fail  to  refuse
it.
305
Both  of these techniques  can serve  a valuable  function  in  accom-
modating  expressed  local  preferences  concerning  matters that  the state
is reluctant  to commit wholly  into the hands  of local  government.  Dis-
trust  of  investing  too  much  power  in  local  governing  bodies  has  long
been a countertheme  of American  politics.30 6 In many states,  the struc-
ture of municipal  home rule  has  limited local  government  authority  to
matters of "local  concern"  and has included among the matters of "gen-
eral"  or "statewide"  concern reserved  to the state as a whole the defini-
tion  of  basic  rules  of  civil  obligation  that  had  been  governed  by  the
common  law in England.1 0 7  To return to Justice  Bradley's example in
Missouri v. Lewis,308 if the people of New York really wanted to adopt
the civil law for New York City and the common  law for the rest of the
state, they would normally have to act through the state legislature;  the
usual  state  law home  rule  doctrines,  which New  York  shares,  deny a
city the power to make  so sweeping  a change in the civil obligations  of
its residents.309  To vary  another  prior  example,  if the  state wished  to
adopt a lower  age  for valid  marriage  in small towns than in big  cities,
action at the state legislative  level  would  also be  required.
Absent state consitutional  restrictions, 10  special legislation  may be
'o  Thus, the  use  of the term  here will  be  narrower  than  in some states,  where
special legislation  includes laws having no geographical  limitation or where local option
laws  potentially  effective  statewide  are  still  regarded  as special,  and  broader  than  in
some  states,  where  the  term  special  legislation  refers  to  the  conclusion  that  the  geo-
graphical  restriction lacks a justification  that would  take it outside  the  scope of a  rele-
vant state  consitutional  prohibition.
=  See, e.g.,  Rippey v. Texas,  193 U.S.  504 (1904)  (local  option to impose  prohi-
bition  on sale  of liquor); City of Canton  v.  Whitman, 44  Ohio St. 2d  62,  337  N.E.2d
766  (1975)  (local  option to  avoid state fluoridation  statute),  app. dismissed, 425  U.S.
956  (1976).
SO See,  e.g.,  THE FEDERALIST  No. 10,  at 70 (J. Madison)  (E. Bourne ed.  1901);
see also Frug, supra note  194, at  1106  (arguing that liberal theory  limited city  power
in order to  vindicate  primacy  of individual  over  group rights).
I"  See,  e.g.,  1 C.  ANTIEAU,  supra note  301,  at  §3.08;  0. REYNOLDS,  LOCAL
GOVERNMENT  LAW  122-23  (1982);  Sandalow, supra note  214, at  674-79.
308  101  U.S.  22,  31  (1880).
" See  N.Y. STAT.  LOCAL  Gov'TS LAW  § 11(4)  (McKinney  1969).  Of course,
this limitation  on the powers of home rule cities  is wholly one  of the  state's own mak-
ing, and federal  equal protection  doctrine  need  not necessarily be  shaped to accommo-
date it.
310  Many state constitutions  contain restrictions on the power of the state to enact
special legislation. See,  e.g., ALA.  CONST.  art. II, § 19;  CAL.  CONST. art. IV, § 16; VA.
CONST.  art IV,  § 14.  Some  of these  derive  from  nineteenth century  struggles  against
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enacted in a variety of ways:  at the request  of the  affected municipality
speaking through  its mayor  or council,3 '  in  response  to  the  desires  of
the  delegation in the state legislature representing the voters  of the mu-
nicipality,  or imposed  by  the state despite  the indifference  or objection
of the municipality.31 2 The  Supreme Court  has  on numerous  occasions
upheld special  legislation against equal  protection  challenges,  though in
cases not involving  fundamental  rights  claims. 33  Ought special  legisla-
tion be treated  as a vehicle  for self-determination  and appropriately  be
excused  from  heightened  equal  protection  scrutiny?
If the  passage and repeal  of special  legislation  were automatically
assured whenever  requested  by the local government to be affected, and
if such  legislation could never  be passed without that government's con-
sent, then  the technique  of special  legislation  would  be  tantamount  to
home  rule  and  could justifiably  be  afforded  the  same treatment.  But
this is neither the theory  nor the reality  of special  legislation.  In  most
states, unfavorable  special  legislation  can  be  imposed  on municipalities
over  their opposition.""4  Even  in  those  states where  special  legislation
cannot be passed without some  manifestation of municipal  consent, spe-
cial legislation may  be blocked  by legislative inertia, parochial jealousy,
or the  desire  of other  representatives  to  extract  political bargains  from
the  affected  community  or its  delegation.  If  one  community  obtains  a
legislative  depredations  on municipalities,  see,  e.g.,  0.  REYNOLDS,  supra note 307,  at
85-86;  Sandalow,  supra note  214,  at  674-79,  while  others  reflect  general  concerns
about  legislative  powers  of classification  and  discrimination.  See,  e.g.,  H.  McBAIN,
THE  LAW  AND  PRACTICE  OF  MUNICIPAL  HOME  RULE  91-92  (1916).  State  courts
construing these provisions  have generated thoroughly  murky doctrines  for  distinguish-
ing the forbidden  special legislation  from that which is limited to certain municipalities
but nonetheless  not  "special"  in  the  relevant  constitutional  sense.  See,  e.g.,  2 E.  Mc-
QUILLEN, supra note 301,  at §§ 4.30-.76;  F. MICHELMAN  & T.  SANDALOW,  MATERI-
ALS  ON  GOVERNMENT  IN  URBAN  AREAS  336-47  (1970).  Fortunately,  we  can  wholly
ignore these  distinctions  for  present  purposes,  because  all  forms  of special  legislation
share the same  material characteristics  from the  equal protection  point of view,  except
that some cases have  regarded  statewide local option  laws as "special."  See infra notes
315-18  and  accompanying  text. I argue  below that  local option  laws should be treated
differently.
811  See,  e.g.,  MASS.  CONST.  art.  II,  §8;  N.Y.  CONST.  art. IX,  § 2.
312  See H. McBAIN, supra note 310,  at 6-12,  45-46, 59-62,  103-105. For a mod-
em  example,  see  Paddock  v.  Town  of  Brookline,  347  Mass.  230,  197  N.E.2d  321
(1964)  (striking down  special  legislation waiving  notice  requirement  for  an individual
in  suit against  named town).
313  See, e.g.,  North  v. Russell,  427 U.S. 328  (1976);  McGowan  v. Maryland,  366
U.S.  420  (1961);  Salsburg  v. Maryland,  346 U.S.  545 (1954);  Packard v.  Banton, 264
U.S.  140  (1924);  Stewart  v.  City  of  Kansas  City,  239  U.S.  14  (1915);  Gardner  v.
Michigan,  199 U.S.  325 (1905);  Hayes v. Missouri,  120 U.S.  68  (1887).  But see Ma-
son  v.  Missouri,  179  U.S.  328  (1900)  (upholding  special  legislation  regarding  voter
registration).
314  See 2  E. MCQUILLEN,  supra note  301,  at  § 4.31. But see MINN.  CONST.  art.
XII,  § 2;  N.Y.  CONST.  IX,  § 2  (both  requiring  local  consent  to  special laws).
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special  law  expanding  the  scope  for  exercise  of  a  fundamental  right
within  its borders  beyond that  available  in the  state  as a whole, there
can  be no  guarantee that  other communities  that seek  equal status will
succeed.  Even when  a community  has  achieved  its desire to obtain  spe-
cial  legislation, if a future electorate  concludes  that it wishes  to restore
equality with its neighbors by  having the legislation  repealed,  it cannot
be  certain  of  success.  In  short,  special  legislation  in  its  geographical
form  is no  less  a type  of  classification  imposed  and maintained  by the
state  as a whole than special  legislation respecting commercial,  ideologi-
cal,  or ethnic  groups.  Such  legislation  does  not  constitute  an  ongoing
process  of  self-determination  by  the  affected  population,  and  the  ap-
proach  advocated  in  this  Article  would  not  entail  excusing  it  from
heightened  equal  protection  scrutiny.
Local  option  laws,  like  special  legislation,  involve  express  geo-
graphical  discriminations  on  the  face  of the  statute. They  differ  from
special legislation, however, in that they  permit the state to compromise
between  local autonomy  and protection  of local  minorities in a manner
less  threatening to  equality  of rights. State courts  have  disagreed  as to
whether local option  laws are merely another form of special legislation
subject  to  state constitutional  prohibitions.  Some  older  cases  held  that
any geographical  variation resulting  from exercise  of local options  rep-
resented  the  kind  of disuniformity  that  the state  constitution  disables
the state  legislature  from  creating. 15  These  cases  reflect  a  broad  dis-
trust of disuniformity,  whatever its cause, but a narrower  charge  could
have  been  levelled  against  local  option  laws:  that  the  agenda  control
involved in  most  local option  legislation  nudges  communities  into  con-
trasting  positions,  creating  a  state-induced  disparity  that  the  ban  on
special  legislation  was intended to  prevent. 1'  Other courts held that so
long as a local  option law was potentially  effective in every part of the
state, the state had not imposed a lack of uniformity, and the legislation
should not be regarded  as  "special";  this position is  dominant  today.
3 1 7
315  See,  e.g.,  Appeal  of Scranton  School  Dist.,  113 Pa.  176,  6 A.  158  (1886).
316  Compare,  for  example,  the  degrees  of local  choice available  in the  liquor  op-
tion statutes  in Rippey  v. Texas,  193 U.S.  504  (1904)  (dry or wet); Harrison v.  State,
687 P.2d 332 (Ala. App.  1984)  (wet or licensed  or prohibition of sale  only or prohibi-
tion  of both  sale and  importation);  and  Brunswick  Corp. v.  Liquor Control  Comm'n,
184 Conn.  75,  440  A.2d  792  (1981)  (town  permitted to  impose  any  system more  re-
strictive  than  enumerated  state options,  but bowling  alley  liquor licenses  not to be  is-
sued  in town opting to limit sale  of alcohol  to beer only). But see Arlan's Dep't Stores
v. Kelley,  374 Mich.  70,  130  N.W.2d  892  (1964)  (condemning  local  option  Sabbath
closing law for  opposite fault: providing full spectrum of choices violates nondelegation
doctrine).
317  See,  e.g.,  City  of Canton  v. Whitman,  44  Ohio  St.  2d  62,  337  N.E.2d  766
(1975),  app. dismissed, 425  U.S.  956  (1976);  2  E.  MCQUILLEN,  supra note  301,  at
§ 4.49. If the option is not available  uniformly throughout  the state, however,  the stat-
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Finally,  some  cases  have  taken  an  intermediate  position,  holding  that
time limits  on  the exercise of the option  foster disuniformity in a man-
ner  that renders  the  legislation  special.31 8
From  the  equal  protection  point  of view,  the  constitutionality  of
local  option  laws  has  long  been  regarded  as settled.  Early  in this cen-
tury,  the  Supreme  Court rejected  equal  protection  challenges  to  local
options for the  prohibition of liquor. 1'  The Court  dismissed the claims
of  discrimination  on  the  typically  Holmesian  grounds  that  the  state
could  have accomplished  the  same  result  by  passing  special  legislation
affecting only  the  accepting  communities,  and  that the  constitutionality
of  the  greater  discrimination  entailed  the  constitutionality  of  the
lesser3 2 s
At  the  risk  of standing  this  historical justification  on  its  head,  I
would  contend  that  local  option  laws  are  more  consistent  with  equal
protection  principles  than  special  laws  are.  If  a  local  option  law  is
framed  so  that  a  community  can,  by  popular  vote  or  by  vote  of  its
elected  representatives,  pass  in and  out  of its  scope  over  time, 21  then
the  local option  is  equivalent  to a very  limited grant  of home rule au-
thority  over a particular subject.  No community  is disadvantaged  vis-a-
vis  any  other  except  insofar  as  a  current  majority  of  the  electorate
wishes  to  be disadvantaged.8 2 2 Local self-determination  may be limited
to a choice among a discrete set of options specified by  the state legisla-
ture, rather than an unconstrained  choice among the full range  of pol-
icy  approaches  to the  given  subject  matter,  but  within  those  limits the
state has  afforded  self-determination  nonetheless.  It  is not necessary to
excuse  the resulting  geographical  discrimination  from heightened  scru-
tiny  to  achieve  self-determination;  the  state  could  always  resign  its
ute may  be regarded  as  special.  See, e.g.,  Nomey v. State, 315  So. 2d 709  (La.  1975);
Ex parte Smith,  231  Mo.  111,  132  S.W. 607  (1910). "I  See,  e.g.,  De Hart v. Atlantic  City, 63  N.J.L. 223,  43 A. 742  (1899).
319  See Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison,  194 U.S.  445 (1904);  Rippey v. Texas,  193
U.S.  504  (1904).
320  See Rippey, 193 U.S.  at 509-10  (Holmes, J.); Lloyd,  194 U.S.  at 448-49  (cit-
ing Rippey); cf.  Fort Smith  Light & Traction  Co. v.  Board of Improvement,  274 U.S.
387,  391  (1927)  (holding  that if state  can  delegate to  municipality authority  to  enact
local  law,  then  state  can  enact  local  law itself).
321  See, e.g.,  Rippey,  193  U.S.  at  504 (local  option liquor law  reexaminable  from
time  to time, except that  lesser included  subdivisions  may not  go  wet while a  prohibi-
tion  election at a  higher level  remains  in force).  But see Town of Seabrook v. Perkins,
112  N.H.  37,  288  A.2d  688  (1972)  (local  option  to  permit  licensing  of  a  dog  track
cannot  be  rescinded);  Whitman, 44  Ohio  St.  2d at  62,  337  N.E.2d  at 766  (only  one
opportunity  to avoid  fluoridation).
"I Local  option  laws  may  be  framed  to  require  a  supermajority  for  certain  ac-
tions.  Cf  Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S.  1 (1971)  (finding that a requirement of 60% vote
of community  for  incurring  bonded  indebtedness  or increasing  ceiling on tax rate  did
not  violate equal  protection).
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agenda  control and grant full home rule  power over the subject  matter,
rather than imposing the particular  compromise between autonomy and
centralization  that  it  has  selected.  But  the  degree  of independence  re-
sulting from  home  rule  should not be  exaggerated.  The limits imposed
by  the  state  constitutional  or  statutory  provisions  defining  the  basic
grant of home  rule also involve agenda control. 2' The requirement that
local  ordinances  be  consistent  with state  legislation  on  matters  of gen-
eral concern  also  involves agenda control. 24 The tradition of municipal
self-government  in this country since independence  has not been one of
plenary local  power unencumbered  by state direction. 25  Thus, the dif-
ference  between  local option  and home  rule  is one of degree:  the  same
local  institutions make  the choices,  but the range  from which  they  can
select is more or less  restricted by  the state.3 2 6  Therefore,  the  contribu-
tion of the option  process to local  self-determination  can justify treating
the resulting departures  from equality  as generously  as independent  lo-
cal  choices  made  outside  a local  option  framework  are treated.
This argument  for equal protection  toleration of local option legis-
lation  depends  on the  legislature  providing  its  municipalities  basically
equivalent  opportunities  to choose, both now and in the future. That is,
every part of the state must be included within a unit that is authorized
to accept  or reject the option, and units that repent their earlier choices
must have the power to revise them subject to appropriate waiting peri-
ods  or prospectivity  conditions.12
7  If the choice  between  options,  once
323  See 2 E. MCQUILLEN,  supra note 301,  at §§  10.13-.16;  Frug, supra note 194,
at 1116-17.
324  See 2 E.  MCQUILLEN,  supra note  301,  at  § 9.08b.
25  See A.  DE TOCQUEVJLLE, supra note  193,  at 67; H. McBAIN, supra  note  310,
at  14-16.
326  Indeed,  from  a federal  constitutional  point of view,  a grant  of local  decision-
making  authority  in a state  constitution  has  no  more  exalted status  thahr  an identical
grant contained in  a statute. Special  legislation,  in contrast,  differs from  both state con-
stitutional  and  statutory  grants  by more than  a matter  of degree:  a community  must
always  seek consent  from  a statewide  institution for  every enactment  or repeal  of spe-
cial  legislation.
'  Waiting periods may  be justified to prevent the chaos  resulting from  continual
referenda.  See  Nomey  v.  State,  315  So.  2d  709,  724  (La.  1975)  (liquor prohibition
referendum may be repeated  every second year). A variety of such techniques have  been
approved  in  other  electoral  contexts.  Compare Storer  v.  Brown,  415  U.S.  724,  728
(1974)  (independent candidate required to wait one year after association  with political
party  before  being  placed  on  ballot)  and Rosario  v.  Rockefeller,  410  U.S.  752,  762
(1973)  (voter must enroll in political party 30 days before general  election to be eligible
to vote in the party's primary election the  following year) with Anderson  v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S.  780, 805-06  (1983)  (requirement  that independent  candidate for  President of
the United States file  nominating petition in  March for November election held  uncon-
stitutional)  and Kusper  v.  Pontikes,  414 U.S.  51,  60  (1973)  (requirement  that  voter
wait 23  months  before  voting in  different  party  primary  held  unconstitutional).  Pros-
pectivity requirements  may be  appropriate to avoid injustice  to those who have justifia-338  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW
made,  is  binding on  the community  until such  time as the state legisla-
ture  can be persuaded to release it, then many of the inequities inherent
in  special  legislation  will  infect  the  local  option  process.  A  one-time
local  option  is not  comparable  to the  self-imposed  fetters  of a constitu-
tion, because  even the unanimous assent of the community  is ineffective
to repeal  the option  without the  concurrence  of outsiders.  Thus, to  de-
serve  the  special  equal  protection  treatment  accorded  to  ongoing
processes  of local  self-determination,  a local option  must  be  susceptible
to reevaluation. 28
Moreover,  the  availability  of the  local  option  to  each  community
must  be  more than  an  empty  form.  The state's  control  of the  agenda
may be  so extreme  that some  communities  have  no realistic opportunity
to  avail  themselves  of the same  options  as other communities.  Suppose,
for example, that  a local option  law addressing the  scope of fundamen-
tal  rights  requires  that  the  options  be  accepted  by  a  vote  taken  at  a
town meeting attended  by more than seventy-five percent  of the munici-
pal  electorate.  Only rather small  towns would  be  physically  capable  of
accepting  such  an  option.  Suppose  instead  that  the  state  law  sets
twenty-one  as the minimum  age for  marriage,  but permits  municipali-
ties  to  lower  the  age  to  sixteen  so  long  a§  they  provide  every  minor
couple  with  a  ten-acre  farm  within  the  town  limits.  Sparsely  settled
farming  communities  could  accept this option, but cities  probably  could
not. In either case, the purported  local option is so limited in its availa-
bility  that  any  resulting  disuniformities  in  the  distribution  of  funda-
mental rights must  be regarded as state-fostered  discrimination, not lo-
cal  self-determination.  As  I  will  discuss  later  in  the  Article,  this
conclusion  has serious consequences  for the situation in which a town's
options  are restricted  by its  ability  to pay.
If  the  foregoing  argument  is  accepted,  then,  contrary  to  Justice
Holmes'  contention,  there  will be  situations  in which  the state and  its
municipalities  combined can  create geographical  disparities  through the
local option  procedure  that  the state itself  could not impose  directly. 29
bly relied on the community's prior choice. Cf Town of Seabrook  v. Perkins,  112 N.H.
37,  40, 288 A.2d  688, 690 (1972)  (local option to permit licensing of a dog track cannot
be  rescinded).
328  Furthermore,  the geographical  units voting  on a  local  option  affecting  funda-
mental  rights should  be  existing  political  subdivisions  of the  state, rather  than ad hoc
units  chosen  by  the  legislature  for  a  particular  option  law. If the  state  were  free  to
gerrymander  the voting units with  an eye  to the content of the option,  then the system
would lack the relative impartiality that lulls our concerns  about conferring  continuing
powers  of self-determination  on municipalities.
82  There  may be  certain  situations,  however, in which  the Constitution  itself de-
mands statewide uniformity and does  not permit local option. The example  that clearly
comes to mind is equal participation  in elections for statewide  offices. The reapportion-
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Like  special  laws,  executive  or judicial  lawmaking  that  imposes
different  rules  in  different  political  subdivisions  within  the  state  can
raise  similar  equal  protection  problems.  If a  statewide  administrative
agency  adopts a regulation  discriminating  among different regions,  one
should  treat  this  regulation  exactly  as  one would  treat  special  legisla-
tion  with  the  same  content.  If distinct  offices  of  a  state  agency,  each
with  its  own  geographical  jurisdiction,  adopt  different  regulations  for
their territories,  then the resulting  discrimination  must  be attributed  to
the state  as a whole  for equal  protection  purposes. 33 0
Similarly,  discriminations  within  the  judicial  branch  can  raise
equal  protection  problems.  In  some  states, judges with  restricted  geo-
graphical jurisdiction  are appointed by the state government; 3 '  in other
states,  they are elected  by  voters  within their jurisdictions. 2  In either
case,  the judges  are part of the state hierarchy,  supervised  and guided
in their legal  rulings  by judges with statewide jurisdiction.3  Random
errors  by  particular judges  do  not  raise  equal  protection  problems. 34
ment  cases  teach  that the  concurrence  of a  local  majority  is insufficient  to justify dilu-
tion  of the  community's  vote.  See  Lucas  v.  Forty-Fourth  Colo.  Gen.  Assembly,  377
U.S.  713,  731-36  (1964).  The  Supreme  Court  has  frequently  asserted  that,  although
offices  need not be made elective, once elections  are permitted  they must conform  to the
one-person,  one-vote principle. See Rivera-Rodriguez  v. Popular Democratic Party, 457
U.S.  1 (1982);  Kramer  v. Union Free School  Dist.,  395 U.S.  621  (1969).  That is,  the
state could have appointed  a governor, see Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231  (1966),  and
a city could choose  to have  an appointed mayor, cf.  Sailors v.  Board of Educ., 387 U.S.
105  (1967)  (upholding appointment  of county school  board members by representatives
from  constituent  school  boards),  presumably  even  if  all  the  other  cities  in  the  state
elected  their mayors;  but  a state  could  not permit  a  municipality  to  close  its polling
places  and exclude its residents  from participation  in the otherwise statewide election of
a governor.  Thus, the  right  to vote  in statewide  elections  has an  unusual status.  It  is
unclear, however, whether  this should be regarded as a replicable phenomenon  of equal
protection law,  or as part of the substantive analysis of the right to vote,  comparable  to
the uniformity  clauses discussed  above.  See cases  cited supra note  70. The difficulty  is
compounded  by the Court's identification  of voting rights as purely an equal protection
phenomenon.
33  As  I  have  argued  above,  although  the  adoption  of different  regulations  may
serve a  valuable role  in tailoring  state policy  to local  conditions  through  decentralized
administration,  these  regulations  are  no more  immune from  equal  protection  scrutiny
than discriminations  among various industries or any other useful administrative classi-
fication.  Decentralized  administration  through  regional  offices  appointed  and  super-
vised by the state  government is not a form  of local  self-determination  justifying  lesser
equal protection  scrutiny.
331  See,  e.g.,  MAss.  ANN.  LAWS  ch.  218,  §§  1, 6  (Law  Co-op.  1986).
332  See,  e.g.,  N.Y.  COUNTY  LAW  §  400(1)  (McKinney  1972);  see  also  Cham-
pagne, Selection and Retention ofJudges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue),  53,  59
table  1 (1986)  (listing state  selection  systems).  See generally L. BERKSON,  S.  BELLER,
& M. GRIMALDI,  JUDICIAL SELECTION  IN  THE UNITED  STATES:  A  COMPENDIUM  OF
PROVISIONS  (1981)  [hereinafter  L.  BERKSON].
333  See  generally Hopkins,  The  Role  of.an Intermediate Appellate Court, 41
BROOKLYN  L. REV.  459  (1975).
3"  See  Beck v.  Washington,  369  U.S.  541,  554-55  (1962);  Snowdon  v.  Hughes,
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But intermediate  courts  of appeals  for  different regions  may  systemati-
cally adopt independent answers  to a question of state law through pre-
cedent.  I  will  call  these  "circuit  conflicts"  by  analogy  with  the  same
phenomenon  in the federal  courts.  The effect  of these circuit conflicts  is
to  some  extent  the  creation  of local  rules  of law,3"5  but it is  local  law
imposed  on the  community  by  a portion  of the state judicial hierarchy,
not law  chosen  by  the  community  for  itself.
The  Supreme  Court,  citing  the  old  formula  of  Missouri  v.
Lewis,"'6  has dismissed the  notion that a state circuit conflict  can create
an equal  protection  violation. 37  Though  failure to  resolve  circuit  con-
flicts  might  be  defended  as  minimally  rational,  the  Court's conclusion
appears  untenable in the context of fundamental  rights discriminations.
If a state  structures  its judicial  system  so that  fundamental  rights  can
vary  from  district  to  district  because  of unresolved  disagreements  be-
tween the respective courts, the resulting discrimination must be  treated
as if it were  directly  imposed  by  the state.  Because the variation is  not
caused  by  a  process  of local  self-determination,  the discrimination  will
not  be excused  from heightened  scrutiny. This  does  not mean  that the
conflict will inevitably  be  condemned  as unconstitutional:  the state  will
still have an opportunity  to demonstrate  its-necessity,  either by a show-
ing  that  the  discrimination  is justified  by  a  compelling  difference  in
local conditions or by showing that  the state's  failure to resolve the con-
flict  is  itself justified by  a  compelling  need.'3  Moreover,  the Supreme
321  U.S.  1, 8 (1944).
33"  The  legal  system  does  not treat  state  circuit  conflicts  as a true form  of local
law,  as  is evidenced  by  the fact  that the  courts  of the same  hierarchy apply  their own
precedents  rather than  perceiving cases that might be thought to arise in another "juris-
diction"  as requiring  the application  of conflict  of laws  principles.  See,  e.g.,  Friendly,
"The Law of the Circuit" and All  That, 46 ST. JOHN'S  L. REv. 406,  412-13  (1972).;
cf.  Marcus,  Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers within the Federal  Judicial  Sys-
tem,  93  YALE  L.J.  677,  702-08  (1984)  (suggesting  that  both  federal  and  state  courts
must review  the merits of federal  cases that come before them and not simply accept the
interpretation  of either  another  circuit or  the  federal  courts);  Note,  Using Choice of
Law Rules to Make Intercircuit  Conflicts Tolerable, 59  N.Y.U. L. REv.  1078,  1091-
98  (1985)  (proposing artificial  choice of law systems to eliminate forum shopping effect
of circuit conflicts). I do not mean to rule out the possibility  that a judicial system could
be created  in which locally  elected subordinate judges  exercised  their  discretion  to cre-
ate bodies  of local  law  responsive  to their local  electorates  in such  a way  as  to justify
treating the  system  as one  of self-determination.
336  101  U.S.  22  (1880).
s  See Ohio ex rel. Bryant  v. Akron Metro.  Park  Dist., 281  U.S.  74, 81  (1930).
8  Cf United States  v. Mendoza,  464 U.S.  154,  160  (1984)  (discussing need  for
"exploration"  of  issues  by  the circuits  to illuminate them  for  proper resolution  by  the
Supreme  Court);  Estreicher &  Sexton, A  Managerial  Theory of the Supreme Court's
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study,  59  N.Y.U.  L.  REv.  681,  716  (1984)  (arguing
that the Supreme  Court  need  not  resolve  intercircuit  conflicts  when further  "percola-
tion"  through  the circuits  is desirable).
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Court has  found equal  protection  flexible  enough to tolerate  temporary
inequalities  where  instantaneous  adjustment  is  difficult,  in  both  sub-
stantive and  remedial  contexts." 3 9 Thus,  short-term  tolerance of circuit
conflicts might  withstand an equal  protection  challenge;  however, long-
term tolerance  of circuit  conflicts,  resulting in substantial  variations in
the  fundamental  rights  of the  affected  populations  without  a  demon-
strable  justification  in  local  conditions,  normally  will  violate  equal
protection.
A  similar analysis  applies  with equal  strength  to  circuit  conflicts
in the federal  courts.  Such conflicts  are an increasingly  common  prob-
lem, and the Supreme Court has shown a surprising degree of tolerance
for  them.340  Federal  circuit  conflicts,  however,  are  hardly  a  salutary
form  of  local  self-determination.  Federal  circuit judges  represent  the
regions  over which  they  are  appointed  in  only  the  remotest  sense. 3 1
Where persistent  circuit conflicts,  whether involving issues  of statutory
construction implicating  fundamental  rights or involving the interpreta-
tion of those rights themselves, lead to substantial regional disparities  in
the  scope  of  fundamental  rights,  the  Supreme  Court  has  a  constitu-
tional obligation under the due process clause of the fifth amendment to
intervene  and  resolve the  conflicts." 2
Conflicting  decisions  of state supreme  courts regarding  fundamen-
tal rights may not be under the same equal protection cloud. Naturally,
339  See, e.g.,  Reynolds  v. Sims, 377  U.S.  533,  583-84 (1964)  (state  apportionment
need  not be  updated  annually); Heckler  v.  Mathews, 465  U.S.  728,  748  (1984)  (reli-
ance  interest justifies  temporary  gender  distinction  in  computation  of  social  security
benefits);  Brown  v.  Board  of Educ.,  349  U.S.  294,  301  (1955)  (school  desegregation
must be  carried  out with  "all  deliberate  speed").
340  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Stauffer  Chemical  Co.,  464  U.S.  165,  174  (1984)
(declining to address  the issue  of whether  the  application  of collateral  estoppel  to  the
EPA  will  require  it to  apply  different  rules  to  persons  similarly  situated  because  of
circuit splits on the substantive law); Mendoza, 464 U.S.  154 (1984)  (finding that non-
mutual  collateral  estoppel  does not apply  to the  government because  the desirability  of
percolating  an  issue  outweighs  that  of intercircuit  uniformity);  Stauffer,464 U.S.  at
178-79  (White, J.,  concurring)  (arguing  against  extending  preclusion  to  circuits  that
have  adopted a contrary  rule on the merits). Justice White has filed many dissents from
denials of certiorari  based on the Court's failure to resolve circuit conflicts. For an early
example  from  the  current  term,  see  County  of  Wayne  v.  Carroll,  107  S.  Ct.  330
(1986).
341  See L.  BERKSON,  supra note  332,  at 7-8.
342  The constitutionality of tolerating state "circuit  conflicts"  on issues  of state law
affecting fundamental  rights can  be  litigated  in  federal  court  on habeas  corpus  or on
direct  review  because  the  federal  courts have  authority  to  confront  the  constitutional
issue but  not to  resolve the  conflict  by  choosing  the "correct"  state law rule. See, e.g.,
Ohio ex  rel.  Bryant v.  Akron Metro.  Park Dist.,  281  U.S.  74,  80-81  (1930)  (holding
that the Constitution does not require the states to adopt a unifying method  of appeals).
It would  probably take  a  peculiar procedural  posture to  induce  the Supreme  Court to
rule on the constitutionality of federal  circuit conflicts, given  that the Court always has
the option  of resolving  the  conflict in  the  case before  it.
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state  supreme  court  decisions  concerning  comparable  state  law  issues
can  vary from  state  to state-such  interstate  variations represent  exer-
cises of federalism that do not implicate the equal  protection clause.  But
even  conflicts  between  state  supreme  courts  on  issues  of  federal  law
probably  do not raise equal  protection  concerns. This problem will typ-
ically  arise where  two state supreme courts differ  on the interpretation
of  a  federal  fundamental  right  in  a  context  where  the  United  States
Supreme  Court  has given  no  final answer.3 43 The suspected  equal  pro-
tection  defect  might  be  characterized  in  one  of  three  ways:  the  more
restrictive  court's action could violate the equal  protection  clause of the
fourteenth  amendment;  the  concurrent  actions  of the  two  courts  taken
together  could  constitute  federal  action  violating  the  equal  protection
principles inherent in the due process  clause  of the fifth amendment;  or
the failure  of the  federal  government  to resolve  the  conflict  could itself
violate the due process  clause.  A holding of unconstitutionality  based  on
any  of  these theories  would  be  surprising.  First,  the equal  protection
clause of the fourteenth  amendment will not be offended by such a con-
flict so long as that  clause continues to be interpreted,  as it has been,  as
addressing only  discriminatory  actions  taken  by  a single  state.  A  state
supreme court  resolving  an open issue of federal  statutory  or constitu-
tional  interpretation  differently  than  another  state  resolves  it  does  not
thereby "deny  to any  person within its jurisdiction the equal  protection
of the  laws."  Second,  state  courts  adjudicating  federal  issues  have not
traditionally  been regarded  as federal  courts,344 or otherwise  as federal
actors  that  must  comply  with  the  provisions of the Bill of Rights.
3 45
Thus, this line of analysis  suggests that, if a conflict between  state
courts  creates an equal  protection  problem, it must be  because  the fed-
eral  government  has  failed  in  its  obligations  under  the  due  process
clause  by  not  providing  sufficient  machinery  for  the  resolution  of  dis-
agreements about federal  rights arising among the states. If this dispar-
ity  is  cognizable  as  a  fundamental  rights  equal  protection  question,
-"' If the Supreme  Court has ruled on an issue, the state court is obliged  to follow
it. See Oregon v. Hass,  420 U.S.  714, 719-20  n.4 (1975);  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.  1,
18  (1958).
84,  See,  e.g.,  Stone v. Powell,  428  U.S. 465,  482-83,  493 n.35  (1976);  Younger  v.
Harris, 401  U.S.  37,  44  (1971).
-11 See Minneapolis  & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis,  241  U.S. 211,  221  (1916);  Cohens
v. Virginia,  19 U.S.  (6 Wheat.)  264,  421-22  (1821).  The  supremacy  clause  has been
thought to bind  state judges  deciding  federal  questions  in  their capacity  as  state court
judges,  and  the limits  on their  procedures  come  from federal  statutes, federal  common
law, or the fourteenth  amendment. See Dice v. Akron,  C. & Y.R.R.,  342 U.S. 359, 361
(1952);  Chicago,  M. & St. P.  Ry.  v. Minnesota,  134 U.S.  418,  456-57  (1890);  Bur-
bank,  Interjurisdictional  Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common
Law:  A  General Approach, 71  CORNELL  L. REv.  733,  763  (1986);  Meltzer,  State
Court Forfeitures of Federal  Rights, 99  HARV.  L.  REV.  1128,  1131-32  (1986).
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then  even  on  the  assumption  that  the  more  restrictive  interpretation  is
the  "correct"  one, litigants  facing  that interpretation  are denied  equal
protection  until  some  federal  court overturns  the  more  generous  inter-
pretation.  This  too  would  be  a  surprising  analysis.34  State  supreme
court judges,  unlike  federal  circuit judges,  are chosen  by the state in a
process  of  territorial  self-determination. 4"  Because  variations  in  the
quality (or qualities) of state court judges will  reflect state preferences,
it is difficult  to see why  a litigant in a state court astute enough  to give
the  federal  Constitution a correctly narrow interpretation  has a right to
complain  that the  federal  government  has  failed to  suppress more  gen-
erous  interpretations  in the  courts  of other states.
If the foregoing suggestions are correct,  then they shed an unusual
light on some  recent controversies  over the Supreme Court's  exercise  of
its certiorari jurisdiction.  From  the equal protection  point  of view,  the
Supreme Court  should be  more concerned  about  circuit conflicts  in the
federal  courts  and  could  afford  to  spend  less  time  overturning  state
court  decisions  favorable  to  federal  constitutional  rights.""8
In summary,  intrastate  discriminations  that  track political  bound-
ary  lines  should  be excused  from  heightened  scrutiny  only  when  they
afford  the  affected  communities  equivalent  opportunities  for the exer-
cise of local self-determination.  Appropriately drafted  local option laws
can  have  this  characteristic.  The  usual  forms  of special  legislation,  as
well as their administrative and judicial  counterparts, including "circuit
346 One might face  procedural  problems in  getting the equal  protection  issue into
federal  court. Cf supra note 342.  If the  Supreme Court  denies direct  review  in a  civil
case,  principles  of res judicata  would  keep  the  equal  protection  claims out  of federal
court. See  Allen v. McCurry, 449  U.S.  90, 95  (1980).  A criminal  defendant,  however,
could raise the equal  protection  claim in federal  court  on habeas corpus. See  28 U.S.C.
§2254  (1982).
347 Whether  directly elected  or appointed  by  elected officials,  state supreme  court
judges serve important  functions  of state  self-determination as  expositors of state consti-
tutional law, state  common law, and state  statutory interpretation,  as well as exercising
what  discretion  they  have  in  cases  involving  federal  law. The  effectiveness  of federal
judge selection  as a means of  self-determination  in the context  of federal  constitutional
law is a  recurrent subject of debate. Compare Rehnquist, Presidential  Appointments to
the Supreme Court, 2 CONST.  COMMENTARY  319, 328-30  (1985)  (arguing that judicial
direction is mostly independent  of the  President and  popular will) with L. TRIBE,  GOD
SAVE  THIS  HONORABLE  COURT  132-34  (1985)  (arguing  that  the  citizenry  has  the
potential  to affect judicial  direction  by  means  of election  of President and  Senate).
3'8 See,  e.g.,  Michigan  v.  Long,  463  U.S.  1032  (1983)  (expanding  the  Court's
exercise of review  of ambiguous state  decisions  favorable  to federal claimants);  Florida
v. Meyers,  466  U.S. 380  (1984)  (Stevens, J., dissenting)  (criticizing the Court's  readi-
ness to review  state court  decisions favorable to federal  constitutional rights);  Estreicher
& Sexton,  supra note 338,  at 722-28,  740-41;  see also Wallace,  The Nature and Ex-
tent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A  Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill, 71
CALIF.  L.  REV.  913,  917-19  (1983)  (supremacy  of federal  law  more important  than
uniformity of decisions).
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conflicts,"  do not share this characteristic  and should trigger heightened
scrutiny  when  they  impose  discriminations  affecting  fundamental
rights.
7.  Fourth Special  Position-Federal  Discrimination  Along  State
Boundary  Lines
The federal-state  relationship  is both like and unlike the  state-city
relationship.  In  material  terms,  the states  are  geographical  subregions
within  the  federal  domain,  and  in  most  situations  the federal  govern-
ment has the power  to work its will on  them. Yet  in other respects  the
federal  role  is more analogous  to the city's role: in principle the federal
government  possesses  only  delegated  powers,  and  it legislates  intersti-
tially against the background  of the corpus juris generated  by  the ple-
nary  lawmaking  power  of  the  states.a49  Territorial  discrimination  by
the federal  government  therefore  requires separate  investigation.
a.  Types  of Federal  Discrimination
Federal geographical  distinctions that cut across political boundary
lines  raise  no special  problems.  They  are  like the  "random  intrastate
variations"  discussed  in  Part  3  above.  Federal  legislation  governing
only in  certain kinds  of terrains"0  or  only  west of a given  meridian 51
imposes  a  federally  crafted  discrimination.  If  such  legislation  affects
fundamental  rights, it should be subjected to the same heightened  equal
protection  scrutiny  under  the  due  process  clause  as  would  nonge-
ographical  discriminations  with  comparable  impact.
Frequently,  federal  law varies from state to state. Sometimes  Con-
gress  enacts  particular  rules  expressly  pursuing  divergent  policy  in
named  states.352 At other  times,  Congress  identifies  undesirable  condi-
tions and imposes  special rules  on those states  where  the conditions  ex-
ist.353  More  frequently,  federal  law  varies  because  varying  state  law
has been adopted  as federal. I will refer  to these  as federal  "incorpora-
s9  See Wallis  v. Pan  Am.  Petroleum  Co.,  384 U.S.  63,  68  (1966).
so  See Hodel  v. Indiana,  452  U.S.  314  (1981).
"'  See United  States  v.  Tulare  Lake  Canal  Co.,  677 F.2d  713  (9th  Cir. 1982),
vacated as moot, 459  U.S.  1095  (1983).
35"  See,  e.g.,  12  U.S.C.  § 1713(c)(2)  (1982)  (statutory  limits  on mortgage  insur-
ance inapplicable  to Alaska);  30 U.S.C.  § 171  (1982)  (restriction on disposal  of federal
land in Alabama);  38 U.S.C. § 601(4)(c)  (1982)  (provisions for veterans'  health care in
Alaska  and Hawaii);  42 U.S.C.  § 418  (d)(6)(G)  (1982)  (special treatment  of state re-
tirement  programs in  seven  named  states).
115  See, e.g.,  South  Carolina v.  Katzenbach,  383 U.S. 301,  328  (1966)  (provisions
of  Voting Rights  Act  of  1965 aimed at  states "where  voting discrimination  [had]  been
most  flagrant").
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tion"  cases.3"  For  example,  some  ventures  in  cooperative  regulatory
federalism  allow the states to choose  to displace the federal  program by
implementing  similar programs, of their own.355  Moreover,  the federal
government  has  long  used  its  power  over interstate  commerce  to  sup-
port state law enforcement  efforts  by imposing federal  sanctions  for in-
terstate  conduct  leading  to  consequences  unlawful  under  state  law.856
Many federal  statutes, expressly or by judicial construction, incorporate
elements  of  local  property,  family,  tort,  or  procedural  law  that  varies
from  state  to  state.' 57  Assimilative  crimes  legislation  allows  federal
crimes  on  federal  territory  within  state  boundaries  to  be  defined  by
state criminal  law.358
Incorporation  serves  several  federal  policies.  First, some  instances
may  be justified  by  simple  convenience.  For  much  of our  history, the
legislative output  of Congress  was  quite meager compared  to  the com-
mon law and legislation  of the  states. Adopting state law even  in areas
wholly beyond state power, such as federal  court procedure  and federal
criminal  jurisdiction,  relieved  the  federal  government  of a  significant
lawmaking  burden. 59  Second,  incorporation  of state law may better ef-
fectuate  federal  policy  by  tailoring  its  implementation  to  local  condi-
tions.  Reliance  on definitions  from state natural  resources  law, for  ex-
ample,  may  suit  federal  rules  to  varying  climate  conditions.3 6 0  Third,
35  I will use the term "incorporation"  more  broadly than is usual, including those
instances  where  Congress  permits  federal  law  to  be  displaced  by  state  law  (which
therefore remains  state law while federal law on the relevant  issue ceases to exist in the
state),  as well  as instances  where federal  law absorbs  rules of state law origin,  thereby
making them federal rules. See P. BATOR,  P. MISHKIN,  D. SHAPIRO  & H.  WECHSLER,
HART  &  WECHSLER'S  THE FEDERAL  COURTS  AND  THE FEDERAL SYSTEM  767-68 (2d
ed.  1973).
355  See, e.g.,  F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,  771  (1982);  Hodel v. Virginia
Surface  Mining  & Reclamation  Ass'n,  452  U.S.  264,  271-72,  290  (1981);  Steward
Machine  Co.  v. Davis,  301  U.S.  548,  574  (1937).
"'-  See  Clark  Distilling  Co.  v.  Western  Md.  Ry.  Co.,  242  U.S.  311,  325-27
(1917)  (federal  statute permitting state prohibitions on liquor to apply to movements  of
liquor  in  interstate  commerce);  18  U.S.C.  § 1952  (1982  & Supp.  111  1985)  (Travel
Act);  18  U.S.C.  § 1962  (1982)  (RICO).
357  See, e.g.,  Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods., 436 U.S.  604, 614 (1978)  (pres-
ervation  of state  law  on  ownership  of  water);  Reconstruction  Fin.  Corp.  v.  Beaver
County, 328  U.S. 204,  210 (1946)  (RFC Act definition  of "real  property");  17 U.S.C.
§ 101  (1982)  (Copyright Act definition of "widow");  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)  (1982) (Fed-
eral Tort  Claims  Act).
385  See Assimilative Crimes  Act,  18 U.S.C. § 13  (1982);  see also United States v.
Sharpnack,  355 U.S.  286,  286  (1958)  (upholding  an  earlier  version  of the  Act).
"'  While  debating  the  first assimilative  crimes legislation,  Representative  Daniel
Webster  noted  that:  "The  committee  [of  Congress]  did not suppose  it incumbent  on
them to enter into the details of a complete  code  of penal laws  for a few hundred of the
people  in  the  United States'  dock  yards and  arsenals."  1  CONG.  DEB.  338  (1825).
360  See California Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement,  295 U.S.  142, 154-
55  (1935).
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adopting  state  law  minimizes  the  frustration  of federal  policy  by  the
conflicting  behavioral  incentives  that  would  result  from  incongruent
state and  federal  rules. 61
The policy coordination is not, however, a one-way  street. Federal
incorporation  of  state  law  often  reinforces  state  policy.  Making  the
same acts unlawful  in federal  enclaves as elsewhere  in the state  protects
the state citizenry  from conduct  it has  identified as antisocial.3
12  Incor-
porating  state  rules  of  succession  helps  the  state  protect  those  family
members  whose  needs  the  state  has  chosen  to  emphasize.6 '  Coopera-
tion may  even  take the  form  of an explicit local  option  for  direct  state
modification of federal  law.36 4  At the least,  borrowing of state law  ele-
ments  can  make  federal  law  more  easily  understood  by  local  citizens
and practitioners.
It would  be a mistake to  characterize  incorporation  of state law as
invariably furthering  the state's  immediate preferences. Federal income
taxation  of married  couples  provides  a  celebrated  counterexample. 65
Prior to 1948,  federal  tax policy followed  state marital property  law to
its logical  conclusion  by  dividing  community  property  income  between
the spouses in  community  property states while  allocating all income to
the earning spouse in common law states.66  Because the tax rates were
progressive,  the common law states experienced this incorporation as an
unwanted increase  in  federal  tax  burdens.  Several  states adopted  com-
munity  property laws  simply to diminish their contributions to the fed-
eral  revenue.3 67  When  Congress  made  available  the uniformizing  op-
tion of the joint return, these new community  property  states  promptly
361  See California  v. United  States,  438  U.S.  645,  668-69  (1978).
362  See  Sharpnack, 355  U.S.  at  293-94  (1958);  Note,  The  Federal  Assimilative
Crimes Act,  70 HARV.  L. Rav.  685,  689  (1957).
36s See,  e.g.,  DeSylva  v.  Ballentine, 351  U.S.  570,  580-82  (1956)  (adopting state
law  definition of children  for  succession to copyright renewal  rights); Seaboard  Airline
Ry. v. Kenny, 240 U.S. 489, 493-94 (1916)  (adopting state law definition of next of kin
in  wrongful  death  action).
"  See,  e.g.,  42  U.S.C.  § 7543(b)  (1982)  (allowing  states  that  regulated  auto
emissions  before  March  30,  1966  to  continue  such  regulation  if  necessary  to  meet
"compelling  and  extraordinary  conditions,"  and  deeming  compliance  with  state  stan-
dard  to  be in  compliance  with  federal  law).
36  See e.g.,  Bittker, Federal  Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN.  L. REV.
1389,  1404-14  (1975).
368 See id. at 1404-14.  Federal  tax law  did not, however, permit  couples to evade
the  consequences  of the  initial assignment  of income  by adopting  enforceable  but  con-
sensual  income  splitting devices,  even when these  were denominated  optional commu-
nity  property systems under  state  law. Rather,  federal  tax law bowed  only  to commu-
nity  property  schemes  "dictated  by  State  policy,  as  an  incident  of  matrimony."
Commissioner  v.  Harmon,  323 U.S.  44, 48  (1944).
367 See  Bittker, supra note  365,  at  1411,  1412.
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reverted  to  the  common  law  system.""8  Thus,  federal  "deference"  to
state  marital  property  definitions  inadvertently  disrupted  the  domestic
policy of those states that were willing to let the tail of taxation wag the
dog of marital property law. Nonetheless,  the original federal  approach
had bowed  to state policy by  taxing income to the party whom the state
chose to  recognize  as  its initial  recipient.  Congress  was just more  con-
sistent  in  carrying  out  that  policy  than  common  law  states  competing
fiscally  with  community  property states  wanted it  to be.
Some  instances  of federal  adoption of state  law may be explained
primarily  as  serving  federal  convenience.  For  example,  the  federal
courts'  practice  of borrowing state statutes of limitations but using their
own  rules  of laches  and tolling  seems  better explained  by judicial  em-
barrassment  at  setting an  arbitrary  time  limit than  by  the rhetoric  of
deference  to  state  policies  of  repose. 3"'  Still,  identifying  the  relative
strengths  of  the  interests  underlying  a  given  federal  incorporation  of
state  law is  rarely easy.
Unquestionably,  federal  incorporation  of state  law can create  dis-
parities  in opportunities  for the exercise  of fundamental  rights. For ex-
ample,  in  1911  the Supreme  Court held  that  the  federal  Assimilative
Crimes  Act  made  the  legality  of circulating  a  newspaper  article  in  a
federal  post  office  turn  on  the  criminal  libel  law  (if any)  of the  sur-
rounding  state.370  If Congress  were  to pass  a statute requiring judicial
approval when a minor seeks an abortion without parental consent, tied
to  a state law  benchmark  like the minimum  age  for valid  marriage,' 1
the rights  of young women  would  be burdened  unequally  in  different
states.
Sometimes  the incorporation  of state  law into  federal  action  does
not  create  a new  disparity,  but simply  translates  to  the  federal  level  a
contrast  already  inherent  in the juxtaposition  of the laws  of the differ-
ent states. The assimilative crimes example  is of that kind: variations  in
the  libel  law  applicable  in  federal  enclaves  in  New  York  and  New
Jersey  merely  reflect  the  difference  in  governing  in  the  rest  of  New
York and New Jersey. A uniform  federal  rule would create  a discrimi-
nation  between  the  opportunities  within and  without  federal  enclaves,
while  assimilation  creates  a discrimination  between  federal  enclaves  in
different states. In practical  terms, this makes  some kind of discrimina-
3 8  See id. at  1414.
369  See,  e.g.,  Burbank,  supra note 345,  at 769.
370  See United  States  v.  Press  Publishing  Co.,  219  U.S.  1, 14-16  (1911).  Worse
still,  President Roosevelt  was  one of the  alleged  victims  of the  libel.  See id. at 3.
171  Cf Bellotti  v. Baird,  443 U.S.  622, 647-48  (1979)  (striking down state statute
requiring  parental  consent  before  abortion  can  be  performed  on  unmarried  woman
under  18  because  no alternative  consent  procedure  provided).
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tion inevitable,  but in  theoretical  terms  the two  discriminations  cannot
be equated:  the former discrimination  is  the natural result of the Con-
stitution's allocation of different spheres of authority to Congress and to
the  states,  while the latter  discrimination  is  a form of divergent  action
taken  by the  federal  government  itself.
In other instances,  the disparity  caused by federal  incorporation  of
state  law  goes  beyond  the  existing  disparity  among  state  laws.  The
abortion example just given illustrates this phenomenon.  There  an ele-
ment  of state law  not  linked to  a  particular  fundamental  right by  the
state itself is  adopted  into federal  law  to fill  in the details  of a  scheme
addressing that  fundamental  right.  Even in practical  terms,  this incor-
poration  creates  new  discriminations  regarding  the  exercise  of  funda-
mental  rights.
Thus, federal  discrimination  between states can affect fundamental
rights, whether  Congress  acts by specifying  different rules  for different
states  or  by  impartially  incorporating  state  law.  The  incorporation
practice,  however, exhibits a characteristic  that by now  should be famil-
iar  to  the  reader:  borrowing  state  law  can  effectuate  the  local  policy
judgments of state electorates,  thereby furthering  the constitutional  goal
of state self-government.  No such  benefit  is created when  Congress  di-
rectly imposes  differing rules on various  states, whether they are identi-
fied  by name  or operationally  described." 7 2 Does the value of comity in
the incorporation  situation justify less rigorous scrutiny of the resulting
disparities?
b.  Virtues of Federal Incorporation
Our  system of federalism  historically  has rested upon  the activity
of  state  governments  as  the  primary  authors  of the  family,  property,
tort, contract, and criminal law that shape social interaction.  For exam-
ple,  marriage,  separation,  divorce,  paternity,  legitimation,  custody
rights, emancipation,  and majority are all  defined by  state  family  law.
The federal government needs to employ some form of these concepts in
administering  such  programs  as immigration,  social  security,  veterans'
benefits, and copyright. 8 73  Congress could generate uniform  federal law
"I The case against  deferential scrutiny  of discriminations of the  kind mentioned
is even  stronger  than the  case  against  such  scrutiny  of special  legislation  at  the state
level because  the United  States Constitution  itself presupposes  and even guarantees the
existence of the machinery  for self-government  in  the states.  See U.S.  CONST.  art. IV,
§ 4; U.S.  CONST.  amend.  X.
171  See,  e.g.,  8 U.S.C.  § 1101(b)(1)  (1982)  (definition  of  child for  immigration
purposes); 42 U.S.C. §§  101(3),  (4) (1982)  (definition of surviving spouse and  child for
purposes of  veterans'  benefits).
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to govern these questions,  but inevitably it would conflict  with the rules
chosen  by  some  state-Congress  would  be requiring  an  individual  to
share  some  benefit  with  a  "spouse"  or  "child"  not  recognized  as  a
spouse  or  child  under  state  law.  Such  rulings  would  undermine  the
states'  traditional  role  in  defining  the  conditions  under which  family
obligations  are  created  or  extinguished  . 74  Alternatively,  the  federal
government  can  incorporate  state  law,  effectuating  federal  policies
while  accommodating  them  to local policy judgments that refine but  do
not  frustrate  the  federal  purpose.
I  would  not  make  the  strong  claim  that  tolerance  for  the  dis-
uniformity that results from federal  incorporation  of state law is neces-
sary to permit state self-government.  The areas of state lawmaking into
which  the  federal  government  has not intruded  are  still large,  and  the
Supreme  Court has  made  the obligation  of the  federal  courts  to apply
state  law  in  the  exercise  of  diversity  and  pendent jurisdiction  much
stronger than  the  full  faith  and  credit  obligations  of state courts. 75
Rather, federal  incorporation  of state law minimizes federal  incur-
sions on  state self-government  and in some  instances extends  the reach
of policymaking  by  interested  states  into spheres  that  the Constitution
assigns initially to federal  authority, like interstate commerce,  immigra-
tion, and federal  enclaves. 76 Federal  incorporation  facilitates  state self-
government,  even though state autonomy would not be  impossible with-
out it.
The  parallels between  federal  incorporation  of state law and state
employment  of a sister state's  law through dipaqage should be evident.
In  both  cases,  borrowing  can  accord  comity  to  the  policy  judgments
made  by  the  lending  state  in  designing  the  borrowed  rule.  Both  re-
present  accommodations  to  the  overlapping  spheres  of  authority  that
sovereigns inhabit in our federal  system. There is,  however, one impor-
tant  difference:  the  dangers  of  parochial  discrimination  inherent  in
state-to-state  choice of law decisions  do not infect the federal  incorpora-
17"  Sometimes  Congress  chooses  to  do  this.  See,  e.g.,  17  U.S.C.  §  101  (1982)
(adopting federal  definition of "children"  for  purposes  of Copyright  Act).  I  do not ad-
dress  the  question  whether  Congress  could  reverse  the  traditional  roles  of state  and
federal  law  and  preempt  state  power  to  define  family  relationships  and  obligations
altogether.
175  See  Erie  R.R.  Co.  v.  Tompkins,  304  U.S.  64  (1938).  Compare Guaranty
Trust Co.  v. York,  326  U.S.  99,  105  (1945)  (federal  court  must apply  state statute of
limitations  in  diversity  case)  with  Wells  v.  Simonds  Abrasive  Co.,  345  U.S.  514,  523
(1953)  (forum state  may  apply  its own  statute of limitations).
376  The Supreme  Court has upheld the resulting extensions of state power  against
claims of unlawful delegation.  See, e.g., United States v. Sharpnack,  355 U.S.  286, 293-
94  (1958)  (federal  enclaves);  Clark Distilling  Co. v.  Western  Md. Ry.  Co.,  242  U.S.
311,  330-32  (1917)  (interstate  commerce). But see Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  v.  Stewart,
253 U.S.  149,  159,  161  (1920)  (forbidding such  delegation  in  admiralty).
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tion practice.  When  a state applies foreign  law to nonresidents,  it may
be  denying  them  benefits  of  its  own  law  that  it  reserves  for  its  own
citizens.  But  when the  federal  government  adopts  state  law,  it  is  not
denying  the citizens  of the states  some  benefit selfishly reserved  for  an-
other,  more  favored  group.  Either  there  is  no  federal  rule,3"7  or the
federal  government  has  given  the  states  themselves  the  option  of  dis-
placing  it.37 8  In  this  situation  there  is  no  favored  group  because  the
members  of Congress  all  represent  the  states. 7 9
Because  parochial  discrimination  does  not  underlie  federal  incor-
poration of state law, we need not be  as suspicious of incorporation  as I
argued we should  be of discriminations  in state choice of law. There is
less danger, for example, that a state's rules will be lifted out of context
and applied against its  residents in order  to disadvantage them. On the
other hand,  federal  incorporation  of state law does  more than just pre-
serve  variations  in state fundamental  rights-it transposes  them to the
national  level  and  can  extend  the inequalities  to spheres  that  the state
has  no power to reach  on its own.  In addition, the degree to  which the
sacrifice of uniformity results  from deliberate  federal  deference  to local
policy, rather than from congressional  indifference  and laziness, will be
unclear  in particular  cases.
The  equal protection  problem arises  when less  favorable  incorpo-
rated  state law disadvantages  a litigant (who may or may not be a resi-
dent of the enacting  state),  and she points to a more favorable rule that
federal  law  incorporates  in  another  state.  The  unfavorable  rule  will
usually  not  be  absolutely  necessary  to  achieve  the underlying  federal
interest,  or Congress  would  not  have  incorporated  the more  favorable
rule  in another state. Furthermore,  in most cases,  the federal  interest in
deferring  to  state  policy  will  have  been  inconsistently  asserted. 80  In-
'77  This is usually the reality  in the cases conventionally  denominated  "incorpora-
tion."  See supra note  354 and accompanying text. Sometimes  the federal  courts reserve
the  right to reject  state law  that is repugnant to federal  policy.  I will discuss  this issue
infra at text  accompanying note  384.
'7  This  is the  case in  some  situations that I  have  also included  under  the  label
"incorporation."  See supra note  355  and accompanying  text.
'7  See,  e.g.,  Garcia v. San  Antonio  Metro. Transit Auth.,  469  U.S.  528,  547-55
(1985);  cf. Frazier v. Heebe, 788  F.2d  1049,  1053  (5th Cir. 1986)  (upholding district
court  ruling  denying  bar  admission  to attorneys who  do not reside in  or maintain  an
office  in the  state)  ("As a citizen,  insofar as federal  actions are  concerned  he is not an
outsider  lacking  political  power, as that  concept  is understood  in  the  equal protection
analysis."),  cert. granted, 55  U.S.L.W.  3357 (U.S.  Nov. 17,  1986)  (No. 86-475).  I put
to one  side for  the moment the  paranoid suggestion that incorporation of state  law is a
plot to  discriminate  in favor  of  the residents  of the District of Columbia.  We  will re-
turn to them  later.
80  See,  e.g.,  Note, supra note 362,  at 691-96  (discussing exceptions  to incorpora-
tion of  state  law  under the  Assimilative  Crimes  Act).
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deed, if Congress  were that concerned  about state choices,  it could have
turned  control of the subject over to the states rather than incorporating
portions  of their laws. No doubt some  incorporations  of state law could
run the gauntlet  of these objections  and still  survive strict scrutiny, but
the  federal  government's  various  compromises  with  state policymaking
will  rarely  be defensible  under a  compelling  interest standard.
Rigid application  of equal protection  principles  would suggest that
the  federal  government  should  be  required  to  adopt  uniform  federal
rules  in  all  instances  where  fundamental  rights  are  substantially  af-
fected  and incorporation  of state law is  not strictly necessary.  I believe,
however,  that  there is  constitutional  value  in preserving  the interstitial
character  of federal  legislation,  and affording room  for a range  of com-
promises  between  state  and  federal  policy.  Federal  incorporation  of
state law  may amplify diversity,  but it  does  not create  diversity where
none yet exists. The independent sovereignty of the states generates  that
diversity, and the differences reflect democratic  policy choices of the cit-
izens of the various states.  Disparities will occur only to the extent that
local  choices  create  them. These  choices will have their greatest impact
on the populations making the choice,  and divergences  from uniformity
may  as often  increase  the  scope  for  exercise  of  fundamental  rights  as
decrease it. Restraint by the federal  government in displacing these pol-
icy choices furthers the constitutional  goals of political participation  and
of federalism  itself. Though the need is less  poignant than in the prior
examples,"'1  federal  incorporation  of state law should be made possible
by excusing the resulting geographical  variations  from heightened  equal
protection  scrutiny  under the due process  clause.
3 82
One additional peculiarity  of federal  incorporation  practice should
be mentioned.  Federal  statutes  sometimes  set  out a  presumptively  ap-
plicable  federal  rule and  then allow  state law  to take  its place  only  to
the extent  that  the state  rule  is stricter  than the  federal  one. 83  Simi-
larly,  the methodology  of  federal  common  law  incorporation  of  state
law  elements  permits rejection  of aberrant  state rules  that would  frus-
trate  the  achievement  of  federal  policy.'  In  discussing  state-to-state
381  Those  examples  are:  (1) municipal action  affecting  fundamental  rights, where
no self-government  would be possible if heightened scrutiny applied, and (2)state  choice
of law,  where  internecine  assertions  of prescriptive jurisdiction  undercutting  self-gov-
ernment would  be  required  if heightened scrutiny  applied.
u'  This  conclusion  is rejected  by  Bernard  Evans Harvith.  See Harvith, Federal
Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALB.  L. REV.  210,  226 (1967);  Harvith,
The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical  Assistance Pro-
grams, 54 CALIF.  L. Rv. 567,  637-40  (1966).
U3  See,  e.g.,  42 U.S.C.  § 7543 (motor vehicle emissions  standards)  (1982).
3" See,  e.g.,  Burbank,  supra note  345,  at  812;  Mishkin,  The  Variousness of
"Federal Law".  Competence and Discretion in  the  Choice of National and State
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choice  of  law  problems,  I  pointed  out  the  discriminatory  potential  of
similar state law  ratcheting principles,  which  would bias the  process  of
adopting  sister state law to the disadvantage  of nonresidents. This dan-
ger  is  not  present  in  the  federal  practice  because  the  citizens  of  the
states  are  not  disenfranchised  rivals  of  the  federal  government.  Even
this  partial  incorporation  increases  the  local  participation  in  self-gov-
ernment. Furthermore, the consequent disparities in fundamental  rights
will be of lesser  magnitude than those  resulting  from unconditional  in-
corporation  of  state  law.  But  the  selective  practice  of  adopting  state
rules  within  a  range  acceptable  to  the  federal  government  is  particu-
larly difficult  to justify under  a strict scrutiny standard. Thus, I would
not carry  over the strictures  against selective  choice of law in the  state-
to-state  context.  This  mode  of  selective  federal  incorporation  should
also  be excused  from heightened  scrutiny.
c.  Complication: The District of Columbia
The  pure  model just  described  is  complicated  by  the  recognition
that  there is federal  territory  where no state law can reach.  The prob-
lem  of overseas  territories  has  been vexing historically  and  exceeds  my
capabilities. 85  It will be enough for the present Article, I hope, to con-
sider how the analysis  is affected by including the District of Columbia.
I previously  argued that federal  incorporation cannot  reflect paro-
chial hostility  against citizens  of the states because  state citizens them-
selves  elect  all the  voting members  of Congress.  No one  could  suspect
Congress  of a natural  tendency  to discriminate in  favor of the District
of Columbia  and against the states, because  the  states  but not the Dis-
trict are represented.8 6 We may be leery, however,  of a possible motive
for congressional  discrimination  against the  District.M
7
The  Constitution  expressly  assigns  to Congress  the power to  "ex-
Rules for Decision, 105 U.  PA.  L.  REV.  797,  804-06  (1957).
3"5  See,  e.g.,  Harris  v.  Rosario,  446  U.S.  651  (1980);  Downes  v.  Bidwell,  182
U.S.  244 (1901);  Leibowitz,  United States Federalism:  The States and the Territories,
28 AM.  U.L.  REv. 449  (1979);  Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional
Doctrine (Book  Review),  100 HARV.  L.  REv.  450  (1986)  (reviewing  J.  TORRUELLA,
THE SUPREME  COURT  AND  PUERTO  Rico: THE DOCTRINE  OF  SEPARATE  AND  UNE-
QUAL  (1985)).
I"  The  District does have a "delegate"  in Congress, but no vote.  See D.C.  CODE
ANN.  § 1-401  (1981).  Since 1961,  the District also has been represented  by three mem-
bers  in  the  electoral college.  U.S.  CONST.  amend.  XXIII.
397  As a ruling group  accountable only  to constituents who  live elsewhere, conven-
ing  in  a city  impoverished  and  overwhelmingly  black,  members  of Congress  may,  for
example,  succumb to the  temptation  to adopt. innovations in the criminal  law that they
would find  unacceptable  for their home  districts. See, e.g., United  States v. Thompson,
452  F.2d 1333,  1339 (D.C.  Cir. 1971)  (construing statute imposing more stringent bail
procedures  only in District  of Columbia),  cert. denied, 405  U.S.  998  (1972).
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ercise  exclusive  Legislation  in all  Cases  whatsoever,  over  such  District
(not  exceeding  ten  Miles  square)  as  may,  by  Cession  of  particular
States, and the Acceptance  of Congress, become the Seat of the Govern-
ment of the United States." 88  The  Supreme Court has emphasized  re-
peatedly  that this  clause  authorizes  Congress  to  pass  the  full range  of
legislation  that  the  states  can  pass  within  their  own  borders. 89  The
Court has also pointed out the resulting dual character of congressional
authority over the District: Congress acts both as a local legislature  and
as a  national  government.3 90
One  might  ask  whether  the  power  of  "Legislation  in  all  Cases
whatsoever"  comprehends  the ability to  enact  laws that  no state could
enact and  that  simultaneously  are  beyond the powers  granted  to  Con-
gress in other clauses.  The conventional answer is yes, for two reasons.
First, some  express guarantees  of individual  liberty against  state action
in  the  Constitution  do  not  bind  the  federal  government. 9"  A  court
might well  conclude that  Congress  is as  free of those  limitations when
legislating  for  the  District  as  when  legislating  nationally.  But  more
broadly,  the Supreme  Court  has suggested  that  there  are  also  powers
beyond  the sphere  of state  government,  and  yet  otherwise  unenumer-
ated,  that  the seat  of government  clause  authorizes  Congress  to  exer-
cise.391 Congress,  in legislating  for the District,  acts as  no "mere  local
legislature"; 9 3  rather,  it acts  for  a purpose  which  is  "national  in the
highest  sense,
394  and the alchemy  of the necessary  and  proper  clause
-and  the supremacy clause  provides Congress  with means of accomplish-
ing its goals  that  no state  has. 95
3  U.S.  CONsT.  art. I,  § 8,  cl.  17.
"I See,  e.g.,  Palmore  v.  United  States,  411  U.S.  389,  397  (1973);  Berman  v.
Parker,  348  U.S.  26,  31  (1954);  Keller  v. Potomac  Elec.  Power  Co.,  261  U.S.  428,
442-43  (1923);  Gibbons v.  District  of Columbia,  116  U.S.  404, 407-08  (1886).
390  See Palmore,  411  U.S.  at 397; Keller, 261  U.S.  at 443;  Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S.  (6  Wheat.)  264,  427  (1821).
3'1  The  contract  clause is an example.  See  PBGC v.  R.A.  Gray & Co.,  467  U.S.
717,  732-34  (1984).  But see D.C.  CODE  ANN.  § 1-204  (1981)  (subjecting D.C.  local
government  to  all  limitations  contained  in  art.  I,  § 10).  Conversely,  there  are  some
clauses, like the seventh  amendment, that bind Congress, and the District of Columbia,
but not the  states. See  Pernell v.  Southall  Realty,  416  U.S.  363  (1974).
392  Discussions  of the reach of enumerated  powers are necessarily embarrassed by
the  fact that nearly  any  congressional  action  can  be  rationalized  under the  commerce
clause. See  Katzenbach  v.  McClung,  379 U.S.  294 (1964)  (upholding Title II  of the
Civil  Rights Act  of 1964  on the  basis of federal  commerce  power). But see Oregon  v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S.  112 (1970)  (invalidating voting rights act  amendments of 1970 with
respect to  state and  local  elections  as  beyond  powers delegated  to  Congress).
3" Cohens  v. Virginia,  19  U.S.  (6  Wheat.)  264,  427  (1821)  (dictum).
I" National  Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,  337  U.S.  582, 601  (1949)
(plurality opinion  of Jackson, Black, and Burton, J.J.); accord O'Donoghue  v. United
States,  289 U.S.  516,  538-39  (1933).
395  See National Mut. Ins. Co.,  337 U.S.  at 600-02;  Cohens, 19  U.S.  at 427-29.
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The  Supreme  Court  distinguishes  among  these  aspects  of  Con-
gress's power in considering  the permissible scope of delegation of home
rule authority to the District. The Court has  upheld delegation of state-
like local  self-governing  power to  an elected  District legislature, 98  but
it  has  also  held  that  Congress  could  not  similarly delegate  its  strictly
national  powers.3 9  Congress  may transfer to a  District government,  as
to  a Territory,  those  "matters  'which,  within  the limits of a State,  are
regulated  by  the laws  of the State  only.'  "398
Thus  Congress  possesses three related  categories of authority with
respect to the District that  serve three  different constitutional  purposes.
First,  as the national legislature,  Congress  has those tasks  and  powers
within  the  District  that  it  has throughout  the  United  States.  Second,
because the States have resigned lawmaking  authority over the District,
someone  must take their place. That task, with accompanying state-like
powers,  is  assigned initially and ultimately  to Congress. Third, because
the federal government  has unique interests in control of its capital, the
Constitution  grants  it  the  broadest  plenary  authority,  "in  all  Cases
whatsoever,  over  such  District." '
This constitutional  scheme leaves  District residents with very trun-
cated  political rights. They  are not represented  in Congress,  which has
ultimate  authority to enact their local laws.40 ° From  time to time  Con-
gress  has  created  elected  local  governments  for the  District, but it has
limited  their  authority.0 1  The District  now  has its  own  local  courts,
These intimations are rare; the extraordinary  means approved include  extension  of di-
versity jurisdiction  to citizens of  the District, pledging the national  credit for  local  bor-
rowing, mixing  legislative  and  article III jurisdiction, and  compelling  states  to permit
sale  of District  lottery  tickets.
3" See  District of  Columbia  v.  John  R.  Thompson  Co.,  346  U.S.  100,  106-10
(1953);  cf. Mattingly  v.  District of Columbia,  97  U.S.  687  (1878)  (upholding  delega-
tion of authority to  revise  and correct  local  assessments  for  public works projects).  In-
deed,  James  Madison relied  upon  the inevitable  creation  of a freely  elected municipal
legislature  in  the  District as part  of  his defense of the  seat of government  clause. See
THE FEDERAUST  No. 43,  at  310  (J.  Madison)  (B.  Wright,  ed.  1961).  Congress  has
not, however,  always  kept  this  promise. See infra note  401.
5" See John R. Thompson Co.,  346 U.S.  at  106.
311  Id. (quoting  Simms  v. Simms,  175 U.S.  162,  168  (1899)).
39  U.S.  CONST.  art. I,  § 8, cl.  17; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note
396,  at  309:
The  indispensable  necessity  of complete  authority at  the  seat  of govern-
ment, carries  its own  evidence  with it.  ...  [A]  dependence  of the mem-
bers of the general  government on the State comprehending the seat of the
government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the
national  councils  an  imputation  of awe or  influence  . ...
400  The  District  does  have  a  nonvoting  delegate.  See supra note  386.
40I  See,  e.g.,  District of Columbia Self-Government  and  Government  Reorganiza-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198,  87 Stat. 774 (1973)  (current version  at D.C. CODE ANN.
§§  1-204,  1-206, 1-233,  47-313  (1981)).  See generally Franchino,  The Constitutional-
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but their judges are appointed  by  the President  and serve only  fifteen-
year terms.
0 2
Some have argued that the District's lack of representative  govern-
ment should entail  heightened  scrutiny  of congressional  legislation  dis-
criminating  against  the District. 03  This  seems  at first  glance  to  be  a
reasonable  consequence  of  the  "representation-reinforcing"  theory  of
constitutional  interpretation  advocated  by  Dean Ely."0"  Groups  denied
a  full  opportunity  for political  participation,  like  aliens,  nonresidents,
and  members  of  racial  minorities,  deserve  close  judicial  attention  to
laws that  discriminate  against  them.
4 05
But  this  argument  proves  far  too  much.  The  Constitution  itself
guarantees the  states a republican  form of government  but assigns ple-
nary power  over  the District  to  a body  in which  its residents  are not
represented.  Treating  District  residents  as  a  suspect  class  so  long  as
they  are  not  enfranchised  would  topple  this  constitutional  structure.
First, the purposes  of the seat of government  clause  would be defeated
if Congress were  forbidden  by the equal  protection  clause  from  enact-
ing local legislation in the District merely  because it lacked  the  power
to enact it nationwide.0 6  Second,  even  where Congress's  powers  over-
ity of Home Rule and National Representation  for the District of Columbia, 46  GEo.
L.J. 207  (1958)  (recounting  the  history  of governance  of the  District  from  1800  to
1924).
Under current law, the D.C. council  has broad self-governing authority. See  D.C.
CODE  ANN.  §§  1-204,  1-206,  1-233,  47-313  (1981).  Congress  originally  retained a
one-house  legislative  veto  over  D.C.  laws.  See District  of Columbia Self-Government
and  Government  Reorganization  Act,  Pub.  L. No.  93-198,  § 602(c)(2),  87  Stat. 774,
814 (1973).  After the one-house  legislative veto  fell  in Immigration and  Naturalization
Serv. v. Chadha,  462 U.S.  919  (1983),  this  was  changed  to  a veto  by  expedited joint
resolution.  See D.C.  CODE  ANN.  §§  1-207,  1-233(c)  (Supp.  1985).
402 See D.C.  CODE  ANN.  §§  11-1501,  11-1592  (1981).
4Os See, e.g.,  United States v.  Greene,  489 F.2d  1145,  1165 n.28  (D.C.  Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon,  C.J.,  dissenting  from  denial  of rehearing  en  banc),  cert. denied, 419  U.S.
1977  (1974);  United States v. Thompson,  452  F.2d  1333,  1341  (D.C.  Cir. 1971);  cf.
United  States v.  Cohen,  733  F.2d 128,  144-46  (D.C.  Cir. 1984)  (en banc)  (Mikva, J.,
joined by Robinson,  C.J., and Wright, J., concurring)  (rejecting the theory that District
residents  are a "suspect  class" within the meaning of the equal protection clause merely
because  they have  no vote  in congressional  elections,  but stating that "when  Congress
acts  in  its  capacity  as  the  national legislature,  a  separate  and  unequal  legislative
scheme  for  the  District  of Columbia  ought  to elicit  some concern  that invidious  lines
have  been  drawn  precisely  because  of the  national  disenfranchisement  of the  groups
affected  by those lines.");  Note, Federal and Local  Jurisdiction  in the District of Co-
lumbia, 92 YALE  L.J. 292,  326  (1982)  ("In view  of the longstanding  restriction  upon
the  exercise  by  District residents  of political  rights  . . . these  classifications  must  be
judged  with particular scrutiny.")  (footnotes  omitted).
4"  See  J.  ELY,  supra note  46,  at 83.
405 See  id. at 83-84,  102-03,  161-62.
4"  This is also  an occasion  for application  of the principle discussed  earlier, that
distinctions  required  by  the  Constitution  itself  cannot  violate  equal  protection.  See
supra note  233  and  accompanying  text.
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lapped  sufficiently  to permit  nationwide  extension  of its  legislation  for
the District, the  Constitution's  allocation  of local  sovereignty  would  be
destroyed  if Congress  had to  override  state  policy  choices  from coast to
coast whenever it adopted a measure  in the District. Thus, suspect class
treatment for the District of Columbia is unworkable,  and the Supreme
Court's  unreceptiveness  to  the approach  is  understandable. 07
Even  if  District  residents  cannot  be treated  as  a suspect  class,  it
could  be argued  that  heightened  scrutiny  should  protect them in  some
instances  under  the  doctrine  of fundamental  rights  equal  protection.  I
argued  earlier  that  a  federal  statute discriminating  by  name  against a
single  state in a manner  that  substantially  affected  fundamental  rights
would rightly trigger heightened scrutiny.  Does legislation applicable to
the District but not  the  states  deserve  similar treatment?
Legislation  enacted  by  an  elected  home  rule  government  for  the
District  would  escape  heightened  scrutiny.  The legislation  would ulti-
mately  be  attributable  to  Congress,4 ° "  but  the  same  modification  in
equal protection methodology  that preserves independent lawmaking  by
municipalities  within  the  states  would  justify  the  discrimination.4 0 "
Otherwise,  self-determination  for  the  District  would  be  impossible.
True  home  rule  would  make  the  District  virtually  a  fifty-first  state,
and the increase  in  diversity of rights would be the kind of diversity we
encourage.
Congressional  legislation  for the  District  is  not similarly justified
as self-government. Indeed, Congress  legislates for the District even less
democratically  than  a  state  legislates  for  its  capital,  whose  residents
have  at  least  some  representation  in the state  legislature.  But  in  most
situations,  congressional  discrimination  against  the  District is justified
because of its contribution to self-government  in the states. The District
may  not  function  as  a  state  from  its  own  citizens'  point  of view,  but
from  the  perspective  of the  citizens of the fifty  states it  does.
Consider the kinds  of statutes Congress  can  enact  for the District.
Some  are  supported  solely  by  Congress's  state-like  powers  under  the
seat  of government  clause  and  could  not  be  extended  nationwide  be-
""  See, e.g.,  Heald v. District  of Columbia,  259  U.S.  114,  124  (1922)  (rejecting
"taxation  without  representation"  challenge  to  taxing  District  residents);  Loughbor-
ough  v.  Blake, 19  U.S.  (5  Wheat.)  317, 320  (1820)  (same);  cf. Harris v.  Rosario, 446
U.S.  651,  651-52  (1980)  (disparate treatment  of Puerto Rico  in federal  welfare  legisla-
tion  subject  only  to rational  basis  test).
408  See also Welch v.  Cook, 97 U.S.  541,  542  (1878)  (treating legislation  enacted
by  elected D.C.  government  as if enacted by  Congress).
409  If, however,  Congress  enacted  restrictive  legislation  in  the  states and  did  not
extend  it  to the District, or gave the  District but not the states, the option to lessen  its
impact  on fundamental  rights, then Congress's discrimination, not the District's, would
trigger  heightened  scrutiny.
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cause  Congress  lacks  authority  to  impose  them  on  the  states.  Accord-
ingly, any discrimination these cause with respect to fundamental  rights
does  not  violate equal  protection. 10
Many enactments  can be supported either  by  Congress's state-like
powers  or  by  other  enumerated  powers  like  the  commerce  clause.4 n
When  Congress  adopts  such  a  statute  to  serve  local  purposes  in  the
District, it  normally  leaves  the  states  free to  decide  whether  to  adopt
more, less, or equally restrictive  legislation  in their own territory.  Any
resulting disparity  in fundamental  rights  between  the District and  the
States  is  then  comparable  to  interstate  variations  inoffensive  to  the
equal  protection  clause.  Congress  acts  with  territorial  restraint,  but it
does  so in order  to preserve  the policymaking  prerogatives of the states
within  their own  boundaries.  This restraint  furthers  both  interests  in
federalism  and  the  facilitation  of self-determination  by  the  citizens  of
the states. 4 2 Holding  back the heavy  federal hand so that local elector-
ates  can govern  themselves  once more justifies  departure from uniform
opportunities  for the  exercise  of fundamental  rights.
This same  rationale justifies  federal  legislation  that  is  applicable
nationwide  but imposes  greater burdens  on fundamental  rights within
the District than in the states, as long as Congress does not preempt the
states'  ability to  equalize the burden.  For example,  if Congress,  in the
exercise  of its  power  under  the  commerce  clause  to  regulate  medical
practice,  required  parental  notification  when  anyone  under the  age  of
fourteen  sought  an abortion,  but raised  the  age to  sixteen  in the  Dis-
trict,41  heightened  scrutiny  of  the  geographical  disparity  should  not
follow.  Congress has effectively  acted  in two capacities-in  its national
capacity,  it  has  decided  that  notification  is  needed  at  least  when  the
patient  is under fourteen  and has left to the states  as a matter of local
policy  whether to require notification  for older  teenagers  as well. In its
capacity  as local policymaker for the District, Congress  has decided that
a higher  age limit than the national minimum is  appropriate.  Though
410  Cf  United States  v. Antelope, 430 U.S.  641,  649 (1977)  (holding  that federal
law applicable  to Indian  reservations that significantly  differs from the  law of the sur-
rounding  state  does  not  deny  equal  protection  and stating  that  "[ulnder  our  federal
system, the National Government  does not violate equal protection  when its own  body
of law  is evenhanded,  regardless of the  laws  of States with respect  to the same  subject
matter")  (citations omitted).
411  Some  enactments  may  be supported  only by the  seat of government  clause  in
the  District, but would  be supportable  by the enforcement  provisions of the  fourteenth
amendment  in  the states.
412  Though not,  alas, of the District of Columbia.
418  Cf H.L. v.  Matheson,  450 U.S.  398 (1981)  (upholding a state statute requir-
ing  parental  notification  prior to  performance  of  an  abortion  for  an  unemancipated
minor female).
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there is a discrepancy  in the treatment different individuals will  receive
from  the  federal  government,  that  discrepancy  reflects  the  different
roles  Congress  performs  in  varying  geographical  locations.  In  Utah,
Congress  acts  as  enforcer  of  nationwide  minimum  standards  that  the
state is free to surpass; in the District, Congress  is the only  government
and  must  play both roles.  So  long as Congress  leaves  the  states  free  to
replicate  the  rule  it  chooses  for the  District, the  inequalities  serve  to
protect local  choice.
Different conclusions  result, however,  when  Congress prevents  the
states  from following its lead. If Congress adopts  more restrictive  mea-
sures  in  the  District  and  preempts  the  states  from  adopting  similar
measures  in  their  own  territory,  or  if  Congress  adopts  a  statute  that
burdens  fundamental  rights more  heavily in the states than in the Dis-
trict,  then  Congress  has not  preserved  the  policymaking  autonomy  of
the  states.  No interest  in self-government  is  served  by  the discrimina-
tion, either in the District, which does  not govern itself, or in the states,
which  Congress  has blocked  from  doing so.  The  disparity  is wholly  of
Congress's making and normal  equal protection  methods  should apply.
Sometimes  precise  equalization  of the burdens  will  be  prevented,
not by  overt  action of Congress,  but by divergences  between  the consti-
tutional  powers of Congress  and the  states.  Congress may pursue some
of its local policy ends in the District using means that are not available
to  the  states.  This  may  be  attributable  to  Congress's  greater  power
under  the necessary  and  proper  clause,414  or to  the  existence  of a spe-
cific  limit on state power  that is  not binding  on Congress. 415 In either
case,  the  state  lacks  the ability to  implement a local  policy  exactly  du-
plicating  the  scheme  chosen  by  Congress  for  the  District.41 0  But  the
state  is  still  free  to  accept  or  reject  as  a  local  matter  the  policy  with
respect to fundamental  rights that Congress has chosen. An opportunity
for total duplication should not be necessary to escape the application  of
heightened  scrutiny;  the state's interest in self-government  is still being
preserved.
Finally,  there  may  conceivably  be  cases where  Congress  exercises
a  national  power  for identifiably  national  purposes  but limits  the  im-
pact of the legislation  to the District. For example, Congress might for-
bid  citizens  of  the  District  from  travelling  to  Nicaragua.17  No  state
414  See supra note  395  and  accompanying  text.
418  The  contract  clause is  an example.  See supra note  391.
418  To take a  possibly  trivial example,  Congress  has made the federal  courts  and
federal  law enforcement  officers  available for prosecution  of crimes against the District
but  does  not normally do  so  when the  states decide  to  enact similar  criminal  statutes.
See generally Note, supra note  362.
41C  Cf  Zemel  v.  Rusk,  381  U.S.  1 (1965)  (upholding ban  on  travel  to Cuba).
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could  enact  such a law without usurping  federal  authority  over foreign
commerce  and foreign  policy."18  Failure to extend the law to citizens  of
the  states,  therefore,  cannot  be  characterized  as  deference  to  state self-
government,  and  thus heightened  scrutiny  is appropriate.
To sum up: to the extent that democratic home rule is exercised by
the District, it should be  able to create greater burdens  on fundamental
rights  within  its  borders  than  federal  law  generally  creates,  without
triggering heightened  scrutiny,  because the discrimination  furthers  self-
government both in the District and in the states. Congressional  legisla-
tion  for the  District should  also  be  able  to  create  greater  burdens  on
fundamental  rights  than  Congress  imposes  in the  states,  without  trig-
gering heightened  scrutiny,  because the discrimination  furthers self-de-
termination  by the states. But if Congress  preempts the states from im-
posing similar burdens or imposes  greater burdens in the states  than in
the  District,  no  interest  in  self-government  is  served,  and  heightened
scrutiny  should  still  apply.
II.  THE  FRAMEWORK  APPLIED
Having sketched  at length a method  for evaluating claims of equal
protection  violations based  on  territorial  discriminations  affecting  fun-
damental rights, I would like to illustrate its application in actual cases.
Two  dissimilar examples  follow.  The  first involves  discrimination  be-
tween federal  criminal  defendants being tried in the District  of Colum-
bia and those  being tried in the states.  The second  concerns  the proper
role of local  government  autonomy  in educational  finance.
A.  United  States  v.  Cohen
In  1980,  one  Jeffrey  Cohen  was  arrested  carrying  three  home-
made  bombs  near  the  embassy  of the  People's  Republic  of  China  in
Washington,  D.C.  Cohen was  charged with  possession  of unregistered
destructive  devices in violation of 26 U.S.C.  § 5861(d),  and tried in the
United  States  District  Court for  the District  of Columbia.  The  court
found  him  not guilty  by  reason  of insanity.4 19
418  See  Zschernig  v.  Miller,  389  U.S.  429  (1968)  (holding  that  Oregon  law  re-
quiring  escheat  of  estate where heir  is citizen  of nation  with  disfavored  probate  laws
intruded upon federal  authority in foreign affairs); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
231  (1942)  (holding  that New  York court's  refusal  to recognize  Soviet nationalization
of Russian assets where the United  States had extended  such recognition impaired  fed-
eral  foreign  policy);  Chy  Lung  v.  Freeman,  92  U.S.  275,  280  (1875)  (holding  that
California  law giving  state  official  discretion  to prohibit  aliens  from  entering country
was beyond  state's  power).
419  See United  States  v.  Cohen,  733  F.2d  128,  129  (D.C.  Cir. 1984)  (en  banc).
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Had  Cohen  been  tried  for  this offense  in  a  federal  district  court
anywhere  else  in the country,  he  would  have been  released.42  In  fed-
eral  court  in  the District of Columbia,  however,  a different  procedure
governed  because  Congress  had  created  a  separate  scheme  for  the  in-
sanity defense  in the  District and applied it both in the local courts and
in  the  federal  courts.42  Pursuant  to  this  system,  Cohen  was  immedi-
ately  committed  to  Saint Elizabeths  Hospital, where  he would  remain
until he could prove by a preponderance  of the  evidence that he was no
longer  mentally  ill and  dangerous.4 2  Cohen  argued that this variation
between  the  rights of federal  insanity acquittees  in the District  of Co-
lumbia and the rights of federal  insanity  acquittees  in the  states denied
him  equal  protection.423 How should an equal  protection challenge  like
Cohen's be  decided?
1.  Background  on  Commitment  of Insanity  Acquittees424
Public  fear  and  resentment  of defendants  who  successfully  assert
the insanity  defense  has  made  their post-acquittal  disposition  a peren-
nial  subject of controversy.  The  moral premise  purportedly  underlying
the  defense  is  that  mentally  ill  offenders  cannot  be  "blamed"  and
should not be  "punished"  for their acts.425  The public  demands,  how-
420  See id. at  131.
421  See id. at  130-31;  D.C.  CODE  ANN.  §24-301  (1981).
422  See Cohen, 733  F.2d at  129,  131.
428  Cohen  deserves  at  least  a  footnote  in  history.  A divided  panel  of the  D.C.
Circuit accepted  his claim, thereby calling  into doubt the separate congressional  scheme
governing  the  insanity  defense  in  the  federal  courts  of the District.  Reportedly  as  a
result  of this  decision,  federal  trial judges  in  the  District began  placing the  burden  of
proof on  the  prosecution  to  demonstrate  the  sanity  of  criminal  defendants  beyond  a
reasonable  doubt,  the  usual  federal  rule  at  the  time,  rather  than  requiring  proof of
insanity  by  a  preponderance  of the  evidence,  the standard  Congress  had  legislated  for
the  District. See Brief for the United  States  at 6 n.5,  United States  v. Jones, 463  U.S.
354  (1983)  (No.  81-5195).
By  an  accident  of timing, the  district court  employed  this  reasonable doubt stan-
dard in the trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr., for the attempted assassination of President
Ronald  Reagan.  See id.; Note, Federal and Local Jurisdiction  in the District of Co-
lumbia, 92  YALE  L.J. 292-93  (1982).  Hinckley's  acquittal  provided a  focus for  public
dissatisfaction  with  the  insanity  defense.  See,  e.g.,  MODEL  INSANITY  DEFENSE  AND
POST-TRIAL  DiSPosrrION  AcT,  Prefatory  Note  11  U.L.A.  142-43  (Supp.  1986);
Marguiles,  The  "Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad": Procedures  for the
Commitment  and Release  of Insanity Acquittees After  Jones  v.  United  States,  36
RuTGERS  L.  REV.  793,  793-94  & n.3  (1984).  This  led to a substantial  tightening  of
federal law  on the subject, coincidentally  sweeping away  for the  future the discrimina-
tion of which  Cohen  had  complained.
424  This  discussion  is  purely  descriptive.  Rather  than  critiquing  the  Supreme
Court's constitutional  analysis  of  issues  relating  to mental  illness, I would  like  to as-
sume its propriety  and then sketch enough of the context to show how the issues change
when territorial  discrimination  is  involved.
425  See, e.g.,  Jones  v. United  States, 463  U.S.  354,  369  (1983)  (dictum)  (insanity
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ever, that  acquittees not be left  at liberty,  and allegations  of a "revolv-
ing door,"  permitting  dangerous  people  to  avoid  confinement  or to  be
released  prematurely,  are  common.426  These  fears  are  coupled  with
concern  that  clever  criminals  may  feign  insanity  and  escape justly  de-
served  punishment.4 27  Proposals to eliminate  the insanity  defense  or  to
confine  successful  defendants  permanently  for  protection  of the  public
therefore  recur.4
28
Efforts  to deprive  acquitted  defendants  of their  liberty  must over-
come  modest  barriers  of due  process  and equal  protection.  At a  mini-
mum, confinement  must serve a legitimate purpose and must be  accom-
panied  by  appropriate  procedural  protections.  But the Court's  method
for  resolving  constitutional  claims  in the mental health  field  is hard to
pin  down.  It has  consistently  avoided  open  adoption  of a  fundamental
rights or  suspect  class approach.429  Nonetheless,  it has often  held  state
action invalid,  by employing  low-level  due  process techniques, 4 0  and a
form  of equal  protection  scrutiny that  the Court  misleadingly  labels a
rationality  test.
4 '
3
The  cases  sketch  some  of the constitutional  parameters  for  invol-
defendant  acquitted, not convicted,  and  therefore may  not  be  punished);  State v. Krol,
68 N.J. 236,  344 A.2d  289,  295  (1975)  (acquittal  by  reason  of insanity indicated  lack
of mens  rea;  therefore,  no punishable  crime  was committed).
426  See,  e.g.,  Lynch  v. Overholser,  369  U.S.  705,  715  (1962)  (dictum)  (fear  of
"flood  of acquittals"  and immediate  release  of criminally insane);  United States v.  Co-
hen, 733  F.2d  128,  130 (D.C.  Cir.  1984)  (en banc); Jones v.  United  States, 432  A.2d
364, 378-79  (D.C.  1981)  (Ferren, J., dissenting), affd, 463  U.S.  354  (1983);  German
& Singer, Punishing  the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of Persons  Acquitted by  Reason
of Insanity, 29  RUTGERS  L.  REV.  1011,  1022-23  (1976);  Kirschner,  Constitutional
Standards  for Release of the Civilly Committed and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity:
A Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 20 ARIZ.  L. REV.  233,  276  (1978).
411  See, e.g.,  Lynch, 369  U.S.  at 715  (implying  that criminals  could  easily  estab-
lish  insanity defense);  Warren v. Harvey,  632  F.2d 925,  932  (2d  Cir. 1980)  (dictum)
(warning against "calculated  abuse of the insanity defense");  German  & Singer, supra
note  426, at  1020-21.
42  See, e.g.,  Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53  GEO.  WASH.  L.  REV.
528,  529  (1985)  (noting  proposals  to eliminate  insanity defense);  Jonakait,  Two Pro-
posals for Abolishing the Insanity Defense  (Book  Review),  35  HASTINGS  L.J.  403
(1983)  (reviewing  W.  WINSLADE  & J. Ross,  THE  INSANrrY  PLEA  (1983)  and  N.
MORRIS,  MADNESS  AND  THE  CRIMINAL  LAW  (1982)).
42  See,  e.g.,  City of Cleburne  v. Cleburne  Living Center, 105 S. Ct.  3249,  3255-
58  (1985)  (rejecting  appellate  court  ruling that mental  retardation  is a quasi-suspect
classification,  but finding zoning ordinance irrational  as applied); Schweiker  v.  Wilson,
450  U.S.  221,  230-31  n.13  (1981)  (refusing  to  reach  the  issue  of what  standard  of
review applies  to legislation  classifying  the  mentally  ill).
411  See, e.g.,  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457  U.S.  307,  314-15, 324 (1982)  (substantive
due process); Addington v. Texas,  441  U.S.  418,  425,  431  (1979)  (procedural  due pro-
cess);  McNeil  v.  Director,  Patuxent  Inst.,  407  U.S.  245,  251  (1972)  (procedural  due
process); Jackson v. Indiana, 406  U.S.  715,  733,  738  (1972)  (substantive  due  process).
431  See,  e.g.,  City of Cleburne, 105  S. Ct.  at  3258; Jackson, 406  U.S.  at  729;
Baxstrom v. Herold,  383  U.S.  107,  111  (1966).
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untary  commitment.  In  1975  the  Court  held  that  the  state  could  not
commit  a  mentally  ill  person  merely  for  custodial  purposes  without a
finding  that he was  dangerous  to himself or  others.432 Apparently,  this
was a pure substantive  due process holding that vindicated the constitu-
tional  right  to  "liberty"  in  the  sense  of  freedom  from  confinement.433
The  Court  launched  its  equal  protection  campaign  in  1966  with Bax-
strom v. Herold.""'  A  prisoner  allegedly had become insane  during his
incarceration,  and the state sought to confine him beyond the expiration
of his sentence.  The Court condemned  as irrational the state's refusal to
provide  him the procedural  safeguards available  under state law in civil
commitment  hearings.  "For purposes  of granting judicial review  before
a jury  of the question  whether  a person  is  mentally  ill and in  need  of
institutionalization,  there is  no  conceivable  basis  for distinguishing  the
commitment  of a person  who  is  nearing  the  end of a penal  term  from
all other civil  commitments.' 3 4  The  equal protection  rationale in Bax-
strom enabled  the  Court  to  extend  complex  procedural  protections  to
allegedly  ill  persons  involved  in  the  criminal  justice  system  without
having  to  grapple  with  the question  of constitutional  minimum  stan-
dards  for  commitment  proceedings.  The  Court  also  employed  the ra-
tionality  analysis of Baxstrom in Humphrey v.  Cady38  and Jackson v.
Indiana. 4 3 7  The Court did,  however, find  that due process required  at
least  some  hearing  on the  issues underlying  the commitment.38
In  1979,  in Addington v.  Texas,4 ' 9  the  Supreme  Court  directly
confronted  the  issue  of a  minimum  constitutional  burden  of proof  in
civil  commitment proceedings.  The Court employed  the procedural  due
process  analyses of In  re Winship440  and Mathews v. Eldridge.
441  Ex-
amining the risk of error, the relative stakes of government  and individ-
ual,  and the enormity  of a mistaken  commitment,  the Court concluded
4s2  See  O'Connor v. Donaldson,  422  U.S.  563,  576  (1975).  The  Court  left open
the  question  of whether  a  mentally  ill person  who  posed no  danger could be  confined
for the  purpose  of treating her illness  because the plaintiff in this  case had  received  no
treatment.  See id. at  573-74.
48  See  id. at 573.
4-  383  U.S.  107  (1966).
438  Id. at  111-12.
436 405 U.S. 504, 508  (1972)  (jury trial; other issues involving presence at hearing
and  confrontation  of witnesses  remanded  for further  exploration).
487 406  U.S. 715,  729-30  (1972)  (commitment  standards  and  release  conditions).
43  See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 251  (1972)  (finding that
ex parte procedure  violates  due process.);  Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605,  610 (1967)
(finding that where  commitment  as  dangerous  sex offender requires  resolution  of fac-
tual  issues  beyond  elements  of offense,  hearing  on those  issues  is  required).
439  441  U.S.  418  (1979).
440  397  U.S.  358  (1970).
441 424 U.S.  319  (1976).
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that  the risk  should  not be  allocated  equally  between  the parties,  as a
preponderance  standard  would  do.442  Rather,  due  process  required
proof by clear  and convincing evidence that the individual was mentally
ill  and  in  need of hospitalization.443
Meanwhile,  the  lower  courts  had  been exploring  the implications
of equal  protection  for criminal  defendants  newly acquitted on grounds
of insanity. Shortly  after Baxstrom, the D.C. Circuit held in Bolton v.
Harris 444 that  existing  procedures  for  commitment  of insanity  acquit-
tees  in the  District of  Columbia were  inadequate.  Judge  Bazelon  em-
phasized  that,  under  federal  law,  insanity  acquittal  indicated  nothing
more  than  the  existence  of  a  reasonable  doubt  about  the  defendant's
sanity at the time of the  offense, while commitment  must be based on a
finding  of present  illness and  dangerousness. 4 5 Acquittal  could  be fol-
lowed by  brief confinement  for examination,  but thereafter  the govern-
ment  must  provide  a  "judicial  hearing  with  procedures  substantially
similar  to  those  in  civil  commitment  proceedings,"  including  proof  of
insanity and dangerousness  by a preponderance  of the evidence.446 The
Supreme  Court  cited  this  decision  with  approval,447  but Congress  re-
acted  against Bolton, as well  as other examples  of Judge  Bazelon's  ac-
tivism  in  the insanity  field.  Emphasizing  the  interaction  of  the  D.C.
Circuit's  lenient  substantive  standard  for  insanity  acquittal  with  the
procedural  consequences  of Bolton, Congress  argued that numerous de-
fendants would  avoid both  conviction  and commitment.448  Accordingly,
Congress  amended the D.C. Code,  adopting  for both  local  and  federal
courts in the District a distinctive procedure  that still remains  in effect
for local crimes.44 9  The statute permits acquittal only when the defend-
ant's insanity has been  established  by  a preponderance  of the  evidence
and  predicates  commitment  on  this finding  of insanity  at the criminal
442  See Addington, 441  U.S.  at 425-27.
'4  See  id.  at  432-33.  The  issue  of hospitalization  for  treatment,  left  open  in
O'Connor v.  Donaldson,  422 U.S.  563  (1975),  did not arise  in Addington because  the
state statute permitted  civil  commitment only if the individual was dangerous  to herself
or  others. See  441  U.S. at  420-21,  426.
444  395  F.2d  642  (D.C.  Cir. 1968).
141  See id. at  647-49.
446  See id. at  651  & n.50. Bolton, of course,  preceded  the Addington standard  of
clear  and convincing  evidence  for  civil  commitment.
447  See Jackson  v.  Indiana,  406  U.S.  715,  724 (1972).
448  See H.  R.  REP.  No.  907,  91st  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  74  (1970);  see  also United
States  v. Jackson,  553 F.2d  109,  115-17 (D.C. Cir. 1976)  (quoting the House report).
449  Since  1984, the federal  courts have  been governed  by  the new uniform  federal
procedure  on commitment  of insanity acquittees.  See infra notes  462-67  and accompa-
nying  text.  However,  this  procedure  does  not govern  violators  of  statutes  that apply
only  in the  District. See  18 U.S.C.  § 4247(j)  (Supp. I  1984).
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trial. 4 50
Thereafter,  a  defendant  seeking  release  from  commitment  must  prove
by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she  is  no  longer  insane  and
dangerous.
4 51
Other state and federal courts reached divergent  conclusions  on the
permissible  diminution  of procedural  safeguards  for insanity acquittees
as compared  to civil committees.  The recurring issues included both the
initial  commitment  of  the  acquittee  based  on  nothing  more  than  the
verdict  on the  insanity  defense,  and the showing  she must make to  se-
cure  release  from  confinement  thereafter.  Some courts  held  that  a ver-
dict founded on a reasonable  doubt as to sanity justified indefinite  com-
mitment  with  the  burden  on  the  acquittee  to  prove  her  recovery.4 52
Others  rejected  even  an  initial  commitment  without  a hearing  on  pre-
sent  mental  state453  or  required  the  state  to  shoulder  the  burden  of
demonstrating  the need  for continued  confinement.454 The problem be-
came  particularly  acute  after Addington, because  most  states  did not
give  the  acquittee  the  benefit  of  the  clear  and  convincing  evidence
standard.
4 55
Some  of these  issues were  eventually  resolved  in Jones v.  United
States,456 in which  the Supreme  Court narrowly  upheld the District of
Columbia  procedure  for  automatic  commitment.45 7  The  Court  mini-
mized the importance  of equal  protection  principles  in the commitment
procedure,  pointing  out  that  if  due  process  required  less  for  post-ac-
quittal  commitment  than for  civil  commitment, then  surely  there  must
be a rational basis for providing  different procedures.45  The Court dis-
450  D.C.  CODE ANN.  § 24-301(j)  (1981);  cf. United  States  v.  Greene,  489  F.2d
1145,  1153-56  (D.C. Cir. 1973)  (upholding change in  burden  of proof at trial  against
due  process  challenge),  cert. denied, 419  U.S.  977  (1974).
451  D.C.  CODE ANN.  § 24-301(k)(3)  (1981).
452  See,  e.g.,  People  v.  Chavez,  629  P.2d  1040  (Colo.  1981); see  also Benham v.
Edwards,  678 F.2d 511  (5th Cir. 1982)  (30  day  observation  period  before commitment
not  challenged),  vacated, 463  U.S.  122 (1983),  on remand, 785 F.2d  1480  (11th Cir.
1986).
453  See,  e.g.,  Powell v. Florida, 579  F.2d 324  (5th  Cir. 1978).
'I"  See,  e.g.,  Benham,  678  F.2d  at 525;  State v. Clemons,  110 Ariz.  79,  81-83,
515  P.2d  324,  326-28  (1973);  State  v. Krol,  68  N.J,  236,  257,  344  A.2d  289,  300
(1975).
4'5  See  Benham, 678  F.2d at  521-25;  Note,  Commitment Following an Insanity
Acquittal, 94 HARV.  L.  REV.  605,  605-06  & nn.5-6  (1981).
45  463  U.S.  354  (1983).
45"  For  negative  commentary  on this  result, see id. at 371  (Brennan,  J., dissent-
ing); id. at 387  (Stevens, J., dissenting);  Marguiles, supra note 423, at 801-03, 810-13;
Note,  Automatic and Indefinite Commitment  of Insanity Acquittees: A  Procedural
Straitjacket, 37  VAND.  L.  REV.  1233,  1258-59  (1984).
458  See Jones, 463  U.S.  at 362  n.10.
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tinguished  the  acquittee's  position  by  recognizing  that  an  insanity  ac-
quittal in the District necessarily  rested  on a finding beyond  a reasona-
ble  doubt that the defendant  had committed  a crime, and a finding by a
preponderance  of  the  evidence  that her  commission  of  the  crime  re-
sulted  from  mental  illness.459  The  Court  held  these  findings  to  be  a
sufficiently  reliable  predicate  for initial  commitment of an insanity  ac-
quittee. Moreover,  the risk allocation  analysis of Addington was inap-
plicable where the defendant herself asserts  and proves  her insanity and
a resulting criminal  act.460  Under  these circumstances,  it was even  ap-
propriate  for the defendant  to be  confined  for a  period  potentially  ex-
ceeding the maximum  sentence she could  have received  if she had been
convicted;  release  procedures  were  available should the defendant  cease
to  be  insane  or  dangerous,  and  Jones  had  not  challenged  their  ade-
quacy.4 1  Thus, the Court made  clear in Jones that  a criminal defend-
ant acquitted  on insanity grounds  can be  committed  initially  for treat-
ment  and  the  protection  of society,  at least  where  she  has  raised  the
defense  of  insanity,  her  criminal  act  has  been  proven  beyond  a
reasonable doubt, and its roots in insanity  have been demonstrated by  a
preponderance  of the evidence.
Congress  took  advantage  of the Jones holding  in  passing  the  In-
sanity Reform Act of 1984,462 actually one of a package of criminal  law
revisions  tacked  on  as  a rider  to  an appropriations  bill  shortly  before
the  1984  elections.  The'statute  represents  a  severe  crackdown  on  the
insanity  defense in the  federal  criminal  law. It redefines  the substance
of the  defense,  eliminating  its  "volitional"  component,4 63  and  requires
all federal  defendants  to prove  their insanity at the time  of the  offense
by  clear  and convincing  evidence.4"  For the first time,  automatic com-
mitment  of insanity  acquittees  is required  in all  federal  courts. 65  Ac-
quittees later seeking release  must demonstrate  their lack of dangerous-
ness;  the  standard  of proof  depends  on  the  nature  of their  crimes. 66
4, See id. at 363-66.  The  Court  rejected  the  notion,  championed  by  some lower
courts, of an unbridgeable  gap  between  insanity  at the  time of the  crime and  present
insanity. It found  that a  presumption  of continuing  insanity comported  with  common
sense  and remitted  an acquittee  asserting  changed  circumstances  to the  subsequent re-
lease  procedures. See  id. at  366.
460  See id. at  366-68.
461  See id. at 368-69.Jones,  however,  does not directly resolve issues regarding the
burden  of proof or other  procedures at  the  release  hearing. See id. at  363  n.11;  Wil-
liams  v. Wallis,  734 F.2d  1434,  1439  (11th Cir.  1984).
462  18 U.S.C.  § 20(a) (Supp.  II  1984).
46S  See id.; S.  REP. No. 225,  98th Cong.,  1st Sess.  225 (1983),  reprinted in 1984
U.S.  CODE  CONG.  & ADMIN.  NEws  3182,  3407.
4-  18  U.S.C.  § 20(b)  (Supp. II  1984).
465  Id. §  4243(a).
466  Id. §  4243(d)  (proof by clear and convincing  evidence  required  if offense  in-
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Nationwide  automatic commitment abolishes for the future  the discrim-
ination  challenged  in Cohen. 4 "  The  validity  of the  commitment  proce-
dures  follows  a fortiori  from Jones. Whether the  highly  restrictive  re-
lease  provisions  satisfy  due  process  remains  an  open  question.
2.  Analyzing  Cohen's Challenge
The  Cohen case reached  a D.C. Circuit panel  before the Supreme
Court's decision  in Jones. 4 68  It was  decided  by  the court  en banc, with
an  opinion  written  by  then  Judge  Antonin  Scalia,  after Jones, 4 9  but
before  the passage  of the Insanity Reform Act.  The  original panel had
some  doubt as to whether Addington outlawed the District's procedures
altogether  but avoided  this question  by  focusing  on the territorial  dis-
crimination  among  federal  defendants.70  Of  course, Jones settled  this
question  by  distinguishing Addington.
Cohen's  equal  protection  attack  rests  on  the  distinction  between
the treatment given to  defendants  acquitted of federal  crimes under the
United  States  Code471  in  the  federal  district  courts  in  the  states  and
defendants  similarly acquitted in federal  district court in the District of
Columbia. At that time, once  defendants outside the District persuaded
the  factfinder  that  there  was reasonable  doubt as  to  their sanity, they
could  be acquitted  and released. 4 7 ' 2  The federal  government  would not
seek to  confine them  for treatment  or incapacitation.473  In fact,  federal
law  did  not  really  permit  a  verdict  identifying  the  defendant  as  not
guilty  by  reason  of  insanity;  only  a  general  verdict  of not  guilty  was
volved risk of bodily injury or serious damage to property; otherwise proof by a prepon-
derance  of  the evidence  is  required).
4  7  The new standards  control in all  federal prosecutions except those for violation
of statutes applying only in the District  of Columbia.  See 18 U.S.C. § 42470)  (Supp. II
1984).
4"  See  United States  v.  Cohen,  No.  81-1036, (D.C.  Cir. March  5, 1982).
41  See  United States  v. Cohen,  733  F.2d  128  (D.C.  Cir. 1984).
470  See  United  States  v. Cohen,  No. 81-1036,  slip  op.  at 2,  7  & n.7  (D.C.  Cir.
March  5, 1982).
471  Codification  of  a  statute  in  one  Code  or  another  is  purely  formalistic,  and
should  have  no  effect  on  the equal  protection  question.  The  "U.S.  Code"  argument
Cohen  raised,  Cohen, 733  F.2d at  132, is a poor  proxy for  the real problem  of distin-
guishing  "local"  from  exclusively  "national"  legislation  within the  district. See  supra
text accompanying  notes  388-418. But see Note, supra note 423,  at 294.
47' See  Cohen, 733  F.2d  at  131;  Tydings,  A  Federal Verdict of Not Guilty by.
Reason of Insanity and a Subsequent Commitment Procedure,  27  MD.  L. Rav.  131,
131  (1967).
473  State officials  sometimes  cooperated  by bringing civil commitment  proceedings
against federal  acquittees.  See Cohen, 733  F.2d at  131;  United  States  v. McCracken,
488 F.2d 406, 416-17  (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Freeman,  357 F.2d 606,  625-26
(2d  Cir. 1966).
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authorized.' 7'
In the District, a special verdict  of not guilty by  reason of insanity
occurred  after  a finding  that the defendant  was otherwise guilty  of the
crime, and a finding  by a preponderance  of the evidence  that the crime
resulted  from insanity.7 5  Thereupon, the court  automatically  commit-
ted the defendant  to  St. Elizabeth's  Hospital, and the burden  was then
on  her to justify her release.'""  This was a pure location discrimination,
because  the variation turned on the location of the forum, which, under
criminal  venue  rules,  normally  depends on  the  place  where  the  crime
was  committed.'
77
The strongest response to the equal protection  argument  is that no
fundamental  right  is implicated  in the challenged  procedure.  The  Su-
preme  Court purported  to decide the relevant precedents  on rationality
grounds  and  has  never  recognized  a  fundamental  right  in  the  equal
protection  sense  in the  commitment  area. In fact,  the court  of appeals
en banc  reversed  the panel  on precisely  these grounds.
4'  Nonetheless,
because  the Supreme Court's actions have seemed to contradict its rhet-
oric  in  the mental  health  cases,  and  because  Cohen  presents  a  good
context  for  examining  the  nature  of federal  territorial  discrimination,
let  us  accept  the  contention  that  fundamental  rights  equal  protection
would  require  heightened  scrutiny  if  the  discrimination  were  not
geographical.
Automatic  commitment  of  insanity  acquittees  can  be justified  in
part  as an  action  taken  by  Congress  for the  benefit of the  District  of
Columbia. First,  because  there is only  one government  in the District,
if Congress does  not take responsibility for treatment of the mentally ill
there,  no state  will. Second,  Congress  is similarly  responsible for pro-
tection  of persons in the District from dangerous  acts that  insanity ac-
quittees may  later commit.  Other, possibly  less  legitimate,  purposes  of
commitment have been identified:  it may serve covertly to punish those
who have  escaped the criminal  sanction and it may deter excessive  use
474  See McCracken, 488  F.2d  at  418;  3  C.  WRIGHT  & K.  GRAHAM,  FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND  PROCEDURE  512 (1982).  The 1984 Act now authorizes a special verdict
of "not  guilty only by  reason of insanity."  18 U.S.C.  § 4242(b)  (Supp.  11 1984).
'75  See  D.C.  CODE  ANN.  §  24-301(c)(1)  (1981);  see also United  States  v. Jones,
463 U.S.  354,  364  (1983);  United  States  v.  Brawner, 471  F.2d  969,  1008  (D.C.  Cir.
1972)  (en  banc).
476  See  D.C.  CODE ANN.  § 24-301(d)(2)  (1981);  Cohen, 733  F.2d at  131.
477  See FED.  R. CRIM.  P. 18. See generally U.S.  CONST.  art. III, § 2,  cl.  3 ("The
trial of all Crimes ...  shall be held  in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed,  but when not committed within any State, the Trial  shall be  at such Place
or Places  as  the  Congress  may  by  Law have  directed.").
478  Compare Cohen, 733 F.2d  at 133-34, with id. at 150 n.*  (Mikva, J., concur-
ring) and United  States  v.  Cohen,  No.  81-1036,  slip  op. at  5-6  (D.C.  Cir. Mar.  5,
1982).
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of the insanity  defense.4"9  But putting these to  one side,  Congress  cer-
tainly  has  reason  for  being  particularly  concerned  with  the  future  of
insanity  acquittees  in the  District.
These  concerns  do  not  necessarily  extend  to  federal  insanity  ac-
quittees  in  the  states.  The  treatment  and  protection  rationales  do  not
depend on exclusively  federal  interests  but  rather  relate  to  a  state's
traditional  concern  for  the  welfare  of  its  citizens  in  both  the  police
power  and  the  parens  patriae  senses.  Leaving  such  decisions  to  the
states  well  serves  the interest  in  state self-determination  on which  this
Article  has focused.
480
The  method  suggested  earlier  for  identifying  permissible  federal
discrimination  validates  the  discrimination  challenged  in Cohen. First,
the  federal  policy  presses  more  heavily  on  fundamental  rights  within
the District  than without.  Second,  the policy that  Congress was  pursu-
ing  in the District  and  leaving to  the  states  elsewhere  implicates  local
general  welfare  powers,  not  exclusively  national  powers  of  Congress.
Third,  the federal  government  left the states  free to  create similar bur-
dens  on fundamental  rights within their own jurisdiction.  Congress did
not  interfere  with  state  adoption  of systems  of automatic  commitment
for  defendants acquitted  on insanity grounds in state courts.4 '  Nor did
it act to  preclude  the states from  committing  defendants  newly  acquit-
ted -on insanity grounds  in  federal  court.482
The last point requires  some amplification.  Congress did not go as
far  as it might  have in facilitating  state  policies  on  commitment.  Con-
gress did not adopt state law on commitment  of insanity  acquittees and
make  it binding  on  the  federal  courts.4 83  Nor  did  Congress  direct  the
federal  courts  in the states  to make  the findings  regarding proof  of in-
sanity  and  proof  of the  criminal  act  on  which  automatic  commitment
479 See generally Jones v. United States,  432 A.2d 364,  376-81  (D.C.  1981)  (Fer-
ren, J., dissenting),  affld,  463 U.S.  354  (1983);  Note, supra note 455,  at 607-17.
480  Congress expressly recognized  the federalism consequences  of nationwide auto-
matic  commitment  and  hesitated  on  those  grounds.  See  H.R.  REP.  No.  1396,  96th
Cong.,  2d Sess.  559,  561  (1980),  quoted in Cohen, 733  F.2d at  137-38.  Congress  re-
cently reversed  this policy  but still  urges  the  state  to accept responsibility  for  the  per-
sons  committed.  See  18  U.S.C.  § 4243(e)  (Supp.  11 1984).  With  federal  involvement
has  come  federal  regulation.  See  id. at  § 4243(0  (release  from  state  facility  to  be
sought in  federal  court); id. at  § 4247(i)  (standards to  be  established  for facilities).
481  Indeed,  numerous  states  do  have  them. See,  e.g.,  Jones  v. United  States,  463
U.S.  354,  370 n.20  (1983);  United States  v. Cohen,  733  F.2d 128,  131  n.7  (D.C.  Cir.
1984)  (citing  nine state statutes).
482  Cohen, 733  F.2d at  131.
481  One might doubt, however, how  fully this would further state self-government,
or whether the states would  prefer to interpret and  enforce their own laws  in their own
tribunals.  See, e.g.,  Pennhurst State  School  & Hosp. v. Halderman,  465 U.S.  89,  103-
06  (1984).
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proceedings  in the District were  based.4 84  It is possible that the absence
of  those  findings  at  the  criminal  trial  would  prevent  the  states  from
committing  an insanity  acquittee  without a  further hearing.  Neverthe-
less,  these obstacles to  precise  identity between  state and District prac-
tice  do  not implicate  equal  protection  concerns  or  vitiate the contribu-
tion  to  self-government  made  by  Congress's  leaving  mental  health
policy to the  states. Congress  provides machinery  for  enforcement of all
the laws of the District without similarly supporting  enforcement of the
laws of the states.485 Some degree  of duplicative investment  in the legal
machinery  is inherent in the separate  existence  of the states  as contem-
plated  by  the  Constitution.'  This  division  of  labor  may  sometimes
work unnecessarily to the advantage  of citizens of the states, in compar-
ison  to those  in the more unified  government  system of the District  of
Columbia.4 8 7  But  the  failure  of the  federal  government  to  involve  its
personnel  in enforcing  state law does  not eliminate the democratic  value
served  by Congress's  self-restraint.
Thus,  even  if fundamental  rights  are at  stake, the territorial  dis-
criminations  present in Cohen should  be excused  from heightened scru-
tiny and should  be upheld if rational. Congress's  decision  to tailor fed-
eral  criminal  procedure  to  its  mental  health  policies  for  the  District,
while  leaving  the  states  to  craft  their  own  policies  and  procedures
outside the  District, is  unquestionably  rational.
The opinion  of three judges concurring  in the judgment  of the en
banc  court  in  Cohen  advocated  an analysis  somewhat  similar  to  that
described  here.' 8  Pursuing Judge  Wright's argument in United States
v.  Thompson,8 9 Judge  Mikva  emphasized  the distinction  between  ac-
tion taken by  Congress  "in  its capacity  as local  sovereign"  for the Dis-
4  Such findings  are  being made under the  new  federal  law.  See supra text ac-
companying  notes  465-66.
4"' This includes  not only the  fiscal  support of the  local police  force,  but the ser-
vices  of the  United  States  Attorney  as  prosecutor  for the  District,  and  United States
District Court jurisdiction  over local  criminal  offenses.  See, e.g.,  Note, supra note 423.
486  See,  e.g., Pennhurst, 465 U.S.  at  103-06;  Tarble's  Case,  80 U.S.  (13  Wall.)
397, 406-08  (1871).
487  See,  e.g.,  Swain  v.  Pressley,  430  U.S.  372  (1977)  (habeas  corpus  proceeding
before article III judge unavailable in the District); District of Columbia v.  Carter, 409
U.S.  418  (1973)  (§  1983  action  unavailable  to  District  residents);  Note, supra note
423,  at  324-25  & n.165  (discussing  advantages  to prosecution  resulting  from joinder
opportunities  in the District).
4'  See  United  States  v.  Cohen,  733  F.2d  128,  141-50  (Mikva,  J., joined  by
Robinson,  C.J., and Wright, J.). Judges Mikva  and Wright formed  the original panel
majority that initially  accepted  Cohen's  argument.
488  See 452 F.2d  1333 (D.C. Cir. 1971)  (holding that the postconviction  bail  pro-
visions of the District of Columbia  Court Reform  and Criminal  Procedure Act of 1970
apply only-to  persons  convicted of purely  "local"  offenses).
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trict  and  action taken  by  Congress  "as  a national  legislative  body.) 490
When  Congress  acts as  a local  sovereign,  and  federal  law  permits  the
states  themselves  to  do  what Congress  has  done,  then equal  protection
analysis  simply has no application.491  The  difference  between  the Dis-
trict  of Columbia  law and  federal  law  in the  states  should  thus  be  as
immune from scrutiny as differences  between laws  of the  states, and for
the  same  reason:  because  persons  in  their  respective  domains  are  not
"similarly  situated"  with  respect  to  the  enacting  legislatures.492  This
rule  covered  the  situation  in  Cohen,  for  the  concurring judges  con-
fronted  the  issue  left  open  by  the majority  and  concluded  that  states
could  adopt  procedures  for  automatic  commitment  of  federal  acquit-
tees.49
"  Accordingly,  Congress  was  acting  as  a  state  could,  and  equal
protection  did not apply.  In contrast, where  Congress acts as a national
legislature, it may only discriminate against the District of Columbia in
situations  where  it  could  discriminate  identically  against  one  of  the
states.494 Incorporation  of local law  is  not  discrimination,  even  though
the  local  rule  for  the  District  is  also  written  by  Congress. 95  Where
Congress adopts a uniform rule in the states, and a different rule  in the
District,  however,  normal  equal  protection  principles  do  apply. 96  In
fact,  equal  protection  may  have  slightly more  bite than usual  here be-
410 See  Cohen, 733  F. 2d  at  141-42  (Mikva, J., concurring).
491  See id. at  142. It  is unclear from  the opinion  whether  "federal  law"  includes
constitutional  barriers or only legislative  barriers. See id. The opinion's conclusion  that
state  courts  could  match  the  federal  procedure  because  automatic  commitment  would
not unduly  burden the right  to raise an insanity defense  in federal court, see id. at 148,
suggests  that  the  concurring judges  may  have  had  only  the  preemption  argument  in
mind.
492 See id. at  144.
41"  Compare id. at  142,  144,  148  (concurrence)* with id. at  131  n.8  (majority).
Although  this  is an  open  question, it has  been  mooted by  the  new federal  provisions.
41  See id. at  143 (Mikva,  J., concurring).
415 See id.
4" See id. at 144-45. For  example, under the analysis  of the concurring judges,  if
Congress made it a federal crime to murder a federal officer  and prescribed  a stiff term
of imprisonment  in  the  states  but the  death  penalty  in  the  District,  equal  protection
principles would  apply. See id. My own  analysis  of this example is that  because  Con-
gress  has apparently  left the  states  free  to enact  their own  statutes imposing  the  death
penalty for  murder  of federal  officers,  and  because  protecting  federal  officers  against
murder is  not  exclusively  a  national  power, the  discrimination  here  should be  treated
no differently  from that in Cohen. That  Congress  chose to enact a death penalty  appli-
cable only  in the  District  of  Columbia  rather  than enacting  a  separate statute  for the
District and  codifying  it in the D.C.  Code is  a matter of form not substance. If, on the
other  hand, Congress  prohibited  the states  from applying  their murder statutes  to the
killing  of federal  officers  and then  imposed  the death penalty for  such  killings only in
the District,  a more troubling  equal protection issue would arise (although the Supreme
Court  has  never  applied heightened  scrutiny to  the classifications  employed  in  meting
out capital  punishment).
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cause  of the  District's  unrepresented  status.497
The  Cohen  majority  brusquely  rejected  this  analysis  in  a  foot-
note.498  Equal  protection,  then Judge Scalia wrote,  does not depend  on
whether  Congress  acts  in a  "local"  or  a "national"  capacity.  Congres-
sional  preemption  of state  lawmaking  authority  would  not affect  Con-
gress's power to  discriminate against the  District. Any  statute applying
only within the District is ipso facto  an exercise  of Congress's plenary
authority  to  enact  local  legislation.4 9 9  Furthermore,  the  existence  of a
separate  grant  of  legislative  authority  over  the  District  demonstrates
that enactment of legislation applying only within the District is always
rational.
5 00
It should  come as no surprise  that I regard  the Cohen concurrence
as  closer  to  the mark than  the majority.  I  believe the  concurrence  errs
in suggesting  that  no equal  protection  scrutiny  applies  when  Congress
acts  in its  local  capacity. 501 I also  disagree  with its  method  for  distin-
guishing the  exceptional national  legislation  and preemptive  action that
subjects  congressional  discrimination  to normal  equal protection  analy-
sis.5"2 Nonetheless, I believe  the concurrence emphasizes important  fac-
tors  whose  relevance  the majority  utterly  rejects.  Congress  cannot  al-
ways  discriminate  against  or  in  favor  of  the  District of  Columbia," 0 3
and when it does, the extent to which  Congress leaves  the states free to
mimic  its  actions  is  crucial  in  determining  the  kind  of justification
equal  protection  principles require.
4  See id. at  145-46.
,  See id. at  132-33  n.10.
4'  See id.
50  See  id. at  138-39.  Judge  Scalia  also  noted that  the  legislation  was  rational
because it served important federalism interests and because  Congress could believe that
the  District had special needs with  regard  to crimes  committed  by the mentally  ill.  See
id. at 137-38.  But  he regarded the existence of a separate constitutional power  address-
ing the  District  as  being  sufficient  to  sustain  the  discrimination  even  without  these
factors.  See id. at  139.
801  See  id.  at  141-42  (Mikva,  J.,  concurring).  I  would  argue  that  the  rational
basis test  always applies, though  it would  be easily  satisfied in  every instance  that the
concurrence  regards  as  "local"  legislation.  I  believe the concurrence  is wrong  to carve
up  Congress  into  two  distinct  conceptual  entities,  and  then  to  treat  the  limits  equal
protection  places on Congress-as-local-sovereign  as  equivalent to those  equal protection
places  on  Maryland-as-state-legislature.  The  States  are distinct  governments,  and  the
fourteenth amendment  treats  them as such;  the federal  government  is one  government
and should  be  treated accordingly.
802  See id. The  concurrence's  "national"  category  is far broader than  the narrow
category of action justifiable  solely by  nationwide powers, and  its definition of preemp-
tion apparently  includes  cases where the states are  free to equalize the situation. See id.
601  Although the concurring judges devote most of their attention to discrimination
against the District, they appear to treat discrimination  favoring the District as compa-
rable to discrimination  favoring one  of the states. See id. at 142,  147.  Of course, I agree
with this analysis.
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B.  The School Finance Cases
The other  example  that I would like to discuss  concerns  intrastate
discrimination  in educational  opportunity  resulting from  inequalities in
school  district  wealth.  The  discrimination  arises  from  the  fact  that
states  assign  local  school  districts  both  the  responsibility  of providing
free  public  education  and  substantial  responsibility  for  financing  this
education  but give them grossly unequal revenue sources,  primarily  tied
to  the  local  property  tax  base,  from  which  to meet  their responsibili-
ties.5°4  In San Antonio Independent School District v.  Rodriguez,5 0 5
the  Supreme  Court  indicated  that  such  discrimination  would  be  sub-
jected  to strict  scrutiny  if education  were  a fundamental  right for  pur-
poses  of  the  equal  protection  clause  but  rejected  this  premise  on  the
grounds  that  the  federal  Constitution  did not  single out  education  for
special  protection.506  That holding  does  not deprive the example  of all
practical interest,  however, for three reasons:  first, because the Supreme
Court  has  left  open the possibility  that it may  some  day  recognize  ac-
cess  to  a  minimally  adequate  public  education  as  a  fundamental
right; 5 07 second,  because the analysis  of school  finance is instructive  for
other  situations  where  the  differing  fiscal  capacities  of  local  govern-
ments  lead  to  unequal  distribution  of fundamental  rights;  and  third,
because  school  finance  litigation  continues  at  the  state  constitutional
level.  Every  state  constitution  contains  guarantees  respecting  educa-
tion,5 08 and several state supreme courts have concluded that they must
travel  a road  not  taken  by  the United States  Supreme  Court. 509
State courts have  interpreted a variety of clauses  in their constitu-
tions  as  imposing  constraints  equivalent  to  those  of the  federal  equal
o  The literature  on this  topic is voluminous.  See, e.g.,  J. CooNs, W.  CLUNE  &
S.  SUGARMAN,  PRIVATE  WEALTH  AND  PUBLIC  EDUCATION,  (1970)  [hereinafter  J.
CooNs]; Developments in the Law-The Interpretation  of State Constitutional  Rights,
95  HARV.  L.  REV.  1324,  1444-59  (1982)  [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Fu-
ture Directions  for School Finance  Reform,  38  LAW & CONTEMP.  PRoBS.  299 (1974);
see  also  Pauley  v.  Kelly,  255  S.E.2d  859,  893-94  (W.  Va.  1979)  (listing  a
bibliography).
505  411  U.S.  1 (1973).
o  See id. at  16-17.
o  See  Papasan  v.  Allain,  106  S.  Ct. 2932,  2944 (1986).
508  See  Developments in the Law, supra note  504, at  1446.
09  See, e.g.,  Dupree  v. Alma  School Dist.,  279  Ark.  340, 651  S.W.2d  90  (1984);
Serrano  v.  Priest,  18  Cal.  3d  728,  557  P.2d  929,  135  Cal.  Rptr.  345  (1976),  cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907  (1977);  Horton v. Meskill,  172 Conn.  615, 376 A.2d  359 (1977);
Robinson  v.  Cahill,  62 N.J.  473,  303  A.2d  273,  cert. denied, 414  U.S.  976  (1973);
Seattle  School  Dist. v.  State,  90 Wash.  2d 476,  585 P.2d  71  (1978);  Pauley  v.  Kelly,
255  S.E.2d 859 (W. Va.  1979);  Washakie County  School Dist. v. Herschler,  606 P.2d
310  (Wyo.),  cert. denied, 449 U.S.  824  (1980).
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protection  clause.510  Three states have relied on such  clauses as the ba-
sis for striking down discriminatory schemes  of school  finance.511 Other
states have  avoided  recourse  to  a  potentially  rigid equal  protection  ra-
tionale  by invalidating unequal  financing  schemes  directly  as violations
of  state  guarantees  of  education;  some  of  these  decisions  leave  equal
protection  questions  open.51 2  Other  states  have  not  yet  ruled  on  the
school  finance problem.  If a state adheres to a constitutional doctrine of
equal  protection  sufficiently  similar to the federal  doctrine to make the
framework  outlined  in  this  article  relevant,  how  should  it analyze  a
school  finance  case?
Not surprisingly,  I  will argue  that  the proper  approach  to school
finance cases  depends on the nature of the school  finance scheme under
510  See Developments in the Law, supra note 504, at  1472-74,  1481-82; see, e.g.,
Serrano, 18  Cal.  3d  at 763  n.40, 557  P.2d at  949  n.40,  135  Cal.  Rptr. at  365  n.40
(CAL.  CONST.  art. I.,  § 7(a): "A person  may not  be deprived of life, liberty or property
without  due  process  of  law  or  denied  equal  protection  of the  laws.");  Horton,  172
Conn.  at  619  n.3,  376  A.2d  at  362  n.3  (CONN.  CONST.  art  I,  §  1:  "[Equality  of
Rights.]  All men when  they  form a social compact,  are equal in rights; ...  no man or
set of men  are  entitled  to exclusive  public  emoluments  or privileges  from  the commu-
nity.";  CONN.  CONST.  art. I,  § 20:  "[Equal  Protection.  No Segregation or Discrimina-
tion.]  No  person  shall  be  denied  the  equal  protection  of the  law  nor  be  subjected  to
segregation  or discrimination  in the exercise or enjoyment of his  civil or political  rights
because  of religion,  race, color, ancestry  or national  origin.");  Washakie County School
Dist., 606 P.2d at 332 (Wyo.  CONST.  art. I, § 34:  "All  laws of a general  nature  shall
have  [a]  uniform operation."). But see Thompson  v. Engelking,  96 Idaho 793, 802-04,
537  P.2d  635,  644-45  (1975)  (questioning whether  strict  scrutiny exists  under  Idaho
equal  protection  clause,  IDAHO  CONST.  art. 1, § 2:  "All  political power  is inherent  in
the  people.  Government  is instituted  for their  equal  protection  and  benefit,  and  they
have  the  right  to alter, reform  or abolish  the  same whenever  they may  deem  it  neces-
sary;  and  no  special  privileges  or  immunities  shall  ever  be  granted that  may  not  be
altered,  revoked, or  repealed  by the  legislature.").
511  See Alma School Dist.,  279  Ark. at  340,  651  S.W.2d  at  90  (Arkansas);  Ser-
rano, 18 Cal. 3d at 728,  557 P.2d at 929,  135  Cal. Rptr. at 345  (California); Washakie
County School Dist., 606 P.2d at 332 (Wyoming);  see also Board of Educ. v. Nyquist,
83 A.D.2d  217,  239-44, 443 N.Y.S.2d  843,  857-60  (1981)  (education  not "fundamen-
tal"  but  intermediate  equal  protection  scrutiny  applies),  rev'd, 57  N.Y.2d  27,  439
N.E.2d  359,  453  N.Y.S.2d  643  (1982)  (only rationality  test  applies);  cf. Hartzell  v.
Connell,  35  Cal.  3d  899,  921-26,  679  P.2d  35,  50-54,  201  Cal.  Rptr.  601,  616-20
(1984)  (Bird,  C.J., concurring)  (proposing  that equal protection  forbids public  schools
from  charging students to  participate  in  extracurricular  activities).
New  Jersey has  taken a more  flexible  sliding  scale approach  to equal  protection,
which  does  not require categorization  as a fundamental  right  to increase  the  level  of
scrutiny applied to educational disparities. See Abbott  v. Burke,  100 N.J. 269,  295, 495
A.2d  376,  390  (1985).
512  See,  e.g.,  Horton, 172  Conn. at  646-51,  376  A.2d at 373-75  (relying on  "ap-
propriate legislation"  provisions of education clause,  CONN.  CONsT. art.  8, § 1); Robin-
son,  62 N.J. at 492-501,  303 A.2d at 283-87 (relying on "thorough  and efficient system
of free  public schools"  guarantee of N.J. CONST. art. 8,  § 4, par. 1); Abbott,  100 N.J.
at 269,  495 A.2d  at 376 (leaving  equal protection  issues open); Seattle School Dist., 90
Wash.  2d at 510-18,  585  P.2d at 91-99  (relying  on clause declaring  "paramount  duty
of the state to make  ample provision for  the education of all children,"  WASH.  CONST.
art.  9,  § 1).
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challenge.  At  the  extremes,  some  methods  of  school  finance  clearly
amount  to  state-imposed  discrimination  that  violates  equal  protection,
while others  should  be  regarded as constitutional  because  any  resulting
inequalities  are purely the result of democratic  choice under  an  uncon-
strained  system  of local  self-determination.  Intermediate  school finance
systems,  however,  bring  us  onto  contested  terrain,  where  resolution  of
the school  finance issue turns  on  a debate  between  competing  visions  of
local  self-determination.
1.  Easy  Cases
Take  first  the  easiest  case:  the  state  does  not  permit  the  local
school districts  to pay for education,  except out of direct grants from the
state,  which  are  grossly  unequal  in amount. 51 3  This  is  clearly  a local
option  law  imposing  unequal  constraints  on  different  districts,  con-
straints  that  are wholly  of the  state's  manufacture.  Under  the  frame-
work  outlined  above,  the  discrimination  should  be  subjected  to height-
ened scrutiny  if education  is  a fundamental  right.
Suppose instead  that a  state  assigns  local  school  districts  primary
responsibility  for  financing  public  education;  that  it  requires  them  to
raise  the  necessary  funds  solely  from  taxes  levied  on real  property  in
the district;  and that it imposes a ceiling on the local property  tax rate,
one  that makes it  impossible for  the property-poor  districts lawfully  to
raise  as much as the property-wealthy  districts spend.  Such constraints
were not unheard of in the wake of the "tax  revolt"  of the  1970's, and
an  often-overlooked  but  important  footnote  in  the  Supreme  Court's
opinion in Rodriguez left open the  possibility that  such  a system  could
be held  unconstitutionally  irrational,  even if education  were  not a fun-
damental  right.514  Assuming  that  public  education  is  a  fundamental
right at the state  constitutional  level, a system of this kind should not be
excused  from  heightened  scrutiny.  It  too  represents  a  restricted  local
option  scheme,  in  wvhich  the state  has  provided  the different  localities
with very  different menus of choices for the scope of fundamental  rights
within their limits. The system does not give reign to local self-determi-
nation-the  property-poor  district  is  forbidden  by  state  law  to  exert
further taxing effort  or to seek  any other source  of revenue that  would
enable it to match  the educational  offerings  of the richer district. This
513  Inequality  of resources  or expenditures  in the  school finance  literature  gener-
ally  means  inequality  of  amounts  calculated  on a  per pupil  basis.  Other  adjustments
sometimes  have to be made to reflect local  variations  with unusual  effects on costs. See,
e.g.,  Washakie County School Dist., 606  P.2d at  336.
s14  See 411  U.S.  at  50  n.107.
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system  is functionally  the  same  as  the first and  should  be  subjected  to
heightened  scrutiny.
The case  remains  easy  even  if we  modify the example further, by
assuming that  state  law  also  authorizes  the district  to spend  on educa-
tion any money it receives  from some additional but unreliable  revenue
source, say,  bequests to the district from philanthropists  (subject to suit-
able controls on  the district's  actions to make sure that the bequests are
wholly  voluntary).  The  district  is  thereby  given  another  means  for at-
tempting  to  increase  its resources,  but no  legal  authority  that  guaran-
tees  an  increase.  If, as  a factual  matter,  the amounts  that districts  can
routinely  raise  by  soliciting  charitable  bequests  are  insignificant  in
comparison  to their school  budgets, then this scheme  is not realistically
different  from  the  previous  ones.  Practically  speaking,  the  powers
granted  to  the  districts  by  the  local  option  are  not  substantially
equivalent, and  the resulting variations  in educational  offerings  should
be  regarded  as  a  state-imposed  discrimination  subject  to  heightened
scrutiny,  not  an excusable  exercise  in  local  self-determination.
2.  Harder  Cases
The  usual  scenario  in  school  finance  litigation  is  substantially
more  difficult  than  the  foregoing  examples.  The state  makes  available
to the local  school  districts  a number  of funding  sources, among which
the  local  real  property  tax  is  quantitatively  dominant.  There  is  nor-
mally no legal  ceiling  on  the property  tax rate  that  a district  can  im-
pose; the limitations  are practical ones.  A property-wealthy  district can,
with minimal  effort, raise amounts that  the property-poor districts  can
match only by abandoning all other municipal  services, by taxing them-
selves at a rate that no electorate  will endure, or  by doing both.515 But,
in principle at  least, the option of catching up with the spending  levels
of the property-wealthy  district is neither illegal nor impossible for the
poorer district. Is this then a local option scheme that should be excused
from heightened  scrutiny?
One partial response may be to focus on the artificiality  of limiting
educational  resources  to  the  proceeds  of  a  property  tax.  There  is  no
natural law principle that public  education must be  financed  primarily
515  See,  e.g.,  Serrano v.  Priest,  18  Cal. 3d 728,  769,  557 P.2d  929,  953,  135  Cal.
Rptr. 345,  369  (1976),  cert. denied, 432 U.S.  907  (1977).  It must  be recognized  that
comparing tax efforts is  an empirically and conceptually  difficult  undertaking, due both
to  issues  of "municipal  overburden,"  see id. at  757-60,  557  P.2d at  945-47,  135  Cal.
Rptr. at 361-63, and  to the controverted  degree to which property tax  rates are capital-
ized into land values. See, e.g.,  Gurwitz, The Capitalization  of School Finance  Reform,
5 J. EDUC.  FIN.  297  (1980);  Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note  201,  at  1733-35.
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from a tax levied  on real property.  Generally  the state withholds  from
the  poorer  district  other  taxing  methods,  including  levying  excises  or
personal  or corporate  income  taxes  within  its  boundaries.  If a  district
with a  relatively  poor  property  tax  base has  a relatively  rich  base  for
some  other taxing method,  and  if granting  the district the authority  to
levy such  a tax would  enable it to match  the expenditures  of property-
wealthy  districts without unreasonable  effort, then once  more the  deci-
sions  the state  has  made in drafting its local option  scheme are respon-
sible  for  the  substantially  inequivalent  choices  made  available  under
that scheme to the  various districts.516  The state  itself has handicapped,
for  example,  the  property-poor-but-income-rich  district,  and  unequal
opportunities  for the  exercise of the right to education will flow inevita-
bly  from  the state's  restriction.  Before  laying  too  much  stress  on  this
discrimination,  however,  I  should acknowledge  the limited  application
of the example:  all too  often,  the tax  bases  of some  property-poor  dis-
tricts  would be  inadequate  under any wealth  measure.517
Rather  than  dwell  on  this  partial  response,  therefore,  I  want  to
confront  directly  the hardest example. Assume  that the districts are  ei-
ther  rich  or poor  by  any  wealth  measure,  and  that  so  long  as  their
taxing jurisdiction  is  limited  to  their  physical  boundaries,  no  taxing
method will  enable districts  imposing  reasonable tax rates on their low
tax bases  to  catch up with the spending of the wealthier  districts.  The
state  may  point  to  the  absence  of  legal constraint  on  the  poorer  dis-
trict's tax rate and argue that the decision not to impose  an "unreason-
able"  tax  rate  is  purely  a  matter  of local  choice.  But  the challengers
will then  point to  a different legal  constraint:  state law unequally  con-
strains the districts in their choices because it limits their taxing author-
ity to  a local tax base. The extreme  inequality  of sacrifice  required for
a  poor  district  to  catch  up  with  a  rich  district  still  results  from  the
state's  definition  of their taxing powers.  "The quality  of public  educa-
tion may  not be a function  of wealth other than the total wealth  of the
state."
518
611  See,  e.g.,  Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  at  25-27  (discussing  weakness  of  correlation
between district wealth and family wealth); Serrano, 18  Cal. 3d at 793-96,  557 P.2d at
969-70,  135  Cal.  Rptr.  at  385-86  (Clark,  J.,  dissenting);  Washakie  County  School
Dist. v.  Herschler,  606  P.2d  310,  319  (Wyo.),  cert. denied, 449  U.S.  824  (1980);  cf.
Comment, A Statistical  Analysis of the School Finance  Decisions: On Winning Battles
and Losing Wars, 81  YALE  L.J.  1303,  1323-28  (1972)  (showing that, in  Connecticut,
poor  families  tend to live in  property-wealthy  districts).
117  See, e.g.,  Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  at 26-27 ("[T]he  wealthiest  few districts  in the
sample have the highest median family incomes  and spend the  most on education,  [and]
the several  poorest districts have  the lowest family incomes  and devote  the least amount
of money  to education.").
518  J.  CooNs,  supra note  504, at 304.
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The  state  will reply  that limitation  to  a local tax base  is different
from  limitation  to  a  property  tax.  Communities'  decisions  under  any
local option law regarding fundamental  rights will depend on their esti-
mates  of  the  local  trade-offs  between  promoting  exercise  of the  right
and  achieving  countervailing  government  interests.  The  urgency  of
those countervailing  interests is  likely to vary from community  to  com-
munity. For example, the traffic congestion of an overcrowded  city may
dictate  a  more  restrictive  policy  on  parades  than  a  rural  setting;  the
greater  proportion  of children  in a  suburb  may  intensify  the  need  for
controlling the dissemination  of sexually explicit materials. The essence
of municipal  self-government  lies  in a local  institution's  weighing local
costs  against  local  benefits.  Limiting the districts'  taxing jurisdiction  to
their physical  boundaries  is part of the process of making the  local op-
tion  an exercise  in  self-determination.  Only  in  this way  will  the  tax
burdens of each  district  be determined  by  the district's  own  choices.
The  challenge  and the state's  defense  are based  on competing  vi-
sions of the  nature  of local self-determination.  The challenge  contends
that  the  unequal  resources  of  the  districts  must  be  viewed  as  conse-
quences  of  state  allocations,  positive  state  actions.  The  resulting  ine-
qualities in the districts' capacities  for  affording fundamental  rights are
similarly attributable to the state and vitiate the claim that the state has
simply  left  the  level  of educational  opportunities  to  local  option.  The
state's reply treats the fiscal capacities  of the districts as natural endow-
ments, and the ability to determine one's  local tax burden  as an insepa-
rable  part  of  self-determination.  Under  this view,  to  say  that  a  local
government  cannot  afford a choice  is simply to say that local conditions
render the  choice  unwise in the  opinion of the  local  electorate.
Resolving  this debate thus requires a greater refinement of the op-
erative  concept  of  self-determination  than  we  have  heretofore  found
necessary.  In  a  sense,  this  is  the  core  of  the  school  finance  de-
bate-whether local governments  should be viewed as autonomous indi-
viduals,  endowed  by  "natural"  geological,  sociological,  and  economic
forces  with resource  pools  from  which  they  can  sustain themselves,  or
whether they should  be viewed  as interdependent  members  of a  larger
state community,  who have been allocated  certain resources  by  law but
have  no inherent  claim  on  those  resources  immune  from  their  neigh-
bors'  call  for redistribution.  This is a replay of the debate  on the pub-
lic/private  distinction  in  the  field  of. private  property, 51 9  except  that
here the defenders  of the status quo are attempting to blur the public/
519  See, e.g.,  Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Broth-
ers  v.  Brooks,  130 U.  PA.  L.  REv.  1296  (1982);  Kennedy,  The  Structure of Black-
stone's Commentaries, 28 -BUFFALO  L.  REv.  205,  348-49  (1979).
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private  line  and  give  the  school  district  the  role  of  the  private
individual.
Both  visions  of local  self-determination  have  their  proponents,
5 20
and my  purpose here is more to  show that this conflict  is the  key issue
in equal protection  analysis  of this class of school  finance cases, than to
persuade  the reader  of the  correctness  of my own  choice between  them.
But  briefly,  I would  argue  that  the  state  should not be  able to  escape
responsibility  for  its  unequal  fiscal  endowment  of  its  municipalities.
The attempt  to maintain some  form of the public/private  distinction  is
deeply  embedded  in our  constitutional  law,  and  public  school  districts
are  an  unlikely  candidate  for  privatization. 52  None  of  our  constitu-
tions, state or  federal,  views  a state  as a  confederation  of autonomous
municipalities.  The  grant  of  some  extraterritorial  taxing  authority  to
local governments  is hardly a novelty.522 In most states, the state role in
educational  policy  and school  finance  is already  substantial.52
1  It may
also be worth observing that the Supreme  Court majority  in Rodriguez
upheld the Texas  finance scheme  on  the grounds that  local  fiscal  con-
trol was rationally  related to fostering local  autonomy in setting  educa-
tional policy,  not fiscal policy,  and  that  it  indicated  that  the  scheme
was  not necessary  to  achieving  any  compelling  government  interest.
5 24
Even the majority was not prepared  to  accept  as a given that local au-
tonomy  may  be restricted  to  use of local  resources.
520  Compare Serrano, 18 Cal.  3d at 772-73,  557  P.2d at 955-56,  135  Cal.  Rptr.
at  371-72  and J.  COONS,  supra  note  504,  at  14-23  with  Buse v. Smith,  74  Wis. 2d
550,  571-72,  247 N.W.2d  141,  151  (1976)  (invalidating  negative  aid program  to pro-
tect  right  of wealthier  districts  to  tax and  spend) and East  Jackson  Pub.  Schools  v.
Michigan,  133 Mich. App.  132,  140 n.12,  348 N.W.2d  303,  307  n.12 (1984)  (stating
that the petition  to intervene of individual  taxpayers and students  to protect "the  right
to  determine  their own  educational  financing  through self-taxation"  should have  been
granted)  and Vieira,  Unequal Educational Expenditures: Some  Minority Views  on
Serrano  v.  Priest,  37  Mo. L. REv.  617,  629  (1972)  (stating  that wealthy  districts  are
entitled  to spend more  because  they  raise  more).
521  See,  e.g.,  Plyler v. Doe,  457 U.S.  202  (1982)  (equal  protection  forbids  denial
of public education to undocumented alien  children); Ambach v. Norwick,  441  U.S. 68,
76  n.6,  78  n.8  (1979)  (equal protection  permits  state  to deny  resident  aliens  employ-
ment as  teachers in  public, as opposed to private,  schools,  because such  teachers act as
agents of the state).  Compare Rendall-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)  (procedural
due process  not required  in firing of employee  by  privately  operated school under gov-
ernment  contract)  with Cleveland  Bd.  of  Educ.  v. Loudermill,  470  U.S.  532  (1985)
(procedural  due process  required  in  firing of  employee  by public  school).
522  See,  e.g.,  R.  MADDOX,  EXTRATERRITORIAL  POWERS  OF  MUNICIPALITIES  IN
THE  UNITED  STATES  74-79  (1955);  16  E. MCQUILLEN,  THE LAW  OF  MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS  § 44.91  (3d ed.  1984);  Anderson, Extraterritorial  Powers of Cities, 10
MINN.  L.  REv.  564,  569-72  (1926).
828  See,  e.g.,  Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  at 45-48; id. at  126-27  (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing);  S.  GOLDSTEIN,  LAW  AND  PUBLIC  EDUCATION  63-65  (1974);  E.  REUTTER  & R.
HAMILTON,  LAW  OF  PUBLIC  EDUCATION  109-12  (1970).
524  See Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  at  49-55  & nn.108  & 109.
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If  this  answer  is  accepted,  then  school  finance  schemes  that  rely
heavily on  local tax bases  should not be excused  from  heightened scru-
tiny in  those  states  where  education  is a  fundamental  right.  As  in the
easier  cases,  the  school  finance  scheme  is  a  defective  local  option  law
that unequally constrains  the  respective  districts. It must  be  recognized
that this argument  is quite general  and would apply  to  more than just
education.  If there  is a fundamental  right in the equal  protection  sense
to  receive  some  government  benefit  or  service,  then  to  the  extent that
substantial  inequalities  going  to  the  essence  of the right  would  result
from  unequal  constraints  on  the  revenue-raising  abilities  of  different
local  government  units,  the  same  conclusion  follows.  The  state  cannot
assign operational  and  fiscal responsibility  to local units without giving
them comparably  adequate revenue  sources. This reasoning should  po-
tentially be applicable  to  constitutionalized  welfare  rights and rights to
legal  counsel  as well  as to education.  The  remedial implications of this
argument  may  daunt  a  court  that  is  contemplating  recognition  of  a
right to government  services as a fundamental  right for equal protection
purposes,  but this  is what such  recognition  should  entail.
3.  The  Other Extreme-District  Power  Equalization
The state's interest  in local autonomy reenters the case  in a differ-
ent  fashion,  however,  once  the  state  has  been  directed  to  eliminate
funding  inequalities traceable  to  its allocation  of revenue  sources.  Is it
sufficient for the state to equalize the revenue sources of the local units
or  is  the  state  also  obliged  to  make  certain  that  the  local  units  avail
themselves  equally  of the resources?25
One means of reconciling wealth neutrality with local autonomy  is
the technique  known  as district power  equalization.  In this system, the
state breaks  the link between  the wealth  of the district and the educa-
tional opportunity  of its children  by ensuring that  all districts  exerting
equal  tax  efforts  can  raise  equal  amounts  for  education-part  of the
revenue  comes  from the  local tax base,  and the state makes up the dif-
ference  between  what the district  has actually  raised and what a richer
district  exerting  equal  effort  would  raise. 526  This method,  expounded
by  Professors  Coons,  Clune,  and  Sugarman  in  their  influential  book
825  State constitutions  may, of course, guarantee  local  districts  the right  to deter-
mine their own taxing or spending levels. This  is a distinct  issue from the constitution-
ality  of a  state  assigning  local  districts  disparate  revenue sources.
526  See,  e.g.,  Serrano  v. Priest,  18  Cal. 3d 728,  747,  557  P.2d 929, 939,  135  Cal.
Rptr. 345,  355  (1976),  cert. denied, 414 U.S.  907  (1977);  J. COONS, supra note 504,
at  200-44.
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Private Wealth and Public Education,52 7  is predicated  on the idea that
breaking that link resolves  the equal protection  dilemma.  The courts of
California,  Wyoming,  and  Connecticut  have  based  their  reforms  on
that  idea,  though  without  committing  themselves  to  district  power
equalization  as  the  remedy.5 28
If,  as  we  have  been  assuming,  state  constitutional  law  subsumes
the  state  and  its  political  subdivisions  in  a  single  guarantee  of  equal
protection,  then  the  decisions  of  different  districts  to  exert  different
levels  of  taxing  effort  combine  to  form  a  discrimination  imposed  on
their  school  children  by  the state government.  Nonetheless,  these  deci-
sions are independently  arrived at by the democratically elected govern-
ments  of  the local  districts  faced  with  equal  resource  pools,  not  con-
strained inequalities  resulting from discriminatory actions of the central
state  government.  Under  both  views  of  self-determination  described
above,  selections made  from among options  equally available  to all dis-
tricts at equal effort  constitute genuine self-determination.  Accordingly,
if the state  equal  protection  doctrine  treats  the independent  actions  of
municipalities the way that federal  equal protection  does, then the  deci-
sions  of different  school  districts  to provide  different  degrees  of educa-
tional opportunity  for the children  of their respective  electorates will be
excused  from heightened  scrutiny. Thus  the framework  advocated here
would  be consistent  with  local autonomy  in  setting educational  policy.
This resolution  of the potential  attack on district  power equaliza-
tion differs in route, though not in result, from an explanation that may
be implicit in the literature and in the cases. If district power  equaliza-
tion  is  a  less  restrictive  alternative  for  achieving  a  state's  compelling
interest in district autonomy,  then district power  equalization may  also
be  deemed  necessary  to  achieve that compelling  interest  and  therefore
be found to be  constitutional.52 9  But how compelling is the state's inter-
est  really?  District  autonomy  is  not  a  consistently  pursued  objective;
states  typically  regulate  substantial  aspects  of  educational  policy  on a
527 J.  COONS,  supra note  504.
2I  See Serrano, 18 Cal.  3d at 746-48, 557 P.2d at 983-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 354-
55  (identifying  fiscally  neutral  alternatives);  Washakie  County  School  Dist.  v.
Herschler,  606  P.2d  310,  332  (Wyo.)  (requiring  only  fiscal  neutrality),  cert. denied,
449  U.S.  824  (1980);  Horton  v.  Meskill,  172  Conn.  615,  652,  376  A.2d  359,  376
(1977)  (recognizing  compatibility of local  control with state's responsibility to "equalize
the  ability of various towns  to finance  education").
529  See,  e.g.,  Serrano, 18  Cal. 3d at 768,  557  P.2d at 953,  135 Cal. Rptr. at 369
(state interest in local control  illusory so long as  dependence on property tax base limits
control  for poorer districts); J.  COONS, supra note 504, at 431-32 (apparently assuming
constitutionality  of either  district power  equalization  or  "family  power  equalization,"
i.e., letting each family set its own effort  level and equalizing  the resources available to
families  at each  level); id. at  203  (apparently  defending  district power  equalization).
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statewide  basis.53 0  Thus, the  state's  education  laws,  including  the  fea-
ture  of  district  power  equalization,  are  unlikely  to  be  "precisely  tai-
lored"  to achieving autonomy.5"'  Furthermore, district autonomy in set-
ting  effort levels  cannot  be justified  as maximizing  parents'  freedom  of
choice  in determining  the level  of education  for their children.  Rather,
it sacrifices  a child's educational  aspirations  to the  fiscal  preferences  of
a  majority in her  community." 2  Nor does  district  autonomy  in setting
effort  levels  serve  the state interest  in a well-educated  child  that led to
the adoption of statewide  compulsory  education  laws  in the first  place.
A district's  freedom to exert a degree of effort unusually  low within the
state serves  only the tautologous interest  in collective  decisionmaking  at
the particular  geographical  level  chosen  by  the state.  A  district's  deci-
sion  to deemphasize  education will normally  result from the desire  of a
majority of its taxpayers to keep for  themselves the money that a better
education  would  require,  or to  have  the  local  government  spend  it  on
other projects not involving fundamental  rights. Is the state's interest in
fiscal  policymaking  by  the  community  compelling  enough  to  override
the  equal  protection  rights  of the children? 5" 3  We  would  not  say,  for
example,  that  the state has  an interest  in collective  fiscal  decisionmak-
ing  at  the  local  level  compelling  enough  to justify  a  county  in saving
funds  for  other  purposes  by  denying  a  free  transcript  to  its  indigent
criminal  defendants.5 4  As I have argued persistently in this Article, the
mere effectuation  of the majority will  is not itself a compelling interest.
Rather,  the defense  of district power  equalization is not an application
of strict scrutiny but an exception to strict scrutiny.  Local autonomy,  in
530  For example, state  statutes often prescribe  what courses will be offered in pub-
lic schools.  See S. GOLDSTEIN,  supra note  523,  at 63.
531  Moreover,  states  sometimes permit  some  students to attend  school  in  districts
other  than  their  own,  at  the  expense  of their  home  district,  because  of particularly
suitable  educational  opportunities  available  in  the host  district. See,  e.g.,  MASS  ANN.
LAws  ch.  76,  § 12  (Law  Co-op  1978).  This  further qualifies  the states'  claim that a
child's  educational  opportunity  must  be  defined  by  the  political  choices  of her  own
district.
83"  See  Michelman,  Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment,  83  HARv.  L.  REv.  7,  50-54  (1969).  Coons,  Clune,  and  Sugarman  ap-
peared to regard  community control  as  constitutionally permissible in J. COONS,  supra
note 504, at 203,  but Coons and  Sugarman condemn it as unjust in  later writings. See,
e.g.,  Coons  and  Sugarman,  Family Choice in Education: A  Model State System for
Vouchers, 59  CALIF.  L. REv.  321,  339  (1971).
533  The problem  may appear especially  troublesome  when the minority consists of
poor  parents  dependent  on  the  public  schools,  and  the  majority  consists  of wealthy
parents  who  send  their  children  to  private  school  and  childless  adults.  Citizens  who
have  no  children,  or  no  desire  to  send  the  children  they  do  have  to  public  schools,
cannot  be  excluded  from  school  district  elections.  See  Kramer  v. Union  Free School
Dist., 395  U.S.  621  (1969).
834 See Griffin  v. Illinois,  351  U.S.  12,  19  (1956).
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the  sense of tolerance  for  the independent  actions  of self-governing  po-
litical  subdivisions,  survives  equal  protection  review  only if  it  is  built
into the structure  of the  analysis.
I believe  that  recognizing  the  exceptional  nature  of the  local  self-
government  defense in  geographical equal  protection cases makes possi-
ble a coherent  account of the  role of "local  autonomy"  in school finance
litigation.  An  equal  protection  analysis  must  grapple  with  the  ques-
tions:  "Why  is  the  state  responsible  for  saddling  a  poor  child  with  a
low property  tax base,  but  not for  saddling  her  with a  community  in-
different  to  her  needs?"  and  "Why  does  'local  autonomy'  justify  in-
terdistrict  inequalities  but not  interracial  inequalities?"  Manipulation
of the balance  in applying  the  compelling  interest test  provides  a rhe-
torical means  for announcing a result once it has been reached but gives
no guidance  for resolving  these and related  cases. I hope  that identify-
ing  the  preference  for  local  self-determination  as  an  historically
grounded  exception  will  help  place  proper  limits  on  the  child's
misfortune.5 5
CONCLUSION
I have tried  to  argue  in this  Article that injustices  should not be
overlooked  merely  because  the  injured  class  is geographically  defined.
Courts have  traditionally been  uncomfortable  with claims  of territorial
discrimination,  rightly  perceiving  that  territorial  classifications  are not
inherently  suspect  and that some  tolerance of territorial  discrimination,
even  with  regard  to fundamental  rights, is  necessary  for  local  govern-
ment to continue. But the recurring instinct to ban geography  from the
scope  of equal  protection  is  too  blunt  a  response.  Provincial  rivalries,
between  North and South, between  town and country, between  upstate
and downstate,  illustrate the  need to  shield fundamental  rights  against
selective  disrespect,  even  from place  to  place.
The  absence  of  a  self-conscious  approach  to  these  problems  has
left the courts to resolve individual cases without a consistent backdrop.
This  puts equal  protection  values  at  risk.  By  isolating  the interest  in
local self-determination  as the key to analysis  of geographical  discrimi-
nations,  it should  be  possible  to  preserve  equality  without imposing  a
rigid uniformity.
'" Even  disparities  resulting from  autonomous  local  decisions  pursuant  to a dis-
trict power equalization  scheme may  violate state  constitutional  provisions  that put  re-
sponsibility directly on the state's central  government to ensure  the adequacy and thor-
oughness  of  public  education.  See,  e.g.,  cases  cited  supra note  510.  It  is  unclear
whether this  can  be  regarded  as  an  equal  protection  issue, or whether  it  is  purely  a
matter  for  resolution  under  direct  substantive  review. Cf supra note  329.
[Vol.  135:261